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Situations of disagreement are a very common occurrence, possibly even
the norm, in most types of human interaction. At the same time humans
spend a great deal of energy seeking to eliminate disagreement and reach
a consensus. From the most private kinds of interactions, e.g. a group of
friends planning to go to the movies, to the most difficult scenarios, like
global diplomacy, consensus is looked for among all classes and occupations:
politicians, physicians, businessmen, and also scientists.
In a large part of the contemporary world, large crowds resolve their
disagreement by democratic means, such as voting, political representation,
and other mechanisms. That is not the case, however, for small groups where
the room for debate is larger, and disagreement can be resolved by other
means than the complex procedures in place in democracies and other large
electorates. In most situations, in small and informal groupings of people,
disagreement is resolved “naturally” by the dynamics of interaction among
the members of the group.
Imagine a group of friends planning to visit the Van Gogh museum in
Amsterdam; under normal conditions, if there is initial disagreement it is
easily resolved, although the larger the group becomes, the harder it may
be to accommodate everyone’s preferences. Nonetheless, there are groups
where for the magnitude of what is at stake, or the complexity of the subject
of disagreement, it is harder, in some cases even impossible, for the natural
mechanisms of human interaction to provide a resolution of disagreement
which is good for all or for most.
These are circumstances where the decision that has to be taken has
important consequences for the decision makers or those whom they represent,
where the interests and personal or group preferences are very high, or else
where the issue is particularly complex to be decided on. In all those
cases resolving disagreement can be a very difficult task, one that requires
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sophistication and analysis both of the subject of disagreement and of the
possible mechanisms for resolving it.
How do small groups, in particular purposive groups — groups with a
specific intent or goal — in situations where the state of disagreement to be
resolved is complex and rests on strong interests, resolve their conflict and
reach a consensus? This will be one of the central question of this thesis.
It is clear that there are a number of ways to approach that question.
Epistemology mostly takes the problem of disagreement and consensus
independently on the topic or matter that is the subject of disagreement. This
is a quite abstract approach, but the analyses contained in the literature on
epistemic disagreement and consensus have provided very valuable analytic
tools to the investigation of the question mentioned above. Among many of
these tools are the so called consensus models, as well as a taxonomy of the
possible stances, and their correlated justifications, that an epistemic agent,
who is faced with a situation of disagreement, may adopt. The first part of
this thesis will deal with the problem of disagreement from a mostly abstract
viewpoint, the chosen viewpoint of most contemporary epistemology.
Disagreement and consensus, however, are particularly interesting in prac-
tical contexts. The question “What, exactly, is the subject of disagreement?”
is an important one for most practical considerations on how to resolve a
situation of disagreement, and possibly achieve a consensual resolution of a
conflict. In the light of that, the possible choices were many, as to which
specific context to address; therefore some arbitrariness was necessary. I
chose, for this work, to focus my analysis on disagreement in economics.
While, as I said, the choice is clearly in part arbitrary and dictated by
personal inclinations, it is nonetheless the choice of a subject that is highly
debated in contemporary civil society.
Everyone would like to have more agreement in economics, or at least in
that part of the science that is concerned with policy making. Among the
many reasons why, is that fact that everyone would like to be able to see
more clearly what the connection is between the science itself and the policy
and decision making it supports. Disagreement, and especially widespread
and methodological disagreement, however, do not help that cause. In the
second part of this work I analyze the formation of consensus in the economic
sciences and among the so-called “economic experts”. The problem, I will
argue, is equivalent to the search for a core of institutional knowledge in
economics; to wit, a core of principles and facts around which institutions
can build their economic policies and strategies.
More consensus, at least according to some, implies also more responsi-
bility. The very last part of the thesis stands as a corollary analysis on the
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question of how small groups can resolve disagreement. The thesis analyzed
in the final section is that groups who possess a specific mechanism for
reaching consensus, or at least convergence, of views, should also be held
responsible for the consequences of their views. Such groups, in broad strokes,
possess many of the features that we normally attribute to individual agents
and, like individuals, should be deemed responsible for their actions. This
is the third part of this thesis, and while it constitutes a relatively minor
contribution to the rest of the work, its goal is to open a window on some
issues that are related to the capacity of small groups to form a consensus.
In the following, I will introduce each part of the thesis in more detail.
I start here from the first approach to consensus and disagreement,
the epistemological one. One can not fail to notice that there are many
reasons of philosophical interest in the topics of consensus and disagreement,
as the literature testifies. Recently, in the 1970s, at least two important
philosophical results pointed to a puzzling conclusion: “Reasonable” people
cannot disagree. More precisely, once a group of rational epistemic agents
discover that they are in disagreement, and engage in exchanging evidence
and opinions, they should not disagree any longer than the time it takes for a
consensus to be formed. In other words, resilient disagreement is irrational.
The results just mentioned, which point to the irrationality of resilient
disagreement, are Aumann’s agreement theorem (Aumann 1976), and Lehrer
and Wagner’s model for consensus (Lehrer and Wagner 1981). While
Aumann’s theorem and the Lehrer-Wagner model are based on very different
frameworks (the former on Bayesian and the latter on linear updating) they
reach the same conclusion, namely that “actual disagreement among experts
must result either from an incomplete exchange of information, individual
dogmatism, or a failure to grasp the mathematical implications of their
initial stage [of disagreement].” (Lehrer 1976, 331). Aumann, on the same
note, concludes that “people with the same priors cannot agree to disagree.”
(Aumann 1976, 1236)
According to Aumann, Lehrer and Wagner, it is the mathematics and
the principles of rationality which bind us to a resolution of our situation of
disagreement. After their work, however, the problem of disagreement did
not see much development, apart from the technical development related
to Aumann’s results (see the review article, Bonanno and Nehring 1997),
until the past decade when the literature on disagreement started growing
significantly in epistemology. As of January 2011, the entry ‘epistemology
of disagreement’, on the popular philosophy website www.philpapers.org,
counts 52 entries, most of which have been published in the past ten years.
Epistemologists of disagreement would like to know what role their
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disagreement with another epistemic agent has, with respect to what they
should believe on the subject they are disagreeing about. The central
question they try to answer is “what should you do when you discover that
someone firmly disagrees with you on some claim P?” (Frances 2010, 1).
There are three main answers to that question. The steadfast position
(see Kelly 2005) claims that, when disagreeing with an epistemic peer1,
you should simply stick to your own beliefs, because disagreement does not
provide any type of evidence to the fact that you might be wrong in holding
whatever beliefs you have. Instead, according to the precautionary position
(see Feldman 2007), upon disagreement with an epistemic peer on a certain
matter you should suspend your judgment on that matter. While prescribing
an epistemic attitude, the precautionary position does not provide a practical
course of action; it may be legitimate, for the purposes of decision theory, to
take different stances with respect to how to act, upon suspension of belief
on a certain problem.
Finally, the conciliatory position (see Christensen 2010) — the one on
which this thesis will focus, in chapters 2, 3, and 4 — defends the claim
that a rational agent should take disagreement as evidence and update her
opinion accordingly, moving closer to the disagreeing partner’s own view. In
order to defend such view one needs to assume that beliefs come in degrees.
Obviously some cases of disagreement are not compatible with conciliatory
positions, when one’s beliefs allow only binary values — 0/1 or ‘yes’/‘no’ —.
Recall for a moment the story of king Solomon and the two mothers in 1
Kings 3:16-28. Both mothers were claiming a newborn as their own, one of
the two mother’s newborn having died shortly after birth. In conciliatory
spirit, King Solomon suggested to split the baby in two halves, one for each
of the mothers. This is an evident case where the conciliatory spirit fails to
give the right answer, as King Solomon understood in all his wisdom.
Despite the aforementioned case and similar others — see for instance
Sen’s story of the three children and a flute (Sen 2009, 13-15) — there are
many examples of situations where disagreement is on a continuous value,
thus open to the mathematical treatment presented in this thesis. What
rate of inflation a government should aim at, what a feasible and significant
CO2 emission-cut goal is; those and several other scenarios allow for the
type of treatment the conciliatory position defends.
The first question that this thesis will attempt an answer to, then, is on
1More on the notion of “epistemic peerhood” will be said in chapter 3 (see, in
particular, section 3.4). In general, an epistemic peer is someone who has your same
cognitive abilities, access to evidence, and so on, on the matter that is the subject of
disagreement.
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the issue of disagreement and “rational consensus”2.
Query 1. Is it possible to form rational consensus by applying the
principles of mathematical rationality, when faced with a situation of
disagreement?
Query 1 can be divided into several subquestions. In the first place, what
is the difference between consensus and compromise? Not all resolutions
of disagreement are the product of a consensus; they can be imposed with
force, negotiated in a compromise, and so on. Moreover, is disagreement
evidence for changing one’s beliefs, as Christensen and Kelly claim? (Kelly
2005; Christensen 2009) And if so, what type of evidence is disagreement?
All of the above are mostly epistemological problems, and their formu-
lation is by necessity somehow idealized in order to make them formally
tractable. On the other hand, it was said earlier in this introduction that
disagreement and consensus are also very practical issues in many disparate
fields, among which is the field of science. In science, disagreement is nor-
mally about theories and/or methodology. Consensus instead, for instance
in the phrase “scientific consensus”, is often used to mean a number of
accepted propositions about a specific scientific problem. Such propositions
are accepted by the relevant scientific community, without implying that each
single scientist of that community has personally endorsed the proposition
word by word, or has personally investigated the issues and come to endorse
their truthfulness.
“The Scientific Consensus represents the position generally agreed
upon at a given time by most scientists specialized in a given
field.”3
According to Kuhn, a consensus is the set of propositions accepted at
a certain stage of a science and agreed upon among the majority of the
scientists that are part of a so-called scientific paradigm. “Men whose
research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules
and standards for scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent
consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal science [. . . ]” (Kuhn
1970, II - The Route to Normal Science). But how does a paradigm form?
2The phrase “rational consensus” is used in the work of Lehrer and Wagner, which
will be central to the first part of this thesis. It will be clarified in the following chapters
what the meaning (or, as we will see, meanings) or rational is.
3From the website of the non-profit international organization GreenFacts. URL:
http://www.greenfacts.org/glossary/abc/consensus.htm.
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Are there so-called rational factors alone — viz. evidence and testing — that
play a part in the formation of such consensus, as the ideal of the scientific
method implies? Is the scientific method, by which disagreement disappears
(at least provided sufficient evidence) and science progresses, suitable for all
sciences as a normative theory of consensus formation?
In economics, the methodological prescriptions of the rational view and
the ideal of the scientific method, have gone a long way in influencing the
way economics is done. Some paradigmatic methodological prescriptions
are contained in the views expressed in Friedman (1953). Even though
his concept of ‘positive economics’ has been extensively investigated and
refined4, the essential mechanisms of hypothesis formulation and empirical
testing have been interpreted mostly in the sense typical of the natural
sciences, and of physics in particular. That is to say that hypothesizing and
testing are based, respectively, on mathematical and computational means,
and on statistics and experiments.
Modeling and testing are by large considered the rational criteria by
which a certain scientific consensus should be evaluated. Although critiques
and corrections have come from many sides of philosophical and scientific
inquiry, the appeal of a rational method — one based on a common language
and shared and verifiable evidence — is hard to deny, also perhaps because
it seems to work so well in so many sciences. Despite the appeal, it is clear
that economic knowledge comes from a variety of sources, experiments (in
some cases and according to some even thought experiments), modeling,
statistic analysis, economic history and the list could continue. Is there a
method then for discriminating and ranking among these sources?
The second question at the core of this thesis is about economic method-
ology and its relation to the formation of economic consensus.
Query 2. Can we formulate some criteria on the basis of which a specific
economic consensus can be evaluated as acceptable or not acceptable,
by the community of scientists, and possibly policy makers, who are
involved with that received consensus?
The ultimate depository of scientific consensus, at any rate, are the
scientists themselves. But what is the relation between the science itself, the
scientist, and the application of economic knowledge, regardless of whether
it derives from theories, experiments, history, experience or other sources?
4A number of scholars of economic methodology have contributed in 2009 to a volume
dedicated to an analysis and review of Friedman’s famous essay The methodology of
positive economics (see Mäki 2009).
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A certain picture in the economic world, and defended by economist
Jeffrey Sachs, sees the scientist as the apothecary in front of the chest
of drawers containing his materia medica5. According to the metaphor,
the economist is like the apothecary when she chooses a certain medical
substance, or a mixture of them, in order to cure a specific condition. The
economist has at her disposal a number of mathematical models, has evidence
from experiments, is aware of statistical analyses, and perhaps also possesses
historical knowledge of the type of problem she is faced with. While it is
unlikely that a single item of her knowledge — a mathematical one, or a
historical one — will provide a cure for all “economic illnesses”, a capable
economist will use her judgment to select those items that are needed for a
specific cure from her economic chest of drawers.
Beyond the metaphor, Jeffrey Sachs reckons that an economist’s expertise
is limited, and that in order to resolve economic problems in the real world
one needs to resort to a variety of theories (items of knowledge, the drawers
in the metaphor). Sachs himself embodies the figure of the practitioner
economist, involved in advising several governments in Europe and Latin
America, during their transition from communist to market-based economies.
Is the picture of these apothecary economists, like Sachs, or Anders
Åslund — Åslund and his role as advisor to the Russian government is
described in Angner (2006) — an adequate one for the resolution of economic
problems, the formulation of economic plans, the construction of economic
tools and so on? Or should we rely on committees, rather than individuals,
like the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England (see Budd
1998)? The advocacy of the power of groups, crowds, and in the cases
discussed in this thesis especially teams, over that of individuals has spurred
from various scientific fields in recent decades and will be analyzed in the
second half of this thesis.
While groups take over the role of individuals, as for example committees
take over individual experts (or should take over, as theorists of group power
suggest), a question is left as to what type of responsibility these groups
should have. With power, goes the old saw, comes responsibility, but the
statement is not always true in practice, as the status of individual anonymity
behind the group can hide guilt and blur responsibilities. It seems necessary
then to have at least some account of group responsibility, if one is to defend
the idea of groups as providers of economic consensus.
The third and final question, then, is related to the responsibility of
5I owe this picture to my supervisor, Pieter Ruys. He was presented with the concept
of the economist as apothecary by famous economist Jeffrey Sachs, who in personal
conversation was defending such idea of the role of an economist in the field of real
economies and concrete economic problem.
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groups.
Query 3. What features should belong to a group seeking consensus,
for example in economics, in order for it to be also held accountable for
the actions it performs?
Far from developing a theory of corporate responsibility, the final section
of the thesis will start from a prominent contemporary account, Pettit and
List’s account on group agents and group responsibility, and develop it by
first asking whether the account is sound, unsound, or needs revisions and
corrections.
To conclude this section, following are the summaries of the individual
chapters.
In chapter 2 I introduce the Lehrer-Wagner theory of consensus and
its interpretations. I present the mathematics of the model and illustrate
how it fits possible interpretations. The core of the analysis will be on
how to defend the Lehrer-Wagner model for consensus as a realistic or a
normative model. In order to provide a comparison, I will present two similar
mathematical models, which are part of the same theory of consensus. While
the Lehrer-Wagner model is commonly defended as an aggregation model
(Lehrer and Wagner 1981), I will argue, instead, that the model can be best
defended as an updating model. This will be the main conclusion of chapter
2.
Provided that the Lehrer-Wagner model can be defended as an updating
model, the question is whether it is rational to update one’s beliefs in the
light of disagreement (cf. Query 1, above). Chapter 3 deals with that
problem. As mentioned in this introduction, probably the two main answers
to the problem of disagreement come from Aumann’s theorem and the
Lehrer-Wagner model, the former in a Bayesian framework and the latter
in a linear updating one. In chapter 3 I will discuss both approaches to
disagreement. While some remarks and disclaimers will be in place, I will
conclude that disagreement does not constitute evidence on which to update,
and therefore does not justify a conciliatory view on disagreement.
Chapter 4 contains a mostly programmatic discussion of how the for-
mation of consensus can be investigated with formal tools such as the
Lehrer-Wagner model. Drawing from the conclusions in chapter 3, the model
need not be considered a truly consensual model, but can be taken as an
aggregation one, similar to a sophisticated voting mechanism6. In fact, it
6Many years after the publication of their work (Lehrer and Wagner 1981), Wagner
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can be taken as a voting mechanism that conveys a great deal more informa-
tion at the group level than, for example, majority voting does. Chapter 4
investigates the Lehrer-Wagner model as an aggregation model, and provides
a strategy for one of the unsolved problems in the original formulation of
the Lehrer-Wagner model, namely the assignment of weights.
In the second half of the thesis, the focus moves from the abstract
treatment of the problem of disagreement in an epistemological context, to
the problem of disagreement and consensus formation in the sciences and
in particular in economics. In chapter 5, I present the topic of consensus
as treated by philosophers of science, and present a number of reasons why
consensus is a desirable outcome in a scientific debate. I then discuss the
problem of the origin of consensus, the desideratum of rational consensus,
and illustrate a standard example of the application of the canons of scientific
rationality in the physical sciences. The final section of chapter 5 will analyze
a number of phenomena typical of the economic and social world, which make
the standard scientific method of consensus formation partly inapplicable in
economics.
Chapter 6 continues the previous chapter along the same lines. The
question now is to try to provide a positive account of consensus formation
in economics. After reviewing some alternative sources of knowledge in
economics, other than modeling and testing, I discuss the problem of expertise
and argue that economic experts are the primary and also irreducible source
of economic knowledge and economic consensus. The meaning of that
irreducibility will be discussed when explaining the role of experience and the
concept of tacit knowledge in economics. In the final sections of the chapter, I
will provide a brief and schematic illustration of the biases and shortcomings
related to expert judgment, and present two models for directing expert
judgment. The thesis defended at the conclusion of chapters 5 and 6 will
be that, while the role of expertise in economics is not reducible to the
application of the rational methods of modeling and testing, there are
methods for reducing biases in expert judgment that can be applied to
economic theorizing.
In chapter 7 I will discuss the problem of responsibility in small com-
mittees, for example the committees of experts referred to in the previous
two chapters. While the topic is not new, and a number of theories of
corporate responsibility exist, the chapter will start the discussion from
Pettit and List’s theory of group agency and responsibility. Pettit (2007)
was indeed convinced of this fact, that the model is a particularly advanced aggregation
mechanism, rather than an updating model. I thank Carl Wagner for sharing his views
on the matter in personal conversation.
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argues that group agency implies group responsibility. I will discuss the three
conditions the authors give for group responsibility and argue that there
are counterexamples to Pettit’s thesis. Finally, I will add two additional
desiderata to Pettit and List’s conditions, and argue why the addition is
important for avoiding the type of counterexamples I previously illustrated.
Chapter 2
The Lehrer-Wagner model
2.1 Consensus and compromise models
The practice of using the term ‘consensus’ in different and often incompatible
ways is reflected by the variety of studies that deal with the problem of
consensus. From a purely definitional point of view, achieving a consensus
in a group means finding a general agreement or identity of judgment among
a number of initially different opinions. By contrast, a compromise can be
defined as the decision to settle on a statement (or set of statements) even
though the members of the group have not, internally, come to fully endorse
a unique subjective judgment identical (or similar enough) to that of all
other members of the group.
It is important to point out that the meaning of agreement, in this
context, is restricted to the context of belief, whereas, in general, agreement
can refer to actions as well. For example, we can agree to do something
because we have reached a consensus or a compromise on what course of
action to take, as a group. On the other hand, if we agree on something
(e.g. whether the arguments in this chapter are cogent or not) we therefore
have a consensus, not a compromise.
I can then define here a consensus as an internal convergence of beliefs
among the members of a group, whereas a compromise is an external (imposed
or chosen) agreement to accept a belief as the belief that is endorsed by the
group. The term ‘convergence’ refers here to the outcome of the process
of deliberation, aggregation, or any other suitable process that can lead
to consensus. More on the different processes in section 2.1.1. The term
‘internal’ indicates that the justification for the consensual belief is “accessible
by the mind”, in conformance with the common philosophical distinction
between internalism and externalism in epistemology.
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The foregoing definitions will guide the following discussion of different
consensus models, which, albeit the fact they all use the same term ‘consensus’
in the “name tag”, they in fact serve very different purposes and produce
very different results.
2.1.1 Two families of models
A number of linguistic or logic-based models1 are called ‘consensus models’
in the sense that they use a logical or mathematical function in order to
extract a unique value from a set. In other words, these models produce
convergence of logical or mathematical values, and are essentially aggregation
algorithms (see Xu and Da 2003), to wit, methods for aggregating beliefs
or information. Normally, the goal of aggregation functions is to satisfy a
number of properties2 selected on the basis of a specific desideratum (or
set of desiderata), for instance, to have a democratic social choice function.
Formal properties are the main criteria of evaluation of linguistic or logic-
based models, even though the properties themselves might be justified on
independent grounds, such as ethical, practical, or other reasons3.
However, linguistic models are consensual only insofar as they produce
an artificial form of agreement — as convergence of mathematical or logical
values — by means of algorithmic methods. From the point of view of
linguistic or logic-based models, consensus is a purely logical phenomenon,
that is, identity of values from an originally diverse set. The rationality of
such models is often grounded on the overall plausibility of the procedure
(e.g. as said before, satisfaction of properties), but no mention is normally
made about the convergence of beliefs (the agreement) implied in the notion
of consensus as defined above. In other words, the agents involved in these
types of models need not be belief-bearers, and there is no requirement
that consensus be produced as the convergence of individual beliefs, in the
internalist epistemological and psychological sense given in section 2.1.
A second branch of studies on consensus goes under the name of “con-
sensus decision making”, and comprises a number of “models” (more often
only sets of institutionalized practices) that can be applied in group de-
1For some representative examples, see Herrera-Viedma et al. (1995) and Herrera et
al. (1997).
2Any aggregation function has the principal role of aggregating information, beliefs,
or other values; this is what separates them from other types of functions. Functions that
aggregate, however, are compared and evaluated among each other on the basis of their
capacity to satisfy a number of (desired) formal properties.
3Pioneer of this type of work was Kenneth Arrow, whose impossibility theorem set the
ground for future Social Choice Theory research and its ramifications (see Arrow 1963).
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liberation in order to reach consensual decisions. These are, for example,
medical consensus models (widely used by the U.S. medical community,
see Solomon (2007)), consensus models in legal theory, and political and
economic consensus models like the Dutch Polder Model (see Schreuder
2001; Plantenga 2002). The term ‘consensus’, in this context, is often used
more as a metaphor, or as an ideal that the models in question should
approximate. In fact, consensus need not mean, in the case of these models,
a full convergence of logical or mathematical values: A supermajoritarian
decision, for example, can be considered a consensus, even though evidently
a full convergence of values might not have been reached by the whole voting
group.
Consensus models in this second family produce genuine consensus in
the sense that they take into account the convergence of beliefs among the
bearers of beliefs, the agents of the group. However, they normally fail
to provide a concrete and precise method for achieving complete or even
partial convergence, or the method is so demanding that it can only lead
to consensus in very special cases. For example, unanimity voting produces
consensus in the sense that it both provides an algorithm for full convergence
and is based on the psychological convergence of the beliefs of the agents
in the group, yet it produces consensus so rarely that it can hardly be
considered a valid alternative to voting or algorithmic procedures in a great
many practical situations.
Similarly, the Polder Model is an institutional procedure by which dif-
ferent parties involved in a decision are made to sit down at the same
deliberative table and discuss in order to reach a decision that satisfies and
is suitable to all or at least most parties involved. The procedure is called
consensual because it stresses the communitarian aspect of deliberation, but
it does not guarantee that the full convergence of values will be reached, nor
that such convergence will be a consensus rather than a compromise.
2.1.2 The Lehrer-Wagner model
The Lehrer-Wagner model is meant to be both a deliberative model and an
algorithmic one. It is deliberative in the sense that it produces a consensus
of opinions among a group of rationally deliberating individuals, and it is
algorithmic because it guarantees the production of consensus under a wide
range of conditions; specifically, according to Lehrer (1976) and Lehrer and
Wagner (1981), under a minimally rational set of conditions4.
4The mathematical and rational conditions for consensus will be discussed, respectively,
in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.
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The model has the goal of producing a real consensus, rather than just a
compromise: All the dissenting members of a group, if rational, will agree
with the aggregate value, which is a function of their original individual
values. The Lehrer-Wagner shows an impossibility result similar to Aumann’s
impossibility of disagreement theorem (see Aumann 1976): Rational agents
who recognize the nature of their dispute cannot fail to agree, at least given
the minimal set of conditions under which the model converges, on the
numerical value produced by the model.
The first class of models discussed in section 2.1.1 was meant to produce
convergence of mathematical or logical values, no matter what these values
represent. The second class, discussed in the same section, was meant to
promote a certain degree of agreement among belief bearers (epistemic,
political, economic agents), no matter whether such agreement is complete
or only partial, truly consensual or perhaps the result of some bargaining
process. The Lehrer-Wagner model tries to link the two tasks, by presenting
a mathematical and algorithmic method for producing convergence of views
among belief bearers.
In the next section I will present the details of the model, that is, its
mathematical structure and its interpretations and possible applications.
The rest of this chapter will analyze the Lehrer-Wagner model, together
with two related ones, and analyze whether they can be truly considered
algorithmic models for consensus.
2.2 Outline of the model
Imagine a relatively small committee of international scientists, who are
asked to estimate a suitable and feasible CO2 emission cut for international
emission cut enforcement. The committee may be composed of people
possessing diverging scientific knowledge, different agendas and different
degrees of commitment to the necessity of finding a consensus. Alternatively,
consider a company’s board of directors, whose members are asked to assess
the performance of the company’s CEO and of some key managers, in light
of a recent investment on a product and its market performance.
Let us assume that the goal of both committees is to agree on an official
position, that is, to find the consensual stance of the board. The question
the Lehrer-Wagner model addresses is whether such ideal committees can
rationally end their sessions in disagreement. The answer from Lehrer and
Wagner (1981) is that they cannot. Whether such analysis is correct will
be the problem of this chapter, after having introduced the Lehrer-Wagner
model in more details in the remainder of this section.
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2.2.1 The mathematical model5
The Lehrer-Wagner model produces a consensus by means of iterated
weighted averaging of the beliefs (expressed, for example, in form of proba-
bility assignments) that the members (agents) of a group hold on the issue
under deliberation.
In the forthcoming paragraphs I will illustrate the model step by step.
In the first stage the agents in the model (the committee members) assign a
certain measure mij to themselves and to all others, where m ∈ [0, 1] and
where i is the agent assigning the measure, and j is the agent receiving it.
These measures form a N ×N matrix W , with entries wij , where N denotes




The matrix W is called the “matrix of weights” of the Lehrer-Wagner model
and is exemplified below.
W =

w11 w12 . . . w1N
w21 w22 . . . w2N
. . . . . . . . . . . .
wN1 wN2 . . . wNN
 (2.1)
In the second step, agents provide their judgment p on the subject
matter on which the group is deliberating. These judgments form a column









W and P make up the initial information-set, that is the situation in
which all members of a group have assigned a certain measure to their fellows
(the interpretation of this will be provided in subsection 2.2.2) and have
expressed their belief on the subject matter. Normally, the entries in P
will differ from each other, denoting the fact that a consensus has yet to be
5An early exposition of Lehrer’s theory of consensus can be found in Lehrer (1976),
a presentation of the mathematical model appeared in Wagner (1978). For two previous
expositions of the underlying idea, and formal theory of consensus, see French (1956)
and DeGroot (1974). The complete exposition of the Lehrer-Wagner theory of consensus,
the mathematical model, and an extension of it, are in Lehrer and Wagner (1981). Most
of the discussion in this chapter will be based on this latter work. In the chapter I will
only present the basic version of the model, in appendix A I will briefly present also the
extended version.
16 CHAPTER 2. THE LEHRER-WAGNER MODEL
reached. When the entries in P will be equal to each other (or approximately
so, if we pragmatically agree on a certain degree of approximation) then the
model will be said to have reached consensus, meaning that all members of
the group are holding the same opinion on the subject matter.
In the following I will explain how the mathematical model goes from a
state of dissensus to one of consensus. By multiplying the matrix of weights
k times and then by the column of probabilities P , that is W kP , a theorem
shows that, under certain conditions, the values of the obtaining column PC
will be equal to each other as the powers k of W rise.
(Column of consensual probabilities) PC = W
kP for k →∞ (2.3)
The conditions for convergence are that the weights in each row of W
be normalized (as explained above), and that there be a “chain of respect”.
The concept of chain of respect is clearly metaphorical, but it is formalized
by Lehrer and Wagner, and plays an important role in Lehrer and Wagner’s
model of consensus (Lehrer and Wagner 1981, 129-133, see also Theorem
7.4). The authors explain the concept as follows: “Convergence towards
positive consensual weights results from iterated aggregation if there is a
chain of positive respect from each member of the group to every other
member of the group, and at least one member assigns positive weight to
himself. We call this communication of respect.” (Lehrer and Wagner 1981,
27)
Lehrer and Wagner give the mathematical conditions for convergence in
the second half of their book: the formal foundations of rational consensus
(Lehrer and Wagner 1981, part two). For our purposes, it is sufficient to
say that if a normalized matrix is reducible, then it does not converge to
consensual weights, and thus does not produce a consensus in the group
of agents. A matrix is reducible if its entries can be split into two distinct
matrices without changing the order of the entries6. For illustration matrix
M is reducible to matrices X and Y (below).
M =

.7 .3 0 0
.2 .8 0 0
0 0 .4 .6
0 0 .1 .9







In the example above, the matrix M in fact converges to two different
6For a formal notion of reducibility see Meyer (2000, pp. 209, 671) or Royle and
Weisstein (2010).
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values, which are equal to the convergence values of respectively matrices
X and Y . X converges to the consensual weights .4 and .6; Y converges to
the consensual weights .14 and .86.7 The non-consensual matrix M∗ would
then look like this.
M∗ =

.4 .6 0 0
.4 .6 0 0
0 0 .14 .86
0 0 .14 .86

In the Lehrer-Wagner model, if the conditions for convergence are satisfied,
the matrix of weights converges to a consensual matrix with identical rows,
and the product W k · P (for k → ∞) yields the consensual column PC .
Each line l of PC is the updated opinion of agent i on the subject under
deliberation and all the values in PC are identical, denoting the fact that a
consensus has been reached.
The proof of convergence of the model is omitted here, although the
precise mathematical formulation of the conditions for convergence must be
attributed to Perron-Frobenius in the Perron-Frobenius Theorem. Other
versions of the theorem and proofs for convergence can be found in Lehrer
and Wagner (1981, pp. 129-133) and in Jackson and Golub (2007). The
conditions for convergence have to do mostly with the requirement of nor-
malization and the composition of the matrix of weights. What weights
represent is not straightforward and it will be the main topic of the next
section.
2.2.2 Interpretations
Some of the elements of the model are of fairly straightforward interpretation.
This is the case for the term ‘P’, which contains the opinions of the members
of the group on the issue that is under deliberation. If the members cast their
opinion in terms of a probability value, then P will contain probabilities. If
otherwise — for example if the opinion is expressed in terms of a quantity,
or of discrete values — P will contain the appropriate numerical values that
express the information provided by the members of the committee.
As explained in section 2.2, the Lehrer-Wagner model can only handle
problems that are representable in a mathematical form. The limitation
derives, in part, from the necessity of having the opinion of each member
expressed in the form of a numerical value, typically, but not necessarily, a
probabilistic value. In a standard case, representable in the Lehrer-Wagner
7The calculation was obtained with 100 iterations, that is X100 and Y 100.
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model, the members of a committee will express their belief as a probability
value. Alternatively, however, the column can contain integers (e.g. if the
problem is to find a consensus about a quantity, rather than a probability), or
also an array of preference sets (e.g. when the problem is to find a consensual
ordering). A convergence theorem (see above, section 2.2.1) guarantees that
the rows in the column (or the array) will converge to a unique value, or a
unique ordering. Most of the discussion in this and other chapters will be on
the use of the model in its common interpretation, that is, with probabilities.
The term ‘k’ in 2.3 indicates the number of rounds that the model takes
to reach convergence. The requirement that k tend to infinity is purely
theoretical, because in all practical problems the matrix of weights reaches
convergence in a finite number of steps, provided that the other mathematical
conditions are satisfied. In practice then, k needs to be “large enough” for
the matrix to converge, in order for the model to reach a consensus.
In context of practical deliberation, one can imagine k to represent the
number of times a committee goes through alternative phases of deliberation
and updating (the members, after deliberation, change or update their
beliefs). A worry with this interpretation is the fact that phase after phase,
at least in the simple model (not in the extended version however, see
appendix A), the matrix of weights remains unchanged, this indicating that
the members update their opinions only on the subject matter, not on the
expertise of the other committee members. In itself, the interpretation of the
term ‘k’ is also straightforward, even though it might be contested whether
the term makes sense in a context of practical deliberation. This problem
will be treated in the forthcoming section 2.4.
More difficult than the interpretation of P is the interpretation of the
matrix W , that is, the interpretation of the weights (ws), as normalized
measures that agents in the model assign to each other. Lehrer and Wagner
(1981) discuss possible derivations of the weights from four different cases in
which the model could be applied, namely a census problem, an estimation
with minimal variance, a weather forecasting problem and a problem of
subjective estimation. A thorough discussion on the interpretation of weights,
in the remainder of this section, will be essential for understanding what type
of “consensus” the model yields, that is, the rationality of the consensual
results from the model, a problem which will be focal in section 2.4.
Without giving here the details of cases 1 and 2, which can easily be
found in Lehrer and Wagner (1981, pp. 138, 139), it is to be noticed that
both of them make use of the model as a mechanical aggregation procedure,
where what is aggregated is objectively obtained information (e.g information
from instruments). Clearly when the subject matter is consensus, we tend
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to think of that in terms of agreement among different opinions. If, instead,
the agreement sought is rather among measuring instruments ‘consensus’ is
simply a term for denoting convergence of measures. In turn, the rationality
of such consensus can only be defined as the appropriateness of using a
specific aggregation function, rather than another one, for example in virtue
of a number of properties that it guarantees. For this reason, when the
model is used as an aggregation function, it can only be said to be consensual
in the sense in which linguistic-based models (see the beginning of section
2.1) are consensual, that is, as externally motivated aggregation procedures.
Similar remarks can be made for case 3, the forecasting example: Imagine
a forecaster who is trying to estimate the probability of rain tomorrow and
is assigned a “verification score”, given by F = ((f1 − O1)2 + · · · + (fN −
ON )
2)/N (Lehrer and Wagner (1981, 140), taken from Sanders (1963)). The
verification score is a measure of past performance in forecasting; fi is the
forecaster’s judgment (forecast probability) on a particular past event, and
Oi takes values 1 if the event occurred, and 0 if it didn’t. The Lehrer-Wagner
model applies to this scenario in the following way:
This verification [F ] score can [. . . ] be computed for a sequence
of consensual probability forecasts as well, and Sanders offers
empirical evidence that a consensus of probabilities based on
even simple arithmetic averaging can attain a verification score
better than that of any individual contributing to the consensus.
While Sanders did not investigate weighted averaging it is clear
that such a refinement is possible. (Lehrer and Wagner 1981,
140)
If the model is taken as a tool of obtaining a more accurate forecast, then
its rationality lies in the fact that the property it has is to “produce better
forecasts”. In this case, there need not be a convergence of the beliefs of the
forecasters in order to justify the “use” of the model, but, as in the previous
two examples, the consensus produced is only figuratively such, that is, as
convergence of information. By using the model as a forecasting tool, agents
need not rationally converge to the belief that the model yields as their own
rational belief.
In this interpretation then, the model cannot be taken as an impossibility-
of-disagreement statement: Forecasters may still be disagreeing as to which
forecast is the correct one, even though the model is shown, a posteriori, to
be a better predictor of the weather. There is however, a different possible
formulation of the forecasting scenario, one which presents the problem of
forecasting as convergence of beliefs. This latter case brings us to the case
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that Lehrer and Wagner give as an example of possible interpretation of
weights, viz. the subjective weights example (Lehrer and Wagner 1981,
140).
When a decision problem involves neither highly structured
estimation subject to a prior analysis of weighting schemes, as
in the examples 1 and 2 above, nor a statistical record of past
performance, as in the preceding example, then the choice of
weights becomes a subjective enterprise. (idem)
Suppose a group of forecasters are asked to estimate the probability of a
certain meteorological event. They gather and assign to each other a certain
measure that represents the value of accuracy that a certain forecaster thinks
her colleague has. So, mij is the measure of accuracy that forecaster i assigns
to forecaster j. Forecasters do not always agree on how accurate a certain
colleague of theirs is, and so the rows in the matrix of weights (resulting
from normalized measures) need not be alike.
The question now, expressed in the terms of Lehrer (1976), is whether
the forecasters can disagree after recognizing their present situation. Granted
that the forecasters accept to give at least some minimal weight to at least
some of the other forecasters, and that no subgroups arise8, the forecasters
should accept to aggregate their opinion with that of the other forecasters
to whom they have assigned part of the weight. The reason for this is
that assigning a weight to a fellow forecaster amounts to accepting that my
opinion on the subject matter be a function of my own initially expressed
opinion and the opinion of (some of) the other forecasters.
To see this, consider that in the aggregation process, my updated opinion
on the probability, for instance, of rain is “wme,me · pme + wme,forecaster1 ·
pforecaster1 + · · ·+ wme,forecasterN · pforecasterN”. In other words, my updated
opinion on the probability of rain is the weight I assign to myself times
my probability forecast, plus the weight I assign to forecaster1 times her
probability forecast, and so on for all the weights I assign to my fellow
forecasters and their relative probability forecasts.
Aggregation, in this case, is the acceptance that my belief as to what
the correct forecast is be a function of the forecasts of all (or some of) the
members in the group, including myself. It remains to be seen, at this
point, how the mathematical function in the Lehrer-Wagner model differs
from an averaging or a compromising procedure. In other words, it remains
to be explained why convergence of the Lehrer-Wagner model to a unique
8In which case the matrix of weights may be reducible and fail to converge, see the
conditions of convergence in subsection 2.2.1.
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mathematical value is a consensus and not just another form of averaging.
Section 2.4 will take up that problem.
2.2.3 Scope of the model
Before proceeding to the evaluation of the Lehrer-Wagner model and its
rationality, in this subsection I will make some preliminary considerations
about the model’s domain of application. In the first place, the model makes
sense only for relatively small groups of agents. The reason is that agents
in the model are required to assess each other’s competence, or to provide
a value or “trust” for each other, at least under a number of important
interpretations of the matrix of weights9. Assessing a large number of fellow
group or committee members, however, may be considered impractical or
even unfeasible for large groups such as nations, large associations, large
committees of stockholders, etc. For this reason, the model is not a substitute
for electoral systems, as it requires a capacity of mutual assessment that is
not realizable for any large body of voters.
Secondly, the model requires the problem to be expressible in a mathe-
matical form. Clearly not all problems are such that they can be treated
mathematically, even though they may be perfectly clear in their formulation.
For example, particularly complex geopolitical decisions, or management
issues, might be clearly expressible yet fail to be properly formalizable. What
extension a hypothetical Palestinian state next to Israel should have, which
management practices a certain company should adopt in a market competi-
tion, and so on, are hard-to-formalize problems not because of some inherent
vagueness in the formulation of the problem, but because of the number
and nature of the sub-issues they involve. Similarly, problems involving
ethical sub-issues are often hard to find a mathematical formulation — see
for example the problem of three children and a flute in Sen (2009, 12-14).
Due to its algorithmic nature, the Lehrer-Wagner model can produce
consensus (or convergence) only on issues that can be expressed in a numerical
form, whereas some of the informal procedures, mentioned above (see section
2.1.1) are aimed at producing, or at least promoting, consensus on a wider
range of possible issues on which the parties disagree. The limited scope
of the Lehrer-Wagner, nonetheless, is an important one. Economic and
scientific problems often are reducible to the assessment of a certain value
or group of values, and even numerous social and political issues are often
largely dependent on the assessment of some quantifiable variables.
9Nonetheless, as I will explain in section 2.3, some extensions or specifications of
the model make it apt for larger groups, as they make the assignment of weights not
dependent of personal assignment but on objectively detectable measures.
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The first example of a possible application of the Lehrer-Wagner model,
which opened section 2.2, was a simplified version of what was happening
at the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen10.
There, much of the dispute was on the exact CO2-emission-cut goal, in
percentage value. We can imagine a great number of more or less similar
examples: scientific committees for the evaluation of a new drug, city councils
evaluating urban planning criteria (see section 2.3.1), etc.
Additionally, it is important to stress the fact that agents in the model
are an abstract category. In the appropriate context, the model’s agents can
be, for instance, groups such as parties in a political context. As an example,
in the Polder model (mentioned in section 2.1), the parties (agents) involved
are three: the government, the employees and the employers. The model
allows for collectivities to be agents in the model, so that convergence can
be sought among groups, rather than among single individuals.
It is fair to say that the limitations of the Lehrer-Wagner model, in fact,
point it in direction of the precise range of problems it can deal with, rather
than leaving it to handle the problems of consensus in its full generality. It
is in that range of possible applications that the model will be evaluated
and discussed as a model for consensus.
Before proceeding to the evaluation of the rationality of the Lehrer-
Wagner model, it will be useful to introduce two similar models, which are,
in part, extensions of the Lehrer-Wagner model itself. The models presented
in the next sections are a consensus model for environmental management
introduced in Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls (2006), and the
Bounded Confidence model (Hegselmann and Krause 2002). The expositions
of the two will both clarify some of the issues about the meaning and methods
for weight-assignment, discussed in section 2.2.2, and provide some examples
of applications of the Lehrer-Wagner model.
2.3 A family of consensus models
It should be noted that what I have so far called a ‘model’ is in fact a general
framework for consensus production that can take a number of different
10In this and the following examples it is clear that a major role is played by political
and economic interests. While such interests, it may be argued, put those examples
outside the scope of the Lehrer-Wagner model, there are also important scientific elements
in them, which can be dealt with by the “standard” interpretation of the Lehrer-Wagner
model as a model for scientific consensus. It should also be pointed out that the model
need not be taken only as a model for (exclusively) scientific consensus, even though
that is the assumption in this thesis. A version of the model as a consensus model for
non-factual matters is pursued in Martini, Sprenger and Colyvan (2011).
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specifications. The terminological choice of this section may be confusing
in the sense that what are here called a ‘model’ are in fact specifications
of what has been previously also called ‘model’. For simplicity I refer to
the environmental management model, the Bounded Confidence model, and
also to the possible further specifications in the latter, all as models. The
group forms a family of what can be called “lower level models”, where the
Lehrer-Wagner theory of consensus and its related mathematical model are
the overarching framework.
2.3.1 An environmental management model
The first model presented in this section (see Regan, Colyvan and
Markovchick-Nicholls 2006) is in fact a development of the basic math-
ematical model presented in Lehrer and Wagner (1981), applied in the
context of environmental management. The task that Regan, Colyvan and
Markovchick-Nicholls (2006) analyzes is the formulation of a list of criteria
to be applied for the selection of urban open spaces for a Californian envi-
ronmental conservation project. The practical problem is to determine a
consensus weight for each of a number of proposed environmental criteria; the
consensus weight attached to a certain criterion will determine its position
in the multicriteria decision tree that the commission is asked to produce.
Examples of criteria are “reduces environmental risk” and “provides
recreational opportunities and benefits” and “contributes to biodiversity”.
These criteria are of very different nature and respond to very different
rationales. Moreover, they will be prioritized differently depending on the
interests of those who are considering them. A consensual ranking is clearly
a very welcome result for any committee trying to come up with a decision
tree for the selection of urban open spaces that accommodates most parties.
The problem is a scientific one, insofar as the criteria are not purely
subjective11, but rely on objective and scientific evaluations. Nonetheless,
due to the complexity of the problem, such ranking of criteria cannot be
derived directly from scientific models, but rather needs to be agreed on
by a group of experts. The sought agreement is influenced by stakeholder’s
interests and personal preferences, and the variables that enter the evaluation
of a criterion over another are not easily codified and evaluated by mechanical
methods like computer models.
For the reasons stated, a group of experts gathered in deliberation seems
to be the best solution to a fair as well as an efficient ranking. The set-up
11For instance, one of the criteria is “improves quality of urban system”; this assessment
depends on state-of-the-matter assessments, not only on individual tastes.
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of the deliberation group that Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls
(2006) has in mind, operates very similarly to the Lehrer-Wagner model
with the important difference that the entries in the matrix of weights W
do not derive directly from measures of trust assigned by each agent to all
others. Instead, weights are derived from the difference in opinions among
the members, that is, from the difference in the assigned values in column
P of the model12.
wik =
1− |pi − pk|
N∑
k=1
1− |pi − pk|
(2.4)
Equation 2.4 states that wik is a function of the distance between pi and
pk “where i refers to the individual who is assigning the weights, k refers
to the individual being assigned a weight and N is the number of group
members” (Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls 2006, 172). The basic
idea is that agent i will be willing to give more weight to agent k, if agent
k’s opinion is closer to hers and the closer k’s opinion is, the more weight
agent i will give her.
The reasons behind the choice of function 2.4 are summarized in a number
of desiderata (Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls 2006, 172). In
short, the desiderata state that each agent should receive the highest weight
from herself, that higher weights are given to individuals with similar values
of p and vice versa, and that weights are normalized for each row Wi∗.
Clearly 2.4 meets all the desiderata and is a simple function of immediate
use13.
The specific motivation for choosing to derive weights from a measure
of “distance in opinion”, rather than a direct measure of trust of accuracy
assignment, as originally thought in Lehrer and Wagner (1981), is that:
The consensus convergence model described above [the Lehrer-
Wagner model] requires each individual in the group to assess all
other group members and then assign a weight to each member
according to their degree of respect for or agreement with that
member’s expertise or views on the issue at hand. For the urban
open space MCDM case study, this approach is infeasible for a
12In the example given by Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls (2006) what
appear in the column are not probabilities but weights to be assigned to a specific criteria
of environmental assessment.
13Exemples of a derivation of weights from a partial data set from the Californian
Conservation Management Project is given in Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls
(2006, 172).
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number of reasons. (Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls
2006, 172. Italics added.)
The reasons referred to are summarized in three points:
• Complexity of the task. It is not stated explicitly but it is inferable
from the paper that the deliberating group in the case study was too
large to consider feasible the task of gathering weights for all agents.
• Manipulability of the method14. Agents, in the Lehrer-Wagner model,
are supposed to give honest assignments of weights, “if, on the contrary,
the weights represent an egoistic attempt to manipulate social decision
making, then it is unacceptable to use those weights though they
were a disinterested summary of information.” (Lehrer and Wagner
1981, 74). That weights are not given disinterestedly, however, is a
possibility in any realistic setting like the one that Regan, Colyvan
and Markovchick-Nicholls (2006) are investigating. Thus the need to
derive the weights from some other measure.
• Quantification of elements that seem inherently non-quantifiable:
“While most people would agree that they have different degrees of
respect for, or agreement with, other group members’ positions, trans-
lating that to a numerical value is a non-trivial task. Furthermore,
group members may feel reluctant to explicitly quantify degrees of
respect, as it could lead to rifts and ill feelings within the group. This
is an undesirable outcome when the purpose of the exercise is to reach
consensus.
The opportunity of deriving the weights from something different than
direct assignments of a measure of trust seems thus motivated; nevertheless,
such a move imports a complication in the original (and general) formulation
of the model. The question that should be asked is whether it is rational to
make weights be derived from opinion distances, or whether they should be
derived from some other measurable variable. The problem will be treated
in section 2.4. In the next subsection I will present the Bounded Confidence
model.
14The concept of strategy-proofness is also at times used, especially in social choice
theory.
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2.3.2 The Bounded Confidence model
Hegselmann and Krause (2002) introduce a model15 based on the idea that
people neither completely share others’ ideas nor ignore them altogether;
rather, they will “take into account the opinions of others to a certain extent
in forming [their] own opinions” (Hegselmann and Krause 2002, 2). The
extent to which an agent in the model will share her opinion with other
agents is determined by how many other agents that person is willing to
share her opinion with. In turn, whom exactly, among all other agents, that
agent is willing to share her opinion with, is determined by how close those
agents opinions are to hers.
An example will illustrate the procedure. Suppose we take the case
of the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen
mentioned in section 2.2. Members of the deliberation group have to agree
on a certain reduction emission target (say between 5% and 40%). Suppose
member A declares a target of 10%; according to Hegselmann and Krause,
it is reasonable to assume that A will be willing to aggregate her opinion
only with those other members whose opinion lays, for example, in the 2%
distance interval from her own opinion. That is, if agent B declares a 8.5%
target, then agent A will accept to aggregate with agent B; if, however,
agent B declares a 5% target, then A will refuse to aggregate with her.
Clearly the interval can be picked ad hoc, and the authors investigate under
which intervals the model produces consensus or, alternatively, opinion
fragmentation or opinion polarization.
Mathematically, the “neighborhood” that a certain agent is willing to
aggregate with is given by a confidence set. Given the opinion profile {xi}i∈I
and the confidence level εi, for agent i, the confidence set for this agent is
defined by: I(x, εi) = {j ∈ I : |xi− xj| ≤ εi}, which is based on the absolute
difference in opinions between agents (Hegselmann and Krause 2002, 382).
Once the confidence set is defined, the opinion (x) of each individual i,






xj(t) for t = 0, 1, 2 . . . (2.5)
The convergence properties of this model depend on how large the interval
ε is and the authors of the model analyze the formation of consensus by
15Properly speaking the Bounded Confidence model is not an extension of the math-
ematical model presented in section 2.2.1, but rather of an extension of that model
(outlined in Lehrer and Wagner (1981, 53-72)) which allows for changing matrices at
each step of the iteration process. For economy of space, the main idea of the extended
model is presented in appendix A.
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means of computer simulations. I leave the issue of the conditions for the
formation of consensus in Bounded Confidence to the interested reader.
What is relevant for the purposes of this chapter and the investigation of
the Lehrer-Wagner model is what is highlighted in an article extending
the exploration of Bounded Confidence (Hegselmann and Krause 2005). In
this article, the authors investigate the model by using average measures
alternative to the arithmetic average used in the original model; for instance
the authors investigate convergence by means of geometric, harmonic, power
and random means.
The declared scope of the extension carried out in Hegselmann and
Krause (2005) is to investigate the convergence properties of 2.5 obtained
by using different means. “The simulations [. . . ] indicate that for all the
different means there is a stable pattern of opinions after finitely many
time-steps.” A proof of this and a “stability theorem” is given to show that
the opinion pattern stabilizes after finitely many time-steps of aggregation.
This does not mean that convergence occurs always, as it depends on the
choice of ε, but rather that after a certain time the initial group of opinions
has either converged, polarized into two values, or fragmented in a number
of different values (opinions).
Besides this investigation, perhaps of rather technical interest, what the
extension of the Bounded Confidence model shows is that there need not
be a single form of averaging in order to achieve opinion stabilization, and,
what is relevant for the Lehrer-Wagner model, for convergence of opinions.
For the purposes of this chapter it is important to notice that the
extension of the Bounded Confidence model challenges the rationality of
Lehrer-Wagner model by showing that the aggregation function used in
the original model is not unique. Lehrer and Wagner (1981) are silent on
whether their model is a rational one among many, or whether the model
is uniquely rational, but the issue is important if one wants to claim, as
Lehrer (1976) does, that rational agents who understand the implications of
their situation of disagreement are rationally required to update like agents
in the Lehrer-Wagner model do. More on this point will be said in the next
section.
2.4 The meaning of rational consensus
There can be, and there are, several ways in which the procedure a model
describes (e.g. how to change one’s belief in a case of disagreement) can
be defined as rational ; consequently, there are several ways in which a
model can be said to be rationally justified or unjustified. Most models for
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aggregating or updating beliefs or information consist of a number of steps.
For instance, the Lehrer-Wagner model has at least three steps towards
reaching a consensus: 1) the association of each agent with all other agents
in the model via the assignment of a certain measure; 2) the evaluation of
the problem in a probabilistic (or at least formal) way; and 3) the iteration
and convergence process to consensus. Defense of a model, however, may fail
to provide a story that justifies each one of its steps, but rather just gives an
overarching justification of the whole. The first question that arises, thus, is
whether it is enough to justify a model as a whole, or whether justification
is necessary for each of its parts.
Moreover, justification of a certain model may give a number of positive
reasons as to why the procedure it describes is rational, yet fail to provide a
reason as to why only such a procedure is the rational one. In other words,
a model may be justified without necessarily being uniquely justified. For
instance, a certain pooling algorithm may be shown to be the only one that
satisfies a number of desired properties. Similarly, one may have reasons for
claiming that a certain consensus model is the only justified consensus model;
this would amount to showing that the procedure it describes is uniquely
rational. Unique-type rationality can be a very strong desideratum, one that
perhaps we do not want to ask from a model, but it is a desideratum that
must be taken into account when considering the topic of rationality. If a
procedure is not uniquely rational, then there should be a number of reasons
as to why it is a valid (or better) alternative to the other ones, if there are
any, suggested in the relevant literature.
In general for this section, the question to be addressed is what makes a
certain model a model of rational consensus, rather than a simple pooling
algorithm or deliberative method. The aforementioned subdivision of the
problem provides us with a useful taxonomy16 in the analysis of the rationality
of the Lehrer-Wagner model that will follow.
Table 2.1: Taxonomy for evaluating the type of justification for a model
in whole in part
Is the model justified? yes/no yes/no
Is the model uniquely justified? yes/no yes/no
Table 2.1 is a simple graphical checklist for the type of analysis that
16Part of the material for this taxonomy was taken from Martini, Sprenger and Colyvan
(2011).
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should be carried out when assessing a model for consensus. Clearly, different
interpretations as to what exactly is required from a model for consensus
will lead to different answers as to whether, for example, the Lehrer-Wagner
model represents a rational procedure for consensus or not. In the following,
the definition of consensus given at the beginning of section 2.1 will lead
the investigation. For now I will leave open the issue as to whether whole
or part-for-part justification is required, the same will hold for the other
elements in table 6.1. I will return to that taxonomy at the end of this
section.
Lehrer and Wagner justify their model as a whole, even though some
justification is provided for the individual parts as well; moreover, they do
not consider whether the consensus procedure their model describes is the
only rational one. In the following I will argue that the explicit defense of
the model (as provided in Lehrer (1976) and Lehrer and Wagner (1981)) is
not sound.
Keith Lehrer provides a “consistency argument” (Lehrer and Wagner
1981, 22)17 in order to defend the claim that the result is a consensual one.
The argument claims that once agents accept to enter into deliberation via
the Lehrer-Wagner model, they accept that their judgment be a function
of two pieces of information: 1) the mutual assessment of their degrees of
expertise and 2) each member’s individual (and independent) judgement
on the subject matter under deliberation. In particular, what is required
as a minimal condition for convergence is that all agents give at least some
weight to the other agents18, as refusing to do so would amount to pure
dogmatism. Lehrer states the argument as follows.
Actual disagreement among experts must result either from an
incomplete exchange of information, individual dogmatism, or
a failure to grasp the mathematical implications of their initial
stage. What is impossible is that the members of some community
of inquiry should grasp the mathematical implications of their
initial state and yet disagree.
(Lehrer 1976, 331)
And again:
17See also Nurmi (1985, 123), about the problem of consistency. Nurmi argues that
the Lehrer-Wagner model is not consistent, in the sense of consistency specific of social
choice theory.
18The mathematics of this condition was given in section 2.2.1. To recall, the matrix
of weights of the Lehrer-Wagner must not be reducible. Informally the condition is that
there must be a “chain of respect” among agents (see Lehrer and Wagner 1981, 98).
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[. . . ] there is a consistency argument in favor of such aggregation
[the aggregation of, for instance, my own opinion with the other
group members’ opinions]. If a person refuses to aggregate,
though he does assign positive weight to other members, he is
acting as though he assigned a weight of one to himself and a
weight of zero to every other member of the group.
. . .
One justification for aggregation is consistency, since refusing
to aggregate is equivalent to assigning everyone else a weight of
zero and aggregating.
(Lehrer and Wagner 1981, 43)
The line of defense that Lehrer and Wagner adopt is at least questionable.
They claim that agents are rationally required to aggregate, because they
have already accepted to deliberate with the model. To them, this means
that agents have accepted to give weights to one another and, when that is
the case, they are expected to aggregate.
A first observation is that one could refuse to endorse this type of delib-
eration procedure in the first place and request an independent justification
for why it is rational to accept the model in the first place. In other words,
while agents already in the model may be needed to accept its mathematical
implications, a person (the member of a committee) may not agree with the
procedure described by the model in the first place.
That critique is not conclusive, and a counter-argument is at hand; it is
true that agents who do not accept the model in the first place, need not be
considered irrational if they don’t aggregate, nonetheless in Lehrer (1976) it is
claimed that the model is a realistic representation of a deliberation procedure
and that agents who refuse to aggregate are equivalent to dogmatic agents
in real-life terms. If the model is realistic, then independent justification for
why agents should aggregate is not needed, as claiming that agents do not
aggregate amounts to saying that agents are dogmatic; if that is not the case,
on the other hand, Lehrer needs to provide an independent justification of
the aggregation process19.
In sum, the best possible formulation of the standard argument in defense
of the model is that its mathematical structure captures a typical situation
19It might also be argued that for the Lehrer-Wagner model to be realistic it should
also include the trade-off between the “cost”, incurred by individual members, of agreeing
with an opinion that does not fully represent their beliefs, and the costs involved with
the possibility of not reaching a consensus at all.
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of disagreement and refusing to change one’s opinion would be equivalent,
in mathematical terms, to assigning a null weight to all other members and
full weight to oneself. This situation, which could prevent the model from
reaching a consensual value, is one of pure dogmatism.
There are at least two remarks to be made about the argument by
consistency. The first remark is that the argument relies on the assumption
that the model captures a typical situation of disagreement, in other words,
that the model is a realistic representation. The second observation is that
it is not so clear from the literature on disagreement that one should not (or
should never) be dogmatic.
I briefly address the two concerns without attempting to give a definitive
solution.
1) Thesis: “The model is not a realistic representation of a situation of
disagreement.” While it is hard to state exactly what it takes for a model
to be realistic or non-realistic20, there are at least some intuitive reasons
to claim that the model is not realistic. Firstly, it may (and often does)
take a very large number of iterations of the matrix or weights (W ) in order
to reach a consensus; but in a realistic scenario, a group in deliberation is
unlikely to undergo several iterations (at least as many as the mathematical
model normally requires) to reach a consensus. A second worry is that the
simple version of the model uses the same matrix W at each step of the
iteration process. This would not be a problem for an averaging procedure,
but if the model needs to be a realistic one, it is not clear why deliberating
agents would use the same information over and over again.
It is true that Lehrer and Wagner provide an extended version of the
model 21 in which, at each step, new information is gathered and the matrix
of weights changes accordingly; nonetheless the extended version has the
disadvantage that the conditions for convergence are stronger and, mostly,
that the information gathered at each step is not at all compatible with
a realistic approach: In the extended model the weights gathered for the
second step of the iteration, w2ij, are assessments that each agent gives on
the expertise of all members of the group; this time the expertise in question
is not expertise in judging the subject matter, but rather in judging their
fellows. In other words, at step 2 weights represent the experts’ expertise
on judging other experts. Mutatis mutandis, at step 3 weights represent
expertise on judging expertise on judging expertise. So on for the successive
20It could be argued that a model, exactly because it is a model, is never a realistic
representation of its object. For the purposes of this thesis it is not necessary to decide
the question of which properties make a model a “realistic” one. For a discussion see
Frigg and Hartmann (2006).
21See Lehrer and Wagner (1981, Chapter 4: The extended model).
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steps. The model quickly becomes cognitively absurd, as no one would
expect agents to be able to represent n-th degrees of expertise and to judge
their fellows on such n-th degrees.
2) I address now the second concern, the thesis that “dogmatism need
not be a sufficient condition for irrationality”. Lehrer (1976) claims that
giving a null weight to all other group members and full weight to oneself
is dogmatic and therefore irrational, but the ‘therefore’ is not obvious and
needs justification. For instance, recently Kelly has argued for a form of
“epistemic egoism without apology” Kelly (2005, 192). In brief, a situation
of disagreement between epistemic peers does not commit one to revise one’s
belief. This situation coincides with the case of dogmatism that Lehrer
advises against, and whereas authors such as Thomas Kelly and Adam
Elga provide reasons pro or against dogmatism or, call it by another name,
“epistemic egoism”, Lehrer does not have arguments either pro or against,
exception made for his moral stance against dogmatism. A moral stance,
however, is not enough to rationally justify aggregation.
It should be clear by now that the classical line of defense of the model is
not sound. For this reason, in the following section I will provide a defense
that does not need the assumption that the model is a realistic representation
of how groups deliberate, nor the assumption that goes from the rejection
of dogmatism to a rational requirement of belief-updating. The defense I
will provide eludes the need for independent justification of the aggregation
procedure.
With reference to table 6.1 (above), the advantage of the argument I
will present in section 2.5 is that it provides a justification of the model at
each of its steps, rather than a holistic one. It is reasonable to claim that
such justification carries across each step and in turn justifies the model as
a whole.
2.5 Lehrer-Wagner as an updating model
How can we defend the rationality of the Lehrer-Wagner model without
appealing to the realisticness22 of the model or rejection of dogmatism?
This line of defense starts by observing that in the Lehrer-Wagner model
agents are not merely aggregating, that is, their judgments are not simply
being merged with the other agents’ judgments. On the contrary, agents
are updating their belief in the light of disagreement from the other agents.
22The neologism ‘realisticness’ is here used in the sense of Mäki (1998), who suggests
to use it when one is to refer to the property (or a set of properties) — e.g. “the property
of being realistic”.
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Since it is rational (non-dogmatic) to give a positive weight to at least some
of the other agents in the group, our belief will turn out to be a function of
our own judgment and other agents’ judgments taken as internal evidence.
This is because in the scenario we are considering there are two sources of
evidence, external evidence (facts on which agents base their independent
assessment) and internal evidence, that is disagreement in the group.
Granted that disagreement counts as evidence, and that rejection of
dogmatism calls for updating, in the light of new evidence agents should
also accept their final judgment to be a function of all the weights they
assign to the other agents multiplied by relative assessments the agents
give on the subject matter. This amounts to take, according to Lehrer and
Wagner (1981), at each step k of the process, an updated arithmetic average.
For instance, in a group of three agents, at step 1, agent 1 will update
her judgment in the following way23: w11 · p01 + w12 · p02 + w13 · p03, mutatis
mutandis for the other agents. Call the result from the previous step p11
(the opinion of agent 1 at step 1 of the iteration process). At step 2 some
disagreement may still be present; in the light of this, agent 1 will again
update her judgement as before, but this time with the new set of updated
assessments reached by all agents at the end of step 1: The new updating
function for agent 1 will be w11 ·p11 +w12 ·p12 +w13 ·p13, call this p21. So on and
so forth for the successive steps. The mathematical properties of Markov





To restate the point, we can assume that in the Lehrer-Wagner model
agents are not aggregating, rather updating. The fact that their updating
process is such that it converges to a consensus is only a matter of the chosen
updating procedure. The important result from using this method is that
the final result is not a compromise. Imagine the following scenario: We are
to decide on the probability of rain tomorrow such that the forecast will be
out on tonight’s news. I claim the probability is .7, my colleague Tom claims
that it is .85 and my other colleague Isabelle states .4. According to much of
the literature on forecasting (e.g. see Armstrong (2001)) we should give, as
a forecast, the unweighted average (for instance, the arithmetic average .65).
This is what we agree to broadcast, not what we agree as to being the right
forecast. In the Lehrer-Wagner model, the situation is different, since we
are all updating our judgment in a rationally justified manner and coming
to hold the same belief, namely that the probability of rain is, for example,
.5824.
23Call p0i agent i’s subject matter assessment at the beginning of the deliberation
process, viz. step 0.
24The value .58 is derived from the following set of unnormalized weights for the group
in question: w1∗ = {1, .1, .8}; w2∗ = {.5, 1, .9}; w3∗ = {.5, .3, 1}, which reflects the fact
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The difference is remarked in Bradley (2006), where the author uses the
terms “aggregation problem” and “revision problem”. As Bradley states
it, the Lehrer-Wagner model “purports to show that rational revision must
lead to a consensus.” (Bradley 2006, 147). In short, in the model agents
update according to a specific mathematical procedure which, thanks to the
convergence properties of Markov chain processes, makes their individual
updates converge to a unique value.
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These observations can be made explicit by use of figure 2.1. In figure 2.1,
the graph labeled ‘aggregation’ shows a process in which three agents’ beliefs
25 are merged, through an appropriate function, into a unique belief Gt2,
which need not necessarily be endorsed by any of the agents, but is endorsed
by the group26. The graph labeled ‘revision’ shows a process in which three
agents’ beliefs are revised (in light of new evidence) and transformed into
the three newly endorsed beliefs At2, Bt2, Ct2, with no further specification
as to whether they coincide with (or differ from) one another.
that agents are quite self-confident, that agent 2 is not considered a very good weather
forecaster, that agent 3 is considered a very good expert and that both agent 2 and agent
3 do not quite have a strong opinion in either sense on agent 1. This example shows that
the LW model requires more information than the information required for a compromise
(e.g in majority voting), namely, information on the mutual opinions among experts in
the group.
25The agents are labeled A, B and C, tx indicates the time.
26If talking of groups that can endorse beliefs in this context seems inappropriate,
the same conclusions can be reached by saying that Gt1 is the belief associated with the
group.
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In the Lehrer-Wagner model, the two processes illustrated above are
combined as illustrated in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Consensus in the Lehrer-Wagner Model
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Figure 2.2 shows a process in which three agents’ beliefs are revised (in
light of new evidence) and transformed into the three newly endorsed beliefs
At2, Bt2, Ct2. Moreover, in this case, the three new beliefs coincide.
In conclusion to this chapter, it turns out that the Lehrer-Wagner model
does not belong to either of the two families presented in section 2.1.1, because
it is neither a purely aggregating procedure, nor a general framework for
consensual deliberation. One can conclude from the consideration made
in this section that the best defense of the Lehrer-Wagner model is as an
updating one. The peculiarity of the particular updating procedure used is
that it leads to convergence of views under specific mathematical conditions.
It must be noticed, however, that the justification of the Lehrer-Wagner
model as an updating procedure that leads to convergence, does not solve the
problem of uniqueness. On one hand, the model in its original formulation is
quite general as to the admittance of different ways of deriving the weights
that are used for updating. On the other hand, in the discussion of the
Bounded Confidence model (section 2.3) I explained that there are several
possible averaging procedures allowed, as Hegselmann and Krause (2005)
shows. A more complete account on the rationality of the model should
explain why a specific updating function is rational, or if its “just as rational”
as some other one, or else why it is “more rational” than others.
In the next chapter, I will consider two specific updating methods, in the
context of the epistemology of disagreement: the Bayesian updating method
and the linear method. I will investigate the question of whether either of
the two can be used to resolve a situation of disagreement, and consequently





3.1 Epistemology of disagreement
One of the fundamental questions for the epistemology of disagreement is
“what should you do when you discover that someone [an epistemic peer1]
firmly disagrees with you on some claim P?” (Frances 2010). The three main
answers, offered in the literature, go under the names of steadfast position,
precautionary stance, and conciliatory stance. They prescribe, respectively,
to “hold on to your beliefs”, “suspend your beliefs”, and “update your
beliefs”, when you are disagreeing with someone whom you deem to be
as good as you at making judgments on the issue object of the dispute.
The three viewpoints just mentioned provide an essential taxonomy of the
problem of disagreement.
It is quite uncontroversial that there is one way only to hold a steadfast
position. Imagine I were told “whenever you face a situation of disagreement
on the truth of P with another epistemic agent, your epistemic attitude on
P should remain unchanged”. It would be meaningless for me to ask “how
should my epistemic attitude remain unchanged?”. There is also one way
only of suspending one’s own beliefs, as prescribed by the precautionary
stance, although it should be noted that different practical directives could be
1Elga postulates the following condition for “epistemic peerhood”: “[. . . ] you count
your friend as an epistemic peer with respect to an about-to-be-judged claim if and only
if you think that, conditional the two of you disagreeing about the claim, the two of you
are equally likely to be mistaken.” (Elga 2007, footnote 21). Despite arguments to the
contrary (see King 2011), and for the sake of the analysis in this chapter, I will assume
that it makes sense to postulate the existence of epistemic peers, or at least an imperfect
version of Elga’s idealized condition of epistemic peerhood.
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given, for the purposes of action theory, in order to address decision making
impasses that may arise from a precautionary stance on disagreement.
An interesting position to hold on disagreement is the conciliatory stance,
because the directive “update your beliefs on the matter of a disagreement
with an epistemic peer” prompts the further question “how should I update
my beliefs?”. In the first place, a distinction must be drawn between cases
of disagreement that admit of continuous values, and cases that only admit
of binary values. In the binary case, the only way to change one’s beliefs, in
a situation of peer disagreement, is to move all the way towards the position
of our epistemic peer. Following is an example. Suppose I learned that you
believe that extraterrestrial life exists. Assuming I initially believed that
extraterrestrial life does not exist, the only way for me to be conciliatory is
to change my belief from “I don’t believe in aliens” to “I believe in aliens”2.
If, in the same exact situation, you also adopted a conciliatory spirit, then
we would end up in a circle in which we will never resolve our disagreement,
unless given other further instructions on how to get out of the deadlock.
While binary cases might need a special treatment, if the conciliatory stance
is to be defended, those are normally not the standard cases analyzed in
the disagreement literature, which instead focuses on situations where the
matter of disagreement is on continuous or probabilistic values (see Lehrer
1976; Aumann 1976; Hegselmann and Krause 2002; Elga 2007; Christensen
2007, 2009; Kelly 2010).
A conciliatory account on the problem of peer disagreement, on the one
hand, will have to provide a rationale for the general claim that we should
respond to disagreement by moving closer to our adversary’s position. On
the other hand, it should also, possibly, provide some concrete instruction on
how close we should move, that is, which updating function we should use,
once we discover we are in a situation of disagreement with an epistemic peer.
The former task has been at the center of much epistemological discussion on
disagreement. The latter however (namely the problem of which specific way
of updating in the light of disagreement is “best”), despite some exceptions3
has been mostly neglected.
In the following sections I will analyze in more detail the conciliatory
position, and the equal weight view (EWV, henceforth) in particular. EWV
2Of course I am assuming here that the belief in question, namely that extraterrestrial
living beings, or aliens, exist, can only take two values, that is 0 and 1.
3Recently, the task of providing a rationale to some updating procedures has been
carried out in, Shogenji (2007) and Jehle and Fitelson (2009). Shogenji shows that the
proportional weight view is incompatible either with Bayesianism or with probability
theory, while Jehle and Fitelson undertake the task of analyzing different versions of the
so-called Equal-Weight-View.
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is at times explicated in Bayesian terms (Elga 2007), the details of which
I will present in section 3.2. I will argue that a Bayesian treatment of
disagreement (exemplified with Elga’s EWV) is irrational in the sense that
it provides only a subjective, and in fact arbitrary, procedure for updating
on disagreement. Conciliatory positions, however, can also be explicated
in terms of linear updating (see Lehrer 1976; Lehrer and Wagner 1981;
Hegselmann and Krause 2002, 2005), which will be discussed in section 3.4.
In that section I will show that linear approaches are also irrational, albeit
this time in the sense of anti-rational, and therefore also fail to provide a
solution to the peer disagreement problem.
3.2 Bayesian treatment of disagreement
Any position mandating a rational agent to update one’s beliefs in the light
of disagreement has to hold true the claim that disagreement constitutes
evidence on which to update. While it can be ignored, for now, the problem
of what specific type of evidence disagreement is, it is in the light of new
evidence that we gain new beliefs, and justifiably change our current ones.
For that reason, if disagreement has to have a special role in our epistemology
and our process of belief formation, it is because it constitutes evidence on
the basis of which we should update.
Assuming that disagreement constitutes evidence on which to update,
perhaps the most intuitive way to deal with it is by means of Bayesian
conditionalization. Bayesian theory prescribes how to rationally update
one’s degrees of beliefs in the light of new evidence and, despite its critics,
remains at the moment the most advanced theory for treating evidence.
Indeed, one of the most discussed views on disagreement (EWV), is at times
presented in Bayesian terms:
Equal weight view. Upon finding out that an advisor dis-
agrees, your probability that you are right should equal your
prior conditional probability that you would be right. Prior to
what? Prior to your thinking through the disputed issue, and
finding out what the advisor thinks of it. Conditional on what?
On whatever you have learned about the circumstances of the
disagreement.
Elga (2007, 490)
Elga (2007) provides a number of very convincing reasons as to why
EWV is a rational stance on the problem of peer disagreement. The salient
40 CHAPTER 3. RESOLVING EPISTEMIC DISAGREEMENT
point of his argument is the observation that in a situation of disagreement
it is true that “[epistemic peers] are equally likely to be correct.” (Elga
2007, 487). Sosa summarizes the point as follows:
Several philosophers have converged on the view that the proper
response to disagreement among ostensible epistemic peers is for
each to give equal weight to the opponent’s view. We are told
that it would be unreasonable to downgrade the opponent based
simply on the substance of the disagreement.
(Sosa 2010, 5)
For the sake of the argument, I will assume that Elga is correct in stating
that, in a situation of disagreement, epistemic peers are rational in thinking
that they are equally likely to be correct. Nonetheless, I will argue that Elga’s
EWV falls short of providing a satisfactory answer to a further question,
mentioned above, that a conciliatory stance on disagreement prompts; to
wit, “how should we update our belief on the subject matter my epistemic
peer and I are disagreeing about?” It is by failing to address that question
that Elga’s view, and in fact any Bayesian interpretation of “updating in
the light of disagreement”, is irrational, where the sense of ‘irrational’ will
be made clear in the foregoing paragraphs.
Let us put in symbolism Elga’s EWV. Call a’s degree of belief in H
‘Pa(H)’, and b’s degree of belief in H ‘Pb(H)’. Let us assume that a’s and
b’s degrees of belief differ, and that Pb(H) = y; it is irrelevant, for now, to
know what the value of Pa(H) is. Elga says, at this point, that rational
agents should conditionalize on the evidence gained from the “circumstances
of disagreement”. But what does a learn, exactly, about the “circumstances
of disagreement”?
The most obvious thing she learns is that Pb(H) = y, that is, she
learns what b thinks about H. The first attempt to conditionalize, then,
should be made starting from this piece of information, in the following
way: Upon finding out what b thinks of H, a’s posteriors should be equal to
Pa(H|Disagreement), more specifically to formula (3.1).
Pa(H|Pb(H) = y) (3.1)
(3.1) expresses the simplest interpretation of the commandment “con-
ditionalize upon learning about the circumstances of disagreement.” The
problems with that interpretation arise when we develop the terms of (3.1),
using Bayes’ theorem, as shown in (3.2):
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Pa(Pb(H) = y|H) · Pa(H)
Pa(Pb(H) = y)
(3.2)
In (3.2), the denominator and the left-hand side of the numerator are
items of information that cannot be straightforwardly obtained in a situation
of disagreement. Consider the following. The left-hand side of the numerator
reads ‘Pa(Pb(H) = y|H)’ and the denominator reads ‘Pa(Pb(H) = y)’. Let
us ask “what is the question I should be in a position to answer in order to
obtain the information required in the left-hand side of the numerator, and
in the denominator?”
First, let us look at the numerator. I assume I am an epistemic agent (a);
in order to know the value of Pa(Pb(H) = y|H) I should be able to answer
the question “given that I know H, what can I say about the probability
that b will assign probability y to H?”. But, knowing that H is the case,
how am I entitled to form an opinion about b’s priors for H? The question
is not trivial and I will show in the following that answering the question
implicates a large number of additional assumptions on the situation of
disagreement.
Suppose I knew that H is quite an obvious and widely accepted theory;
I thus think your priors for H will likely be the same as mine, provided our
cognitive abilities are similar. Instead, now suppose I knew that you detest
everything that, you think, only seems obvious; perhaps you would think
H is too obvious to be true. If that is the case, knowing H, I should think
your opinion on the truth of H would likely differ greatly from mine. On
what principles, then, should I form an opinion on your priors for H, given
only my knowledge that H is the case?
It is evident in this case that the expression Pa(Pb(H) = y|H) is a fully
subjective value; in other words, there is no systematic way of evaluating
such expression. Even more, however, the example above shows that slightly
different initial situations, one in which I think b is a “conformist”, and
one in which I think b is an “nonconformist”, are likely to lead me to give
completely different values to the same expression. It is easy to imagine
a wide array of possible initial assumptions and variations in the picture
which will make the values of that same expression change randomly and
without apparent conformity to rational rules.
Equally worrisome is the case for the denominator, Pa(Pb(H) = y), the
details of which are very similar in nature to those for the previous case.
On what rational grounds can I form priors about your priors? Suppose
I know nothing about you, other than the fact, assumed throughout this
chapter, that we are epistemic peers; how can I have a justified claim about
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the fact that your priors for H will be, say, y? It should be clear that
very few situations of disagreement, perhaps none, will reveal the type of
information required for Bayes’ formula to be implemented in the case of
disagreement. Furthermore, it is arguable that there cannot be rational
guidance for obtaining that type of information, given that apparently
irrelevant variations in the initial assumption can change the value that
formula (3.1) will take.
To summarize the points just made, it seems that at least the simple
interpretation of Elga’s EWV does not leave us with an algorithmic solution
for responding to disagreement, but rather with a formula that only a very
idealized agent could use, one able to calculate the posteriors in the light of
disagreement. That is, in itself, not yet a reason for claiming that EWV is
anti-rational. The view, however, is not rational in the sense that it leaves
the rational agent facing disagreement with a number of arbitrary rules for
updating, as it was shown in the examples above. To reiterate, Elga’s EWV
is not irrational in the sense that it clashes with some specific principle
of rationality. But using Bayesian updating in response to disagreement
leaves us with an arbitrary procedure, and Elga’s EWV is in that sense not
rationally motivated.
One could argue that the problem is not with the use of Bayesian theory
per se, but rather with the interpretation of conditional probability by means
of the so called ratio analysis. Hájek has brought the fact to attention in a
number of cases where the so called ratio analysis of probability does not
give us the right answer, even though we have a very clear intuitive notion
of what the conditional probability for those cases are (see Hájek 2003a,b).
Hájek suggests an alternative: “I suggest that we reverse the traditional
direction of analysis: Regard conditional probability to be the primitive
notion, and unconditional probability as the derivative notion.” (Hájek
2003a, 315). While it is an interesting research project to see whether the
notion of conditional probability could be taken as a primitive in the case
of peer disagreement, the task cannot be undertaken in the space of this
chapter and will have to be left for future work.
To conclude this section, I have not claimed that Bayesian updating is in
principle the wrong approach to disagreement, but that if the desideratum
is to have a finer-grained theory on how to respond to disagreement, and
especially one that can be rationally motivated, the foregoing arguments
suggest that Bayesian theory is at its present stage of analysis not a rational
way for updating on disagreement. Lack of such a finer-grained theory results
in the proposal of an arbitrary strategy for responding to disagreement.
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3.3 The Equal Weight View reformulated
Elga himself seems to recognize that there may be issues with his own initial
formulation of EWV in Bayesian terms, and, still maintaining the Bayesian
framework, gives a partial reformulation of the original definition as follows:
“[as before] Conditional on what? On whatever you have learned
about the circumstances of how you and your advisor have
evaluated the claim.”
Elga (2007, 490: footnote 26).
What Elga seems to be doing with this reformulation is to interpret
the “circumstances of disagreement” in the previous formulation as the
“circumstances of how you and your advisor have evaluated the claim.” The
latter interpretation, however, is at risk of being too loose.
Imagine the following classical example of a situation of disagreement,
the split-the-bill case (see Christensen 2009). You and I are at a restaurant
and, at the end of our dinner, each of us calculates the bill independently. I
claim that the bill is $43, and you say that it is $45. One of us must be wrong
although we do not know who. Does disagreement tell us anything about
the way in which each of us has evaluated the claim “the bill is $X”? It does
not. All that the situation of disagreement tells us is that one of us must be
wrong (clearly, we can, in principle, both be wrong). Imagine the following
similar situation: I calculate the bill with an abacus, I then calculate it
again with pen and paper. The two results do not match. Clearly I must
have made a mistake in at least one of the two calculations. The mismatch,
however, does not tell me anything about the correctness or wrongness of
either.
What should I do then in a situation of disagreement? I should go
over my calculation (my reasoning) again. This much seems straightforward.
However, if this is the implication of EWV, as reformulated in Elga’s footnote
26, then disagreement does not play any special role in my epistemology,
at least not a role in any way different from all other situations in which I
might become aware of a mismatch between two results which should be by
hypothesis equal, had I not made any mistake.
The question that epistemology of disagreement investigates is what
special role, if any, disagreement has in our state of belief towards a certain
proposition, or theory, H. If I should update my beliefs in the light of
disagreement it is because disagreement itself constitutes evidence, and
not because I gain new factual evidence in the process of rechecking my
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reasoning. If I find out that I am disagreeing with someone, the least I can
do, provided I give at least some credit to the other person, is to check my
reasoning once more. But this is not to say that disagreement is evidence,
at least not evidence on which I would update, whereas it is, by pure logic,
evidence of the fact that one of us is mistaken.
That disagreement is evidence, however, is implied by the conciliatory
position when claiming that, once we have taken into consideration all the
available evidence, redone the calculations over and over again, and checked
our reasoning enough many times, if we are still disagreeing, then we should
move our belief towards the other party’s belief.
It should be clear that the second interpretation of the EWV cannot
answer the problem of disagreement because it does not treat disagreement
as evidence, or at least not the type of evidence on which one can update. It
remains to be seen if there are other ways to update one’s beliefs in the light
of disagreement. The next section will be dedicated to a possible alternative:
the linear updating interpretation of the conciliatory stance.
3.4 Disagreement and linear updating
Not all belief updating needs to be treated with Bayes’ formula for calculating
the posteriors, although it is a different question whether all belief updating
should be at least compatible with the rules of Bayesian reasoning4. The
problem, however, will not be discussed in this chapter. It is a fact that
linear updating functions are used in a number of conciliatory models, like
the Lehrer-Wagner model, the Bounded-Confidence model, most weighted
average models, and also in the often mentioned split-the-difference view, at
times conflated with the EWV but not necessarily equivalent.
Linear updating is a form of updating one’s beliefs by means of a linear
function. The question I will address here is whether linear updating is a
suitable form of updating in the light of disagreement. For simplicity, I will
consider only the split-the-difference view, although the foregoing arguments
hold for all other forms of linear updating. The split-the-difference view
states that if you and I disagree on a certain issue, then we should take
the arithmetic average of our beliefs, so to converge to the middle point.
The view is clearly a good algorithm for updating because, given a case
of disagreement, we know exactly by how much we should scale each of




, where n is the
4Bradley shows that Bayesianism is incompatible at least with some forms of linear
updating (see Bradley 2006, 151: Proposition 3).
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number of members in the disagreeing group and O is their probability
judgment. For that reason, a conciliatory view that uses linear updating
does not run into the problems of arbitrariness highlighted in section 3.2 for
Bayesian updating. But is linear updating a rational answer to the problem
of peer disagreement? In the following I will argue that it is not.
To recall, the problem of peer disagreement is “what rational epistemic
attitude should we take, when we disagree with an epistemic peer?” Consider
the following scenario. You and your friend Sara are planning to do some
bird-watching at the Isle of May (in Scotland) this coming weekend. You
have been there a few times and you know that the trip is not worthwhile in
case of bad weather. You and Sara both happen to be weather forecasters;
you think that the probability of rain for the weekend is .8, whereas Sara
thinks otherwise. Moreover, you and Sara think that, both of you being
epistemic peers, you should “split the difference”, that is, take an arithmetic
average of yours and Sara’s judgments.
Why should you split the difference? “It is rational”, is the answer
from the conciliatory split-the-difference view. In fact, you are not just
holding a “conciliatory spirit” in the discussion with Sara about what to
do over the weekend. You are not worried about keeping your friendship
with Sara going; that would not be an epistemic reason for updating in the
light of disagreement. Rather, you think that your disagreement with Sara
constitutes evidence for the fact that you and Sara are equally likely to be
wrong in your respective forecasts.
[. . . ] you count your friend as an epistemic peer with respect
to an about-to-be-judged claim if and only if you think that,
conditional the two of you disagreeing about the claim, the two
of you are equally likely to be mistaken.
Elga (2007, footnote 21)
If that is the case, as it should be if the split-the-difference view is
rational, claiming that you should split the difference means that you agree
with the statement “I think that the probability of rain is .8, but I might
be wrong”. Exactly how wrong? “I might be wrong with probability .5”.
The question I will address in this section is whether the belief, or state of
belief, ‘I think that the probability of rain is .8, but I might be wrong with
probability .5’ is rational. At least two cases must be distinguished, namely
whether the probabilities in question are objective or subjective, as follows.
Suppose your belief ‘the probability of rain is .5’ is your subjective degree
of belief. Being a professional forecaster, you have a number of mathematical
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models, charts, and weather maps available, plus a great deal of background
knowledge, all of which makes you a reliable expert on the topic of weather
prediction. At the end of the day, however, you know that tomorrow it will
either rain or not rain, and you know that the probability you are assigning
to the event RAIN is only an expression of your limited knowledge as an
expert. This picture is perfectly compatible with, and in support of, the
idea that the expression “the probability of rain tomorrow at the Isle of May
is .8” is about subjective probabilities.
If that is the case, what does it mean to add to your sentence the clause
“but I might be wrong”? Of course you might be wrong, the probability you
expressed is a function of your limited knowledge on the event ‘it will rain
tomorrow at the Isle of May’, which, it was assumed in this context for the
sake of the argument, is an event in a deterministic world. Provided you
knew all about weather patterns and so on, you would either know that it will
rain tomorrow, or know that it will not. But assuming that the probability
you express is subjective, then what sense does it make to add the clause
“but I might be wrong”? In particular, what sense does it make to add the
clause “but I might be wrong with probability .5”?
It is clear that adding the clause “I might be wrong” to an expression
containing subjective probabilities is redundant, thus the idea of updating
in the light of disagreement finds no ground in the context of subjective
probabilities. In such context, disagreement does not constitute any new
evidence in addition to that which one already possesses. For that reason,
scaling down one’s initial opinion is not a rational procedure as it is equivalent
to double-counting: I know I may be wrong, but disagreement, not even
with epistemic peers, should not prompt me to revise my belief further.
Let us now imagine the second possibility, that the expression “tomorrow
it will rain on the Isle of May with probability .8” is not an expression of your
subjective probability for the event RAIN, but rather about an objective
probability. Whatever objective probabilities may be exactly, let us assume
that when by giving your forecast (probability of rain = .8), you are giving
an estimate of the objective probability of the event RAIN. That probability
may be indicated, for instance, by the mathematical models you are using
for computing the probability of rain.
Now suppose your friend Sara shares her forecast with you, she uses
different forecasting models, and her models indicate a different estimate
of the objective probability for the event RAIN. If that is the case, you are
faced with a situation in which the probability of the event RAIN is a certain
value x according to you, and a different value y, according to Sara. It is
rational to say that both yours and Sara’s values constitute information,
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which should indicate what the objective probability of rain is. Let us call
such value ‘α’5.
Now suppose that both you and Sara have read Scott Armstrong’s
Principles of Forecasting, and learned that combining information is in many
cases more likely to give the most accurate forecast. Is it then rational for
you to update your own judgment and merge it with Sara’s? In this case
there seems to be nothing against the rationale of that procedure, since you
are reporting on information from your forecasting model, which of course
could be subject to further revision in the light of additional information.
But given the scenario just presented, one can hardly claim that there was
disagreement at all between the epistemic agents (the epistemic peers) in
the first place.
In fact, in the scenario just presented, you and Sara had a number of
beliefs related to the event RAIN. You believed that whatever the probability
of rain was, it was an objective probability with value α. You believed that
the most accurate forecast was some adequate combination of all the available
information pointing in the direction of the true value of α. And finally, you
believed that the information available to you was .8, whereas Sara believed
that the information in her possession was, let us assume, .9.
It is hard to see how that situation was a situation of disagreement.
Imagine you and Sara decide to take a straight average of your forecasts.
The value of your combined forecasts (your consensual forecast) is then
‘.8 · .5 + .9 · .5’. Does this mean that you have somehow changed your beliefs
for event RAIN from .8 to 8.5? You have not. You never believed that “the
probability of rain is .8” because what you really believed was the fact that
your forecasting model gave the indication ‘.8’ about the objective probability
of rain α.
3.5 Conclusion
It is easy to see that the arguments in the previous section apply not only
to the split-the-difference view, but to all other forms of linear updating,
such as the Lehrer-Wagner model or other forms of weighted average.
It is time now to summarize the conclusions reached so far. The concilia-
tory stance on disagreement implies that disagreement constitutes evidence
on which rational epistemic agents should update their beliefs. Sometimes
this idea is presented in Bayesian terms. Section 3.2 showed that, if updating
5The argument becomes slightly more complicated if we allow for vague objective
probabilities, the problem cannot be addressed in the space of this chapter, even though
the conclusions do not vary significantly.
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is based only on the information regarding the disagreement itself, then the
prescriptions the conciliatory view gives become arbitrary, and in that sense
irrational. On the other hand, if updating is done in the light of the process
by which the agent goes over her reasoning once again, then disagreement
does not seem to have any special role in the updating process. In particular,
disagreement does not constitute evidence, as the conciliatory view would
require.
Bayesianism, however, was not the only option. In section 3.4 I argued
that linear updating is also not a rational response to disagreement, when
what is being updated are subjective probabilities. If instead what is being
updated are objective probabilities, over which one does not have a specific
truth-implicating belief, then the case is not one of genuine disagreement.
At this point, a question may arise as to what exactly the foregoing
arguments imply. In particular, I have not argued for the positive claim
that “one should not update her beliefs, and should not move her belief
in the direction of her peer’s belief, in a situation of factual disagreement.”
What I have argued is that the prescriptions coming from the conciliatory
stance, which seems, prima facie, rational and justified, run into problems
when interpreted in either Bayesian or linear terms. Clearly the possibility
remains that other forms of updating in the light of disagreement be viable,
and that both linear and Bayesian updating are simply inadequate theories
for capturing our rationality when it comes to the problem of disagreement.
While the latter possibility cannot be excluded on a-priori grounds, it
should be noted that there are strong independent reasons for accepting
the validity of Bayesian and linear updating as a way of capturing human
rationality, and assuming that rational response to disagreement is simply
a special case of human rationality would grant that the two approaches
should be no exception when it comes to the problem of disagreement.
To conclude, while leaving the possibility open for further options as to
how to update in the light of disagreement, the arguments so far presented
provide strong support to the thesis that the present conciliatory stances
on disagreement are irrational, in the two senses of “rationality” that were
made explicit in this chapter.
Chapter 4
Consensus and networks
4.1 The status of the Lehrer-Wagner model
The conclusion from chapters 2 and 3 was that the Lehrer-Wagner model
cannot be taken as a genuine model for consensus formation, at least not
in the sense of consensus that was given in section 2.1. As an aggregation
model, the Leher-Wagner model cannot be defended as a consensual one
(section 2.5), and as an an updating model, on the other hand, it is not a
rational aggregating function (section 3.4).
Nonetheless, it was said early in chapter 2 (section 2.1), that it is a
common linguistic use to call some aggregation models ‘consensus models’,
even though they cannot be said to produce a true consensus of beliefs
among the members of, for example, a deliberating committee. Similarly, the
Lehrer-Wagner model should be considered a particularly refined aggregation
model or voting mechanism1. The Lehrer-Wagner does not only take into
considerations the opinions of the deliberating members on the issue under
deliberation, like most voting functions, for example, do, but it also uses
the information contained in the opinion that members have towards their
fellow deliberators.
Given the presence of a matrix of weights in the Lehrer-Wagner model,
and given that a certain interpretation of such matrix considers weights as
the opinions that members have towards other members of the deliberating
group, this chapter undertakes the task of studying the process through
which disagreement is “resolved” in the Lehrer-Wagner model, when different
opinion structures are present in the deliberating group.
From now on in this thesis, the Lehrer-Wagner model will be referred
1Many years after the presentation of the model, one of its authors shared a similar
opinion — cf. footnote 5, in the introduction to this thesis.
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to as a ‘consensus model’ even though I have argued against the truly
consensual nature of it in chapter 2 and 3. The use, maintained in this
and the next chapters, is one of pure convenience, given that the customary
use of the terminology in the literature does not distinguish between the
epistemic concepts of consensus and compromise that were instead pointed
out in section 2.1.
The following sections are organized as follows. In section 4.2 I discuss
one of the principal unresolved problems associated with the Lehrer-Wagner
model as an aggregation model, to wit, the problem of how members in a
committee should assign weights to each other. In sections 4.3 and 4.4 I
make a proposal for a strategy for assigning weights. In section 4.5 I provide
some examples of noteworthy networks, and in section 4.6 I motivate the
proposal from the descriptive and normative points of view. In section 4.7 I
draw some conclusions to this chapter.
4.2 Weight assignment in the Lehrer-
Wagner model
The fact that agents in the Lehrer-Wagner model assign weights to each other
is very important for the consensual nature of the results from convergence,
insofar as weights represent trust or confidence among a group’s members
(see Lehrer 1976; Lehrer and Wagner 1981). However, how agents are to
assign weights to one another remains one of the major unsolved problems
in the work of both Lehrer and Wagner.
Lehrer and Wagner (1981) do not give a strategy or algorithm for
assigning weights, although four different examples of possible assignments
are given. The first three examples involve some mechanical procedures
for aggregating information and, in those cases, weights are not meant to
represent trust or confidence in other agents’ judgments, but rather some
more or less objective quantity (Lehrer and Wagner 1981, 138-140). For
that reason the first three cases are omitted here. In their fourth example, on
the other hand, the authors take the weights to be dependent on subjective
assignments.
When a decision problem involves neither highly structured
estimation subject to a prior analysis of weighting schemes, as
in the examples 1 and 2 above, nor a statistical record of past
performance, as in the preceding example, then the choice of
weights becomes a subjective enterprise. (Lehrer and Wagner
1981, 140)
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The idea of a subjective assignment of weights is what drives consensus
in the model, according to Lehrer (1976). However, making the assignment
of weights a “subjective enterprise” raises a number of problems that have
been pointed out in the subsequent literature on consensus.
One of the main critical stances on subjective assignment of weights is
in Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls (2006). That paper takes
the Lehrer-Wagner model as a practical option for consensus seeking in
medium-sized committees. The authors present a case study in which a
panel of experts are to formulate a list of criteria, which will in turn be used
for selecting urban open spaces for a Californian environmental conservation
project.
The problem that the committee in Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-
Nicholls (2006) has to deal with cannot be resolved by a purely scientific and
objective analysis, because the list of criteria involves both ethical principles
and complex multi-disciplinary evaluations, which make it impossible for
one to rely entirely on “hard science”. But the decision making process is
not entirely subjective either, since important elements of the evaluation
need to be assessed on the basis of specific expert knowledge and scientific
data. Moreover, the agreement will most likely be influenced by stakeholders’
interests and personal preferences.
In such context, it is argued in Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls
(2006), the Leher-Wagner model could provide a useful framework in order for
the committee to achieve a consensual resolution; in particular, a consensus
that takes into consideration not only the opinions of each expert, but also
the weights associated with their opinions. In other words, the Lehrer-
Wagner model would take into consideration also the degree of trust, or
respect, that the committee members have towards each other. As the
authors stress, however, asking experts to subjectively assign weights to each
other would be open to a number of both theoretical and practical problems.
In the first place, it would be a very impractical task to ask each member
of the committee to assign a weight to all of his or her fellows. Secondly,
members may conceal their true agendas in order to manipulate the results2.
Furthermore, Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls (2006) provides a
third argument against subjective assignment of weights; the argument is
reported in full below, as it is difficult to summarize.
Third, and most important, the assignment of a numerical value
on a person’s degree of respect for each of the other members
in the group is abstract and provocative. While most people
2Nurmi shows that the Leher-Wagner model, when weights are assigned subjectively,
is manipulable (see Nurmi 1985, 15: Proposition 1 ).
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would agree that they have different degrees of respect for, or
agreement with, other group members’ positions, translating that
to a numerical value is non- trivial. Furthermore, group members
may feel reluctant to explicitly quantify degrees of respect for
other group members, or reveal their true weight of respect, as
it could lead to rifts and ill feeling within the group. (Regan,
Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls 2006, 172)
For these reasons, the authors propose a method for assigning weights
based on the relative distance of two agents’ opinions. In other words, the
weight wij that agent i assigns to agent j will be a function of the distance
between agent i’s and agent j’s opinions3.
A similar suggestion has also been proposed in Hegselmann and Krause
(2002). There, the authors present the Bounded Confidence model, a model
for consensus similar to the Lehrer-Wagner, and suggest that agents should
aggregate their opinion on the subject matter under consideration only with
those other agents whose opinion is at a certain distance ε from their own.
In other words, the admitted weights are only 0 and 1. Agent i will assign
weight 1 to agent j if and only if agent j’s opinion lies within the “confidence
interval” ‘± ε’ from hers, otherwise, she will give agent j weight 0. In that
way, all normalized positive weights in each row Wi∗ of the matrix W will
be the same.
Both the proposals in Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls (2006)
and Hegselmann and Krause (2002) have a number of advantages; in par-
ticular, they solve the problems I highlighted above about a subjective
assignment of weights. With a distance-based mechanism, weights would
no longer be assigned subjectively, at least in part avoiding manipulability
of the assignments. Moreover, weights would be derived directly from the
information about the agents’ opinions, thus providing an economical, easily
quantifiable, and “sentiment-free” measurement.
There are, however, also drawbacks to that proposal. For example,
imagine a case in which the decision on which the group is seeking agreement
is, by nature, highly polarizing (e.g. people have very high personal stakes
in the matter that is the object of the decision). The goal is to obtain a
solution that is not only the win of a majority, but a function of all the
opinions of the members in the group.
Adopting either of the two aforementioned solutions would not achieve
the goal of promoting agreement, rather the opposite effect of polarizing the
two groups. In particular, an extreme type of manipulation is still possible
3Details on the function and derivation of weights are left to the interested reader
(see Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls 2006, 172).
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with the proposal in Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls (2006):
Members of the two subgroups may conceal their true opinion and decide to
give an extreme opinion (1 or 0), knowing that it is opposite to the opinion of
the other subgroup. If the other subgroup does the same, the resulting matrix
will be reducible to two sub-matrices, which will independently converge to
two different values.
The Bounded Confidence model has similar problems. As Hegselmann
and Krause (2002) show, in a important number of cases (if ε is “small
enough”), the model converges to two or more independent opinions, meaning
that the original opinions of the group’s members stabilize on multiple non-
communicating convergent paths (see Hegselmann and Krause 2002, 10-20).
In other words, as the confidence interval (ε)4 decreases, the members of
the group will tend to stick to their own opinion instead of moving closer
and closer to the others.
While the drawbacks of assigning distance-dependent weights are not
sufficient to defeat either of the proposals, there seems to be a question to
be asked about the rationality of assuming that agent a will assign a higher
weight to b, if b’s opinion is closer to her own, as both Regan, Colyvan and
Markovchick-Nicholls (2006) and Hegselmann and Krause (2002) assume.
The assumption is rational insofar as it is rational to expect that people will
tend to converge towards those positions that are closer to theirs5.
While that can possibly be the case, one can think of many scenarios
where it needs not to. For instance, one can imagine that a mother would
put much respect or trust in her son, even if she did not agree with her son’s
opinions. Similarly, the president of a nation would give a high weight to the
president of another nation with which she had strong economic interests,
even when, taken out of context, her opinions would differ greatly from those
of that president. The possible cases are many but these examples should be
sufficient to clarify the point being made here, namely that distance-based
assignment of weights is rational only when some assumptions about the
deliberating committee are made.
In light of the aforementioned problems, the methods in Hegselmann and
Krause (2002) and Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls (2006) should
4“Confidence interval” is used here in the sense of Hegselmann and Krause (2002),
not to be confused with the homonymous concept used in statistics.
5So far, I have taken both methods in Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls
(2006) and Hegselmann and Krause (2002) to be normative in character. Whereas the
choice is not problematic for the former, it is arguable whether the latter should be
taken as a normative model, at least in the authors’ intentions. In principle, however,
there seems to be no reason for prohibiting that the bounded confidence model be taken
normatively, regardless of the original authors’ intentions.
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be taken as one of a number of possible solutions, each of which has advan-
tages as well as disadvantages. It is in the light of those considerations that
in the next section I will present an alternative method for assigning weights,
one that seems particularly fruitful, for example, for counterbalancing the
dynamics that tend to make a group split (polarize) on very sensitive issues.
4.3 Social influence and networks
The method for the assignment of weights suggested in this chapter takes
its rationality from the observation that, in real life, groups do not come in
the idealized form that is often assumed by most consensus models. Lehrer
and Wagner (1981) assume that agents give honest assignments of weights.
[. . . ] if, on the contrary, the weights represent an egoistic attempt
to manipulate social decisions making, then it is unacceptable to
use those weights though they were a disinterested summary of
information.” (Lehrer and Wagner 1981, 74).
However, honest assignments cannot be taken as a realistic assumption.
A member of a group may tend towards the opinion of other members not
necessarily because those opinions are similar to hers, but also for a number
of other possible reasons, e.g. political or economic interest, kinship, etc. In
other words, in several concrete scenarios, people are not, so to speak, “on
equal grounds”, but rather “networked”, to wit, organized in a structure
(a network) in which the degree of connectedness of different agents varies
depending on that agent’s position in the network.
Theorists have recently drawn attention to the phenomenon of network
formation in initially homogenous groups, and on how a network can affect
the flow of information within a group6. In general, a network is a structure
of connected elements (e.g. the agents in a model) that can be represented
mathematically with a graph. A graph is an ordered pair P = (N,E) which
includes a set N of nodes, or vertices, and a set E of edges (see Weisstein
2011). The nodes of a graph, as used in this chapter, represent the agents in
a consensus model, and the edges represent the existing connections among
agents.
The literature on networks has evolved especially in economics and
sociology. DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) address the problem of
how persuasion biases can be more effective depending on how well-connected
6For a recent comprehensive treatment of networks in economics and sociology see
Jackson (2008).
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an agent is in the group. Biases, persuasion, and the structure of a network
can arise from disparate situations — a city council’s members may be linked
more or less strongly by political, economic and even family-related interests.
Similarly, the members of an environmental panel may be linked by reasons
of national interest, ideology or a number of other factors.
It is in the interest of a modeler who wants to find an optimal solution
for how agents should assign weights to each other, to maximize or minimize
the effects of a network structure among the agents within a deliberating
group. If, for example, a panel is composed of members (agents) whose
opinions are known to tend towards the opinion of a known node (agent) in
the network, an appropriate schema of weights would reduce the influence
of the central node on the other nodes7.
In the following sections, I will first discuss the existing literature on
assigning weights on the basis of the structure of a group (section 4.4), and
then formulate a proposal for assigning weights that is based on the idea
of maximizing or minimizing biases and the effects of a network in a group
(section 4.5).
4.4 Deriving weights from network struc-
tures
The idea of deriving weights from a network structure was first suggested
by French. French (1956) analyses the convergence properties of different
networks and provides a number of theorems for convergence of different
“networked groups”. The theory in French (1956) is only sketched out, and
the proofs are presented informally, but Golub and Jackson (2007) address
the same question — which networks allow a deliberative group to reach
consensus — and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence
of the opinion of the members in a networked group.
Golub and Jackson (2007) propose a convergence model in which the
flow of information in the group is conveyed through the existent network,
even though their approach does not allow agents to give different weights
to one another when they are equidistant in the network. Similarly, the idea
in French (1956) was to sketch a mathematical theory of social influence,
where influence (“power” in French’s words) is represented by the capacity
of one node to “exert influence” on another node (French 1956, 182-183).
Both French (1956) and Golub and Jackson (2007), however, deviate
7This case is exemplified in figure 4.2 — see section 4.5.2 — and will be treated in
that section.
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from the intentions of the Lehrer-Wagner model in that they have an
essentially descriptive approach. They assume that there is a certain network
of connections and influences among members of a group, and that an edge
between two elements, a and b, of that group will affect in a specific way
the dependence relation between the opinions of a and b. The question they
answer is “what we can say about how a consensus, if any, will evolve, when
such dependence relations are present in a group?”.
In this chapter I suggest two main variations from the aforementioned
literature. In the first place, the method suggested in the foregoing sections
allows for more flexibility in the assignment of weights, that is, weights are
not fixed for all links but are: a) dependent on the total distance (in number
of links) between agents, and b) some variations are allowed to occur in the
attribution of weights even when agents’ mutual positions are equidistant.
The second and most important variation from a derivation of weights
based on the network structure of a group is that here the idea of a normative
model for consensus formation, as it was described in Lehrer and Wagner
(1981), is maintained. The idea, that is, will be to use the network structure
in order to maximize or minimize, according to the intentions of the modeler,
the structure of influence relations in a group.
4.5 Network-dependent weights
4.5.1 A balanced network
The idea behind a derivation of weights from the underlying network structure
of the deliberating group is that there are scenarios in which agents assign
weights based on their preferences for, or biases towards, other agents.
Imagine the following scenario in which the group is composed of diplo-
mats from different countries. For simplicity I will assume that each agent
(each diplomat) has exactly two proximate neighbors8. Agent A is neighbor
with agents B and C, B will then be neighbor with A (the relation of being
neighbor is symmetric) and with D, C on the other hand is neighbor with A
and E. Again, for simplicity, I assume that the group is small and that it is
closed, that is, there is a member F that has E and D as neighbors. Figure
4.1 represents such a group.
For example, neighboring countries may have common interests: trade,
military security, environmental safety, etc. As the distance between two
8An agent is a “proximate neighbor” with another agent if there is an edge that
connects them without passing through any other agent.
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countries increases, however, those factors will most likely play less and less
a role in their preferences towards one another.
From figure 4.1, a list of instructions for the derivation of weights can be
formulated, as illustrated in table 4.1. Table 4.1 gives a simple set of rules for
the derivation of weights based on the relative distance (in number of nodes)
from agent to agent. For example, if a = 1; b = 0.8; c = 0.5; d = 0.3; e = 0,
then wad ∈ (0.5, 0.3), because agent A is two links away from agent D.
According to the schema, an agent will give herself a higher weight, her
proximate neighbor a slightly lower weight, her next neighbor an even lower
weight, and so on. The schema can be reformulated for any number of nodes
in a ring-shaped network.
Hartmann, Martini and Sprenger (2009) analyze the case of a ring-shaped
network, like the one in figure 4.1, in order to provide a formal definition
of epistemic peers and investigate the dynamics of consensus formation.
Initially, the paper assumes a stricter schema for the assignment of weights,
such that if agent A is distant x nodes from agent B, then there is only one
possible weight that wab and wba can take. In other words, with reference to
table 1, each “ . . .∈ (a, b) . . . ” [or (b, c), etc.] is substituted by “. . . = α . . . ”
[or β, etc.], where α, β, etc. are fixed values between 0 and 1.
9The items listed below should be read as follows: If and only if the number of edges
between x and y is 0, then the weight that x gives to y is a value in the open interval (a,
b). Similarly for the other cases (e.g. the number of edges between x and y is 1). The
idea is that as the number of edges (that is, the distance) between vertices (agents) in the
network increases, the weights decrease. Similar tables can be written, at the discretion
of the modeler, in order to make weights increase, decrease or remain constant depending
on the number of edges between two vertices.
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Table 4.1: Weight-derivation for a six node graph9
1. wyx ∈ (a, b) ⇐⇒ # edges between x and y is 0 (case for x = y)
2. wyx ∈ (b, c) ⇐⇒ # edges between x and y is 1 (where a ≤ b)
3. wyx ∈ (c, d) ⇐⇒ # edges between x and y is 2 (where b ≤ c)
4. wyx ∈ (d, e) ⇐⇒ # edges between x and y is 3 (where c ≤ d)
Hartmann, Martini and Sprenger have shown (see Hartmann, Martini
and Sprenger 2009, 116: Theorem 1 ) that the consensual results deriving
from the model are equal to the arithmetic average of the values in the
column P (see equation 2.2 in section 2.2.1.) of the deliberators’ opinions.
In the same paper, it was shown that also by relaxing the schema for the
assignment of weights (as from table 4.1), the results are robust; that is, the
consensual value will be approximately equal (≈) to the arithmetic average
of the column P.
What those results mean is that whenever the group forms a symmetric
network, like the one of figure 4.1 (or any isomorphic extension of that
network with more agents), the different weights assigned by agents to other
agents balance each other out and the situation is equivalent to that of a
group where agents assign no weights to one another. The analysis, so far, is
still at the descriptive level, and in Hartmann, Martini and Sprenger (2009)
it was used in order to justify an “equal weight view” among epistemic peers
(see Kelly 2005; Elga 2007).
From the normative point of view, however, if the choice of the modeler
is to derive weights from a network structure like the one presented in this
section, the implications are that whenever such structure of relations, or
power structure (as in French 1956), is present, then the role of matrix of
weights in the Lehrer-Wagner model is null or almost null. In other words,
if the goal of the modeler is to reduce the influence of opinion that members
exert towards each other in the group represented in figure 4.1 (or any similar
group), then we can be sure that the members’ influences will simply cancel
each other out in such group.
4.5.2 Other networks
The example provided in section 4.5.1 is only one of numerous possible
network formations that can in principle be studied in order to provide some
normative guidelines for the modeler of consensual opinion formation. A
thorough analysis of the dynamics of consensus formation with the Lehrer-
Wagner model has yet to be carried out and is beyond the scope of this
4.5. NETWORK-DEPENDENT WEIGHTS 59
chapter. The following remarks will serve as an illustration of the many
theoretical possibilities that such analysis can disclose.
The ring-shaped network presented in the previous section was an example
of an extremely regular network, in which all the weights even each other
out. It could, as stated before, represent a group of countries each of which
has a bias towards its neighbors, and the finding there was that when that
is the case, the global effect of all the biases involved does not influence the
results of the consensus.
In other networks, the same effect may not occur, and the biases might
influence the formation of consensus. Indeed French shows that there can be
cases where “[a member of the group] will influence the others but no one
will influence him.” (French 1956, 189); when that is the case, in the limit
all members will converge to that member’s opinion. For instance, there
may be groups in which one of the agents plays the role of the leader, and to
whom all other agents assign a high degree of respect or confidence (a high
weight). An example of this is what Elga calls ‘gurus’, that is “people to
whom we should defer entirely” (Elga 2007, 478). Identifying the presence
of a guru in a group might have important epistemic implications.
The epistemic value of the presence of a guru was one of the points left
open in Hartmann, Martini and Sprenger (2009): “[. . . ] we did not address
the question of whether the leader bias is beneficial or not — this depends
on the leader’s factual competence and honesty. The Lehrer-Wagner model
is silent on these questions.” (Hartmann, Martini and Sprenger 2009, 120).
The Lehrer-Wagner model, when weights are assigned subjectively, is
not sensitive to the presence of a leader in the group. However, in a star-like
network (see figure 4.2), the consensus will be biased towards the opinion of
the leader10.
Deriving weights from a given star-shaped network would, on one hand,
allow us to represent a real case of consensus formation in case a leader should
be present. On the other hand, from the normative point of view, it would
allow us to reduce or maximize the leader’s influence on the other members.
The presence of a leader can be regarded as a positive or a negative effect
on the group, depending on whether the opinion of the leader in question is
considered “good” (e.g. truth conducive) or “bad” (e.g. misleading).
With the scheme for deriving weights exemplified in table 4.1, if properly
modified, it is possible to balance the weights that agents assign to one
another so that the opinion of the leader will be weighted higher or lower,
depending on which of the two the modeler thinks of as the appropriate
10For an explanation of this see Hartmann, Martini and Sprenger (2009, 120: Theorem
3 )
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strategy. For example, if we deem the leader to be a negative influence on
the group, the schema for the assignment of weights could be built along
the lines of table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2: Weight-derivation for a nine-node graph
1. wyx ∈ (a, b) ⇐⇒ # edges between x and y is 0 [case for x = y]
2. wyx ∈ (b, c) ⇐⇒ # edges between x and y is 2 (where a 0 b)
3. wyx ∈ (d, e) ⇐⇒ # edges between x and y is 1 (where d c)
The derivation of weights from table 4.2 causes the influence of a leader,
which would normally sway the results of the consensus, to be diminished.
Agents will still be giving more confidence (or preference) to the leader, due
to the preference structure of the network, but their opinions towards the
leader, will be automatically scaled down. The idea is that the consensus
should be a measure of an agent’s independent opinion on the matter under
consideration, so that factors affecting that independence, if possible to
detect, should be minimized.
4.6. JUSTIFYING NETWORK-DEPENDENT WEIGHTS 61
4.6 Justifying network-dependent weights
4.6.1 Normative justification
At the end of section 4.2 it was said that the method for deriving weights
suggested in this chapter should be taken as one of many possible methods,
each of which will have advantages as well as drawbacks. In this section I
will enumerate a number of reasons for justifying weight derivation on the
basis of the underlying network structure. While the focus of this chapter is
on the normative advantages, as in the spirit of the original formulation of
the Lehrer-Wagner model, I will provide some reasons for a descriptive take
on the method as well.
A normative interpretation of the Lehrer-Wagner model was the one
endorsed in Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls (2006). According to
that paper, weights should be assigned as a function of the distance between
agents’ opinions. This is rational, in those cases in which agents assign
higher weights to agents with opinions similar to their own; for instance,
we may think that musicians may assign higher weight to musicians with
musical tastes similar to their own.
That scenario, however, need not always be the case. As I explained
in section 4.5, we can imagine cases in which we give a higher weight to
someone who is “close” to us, or whom we view as the leader, no matter
what her opinion on the matter under deliberation is. In all these cases
the problem is whether such preference, the influence of the network on the
group’s decision, is epistemically advantageous or not.
The main reason for normatively adopting a network-based derivation of
weights is that it is in principle possible to exploit the epistemic advantages
of a certain network or minimize its influence, depending on whether the
particular network is positively or negatively affecting deliberation. That
there are biases in groups and small committees — for example the panel
of experts that are the object of the case study in Regan, Colyvan and
Markovchick-Nicholls (2006) — is an assumption that does not need many
arguments in its defense. If that is the case, however, the opinions of the
members will move in one way or another according to the forces and biases
that are present in the group. So far, this is the descriptive account of
networks and social groups studied in French (1956).
Once we get to know what type of network is in place, however, the
problem is whether we would like to maximize or minimize its effects. With
the method suggested in Lehrer and Wagner (1981) — subjective assignment
of weights — the effects of a network will be maximally evident, since agents
will assign weights following their own biases completely. As it was argued
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in section 4.3, it is unrealistic to assume, like Lehrer and Wagner (1981)
do, that weights represent an “honest assignment” of respect or trust from
member to member.
On the other hand, the proposals in Hegselmann and Krause (2002) and
Regan, Colyvan and Markovchick-Nicholls (2006), while partially avoiding
the shortcomings of a fully subjective assignment, base their rationality on
an assumption that holds only in special cases, namely, when it is in fact
the case that I give a higher weight to those agents whose opinion is closer
to my own.
The proposal in this chapter, instead, was to assign weights on the
basis of the network structure of a group, in order to exploit or reduce its
effect. Clearly in this case the results from convergence will be maximally
manipulable, not by the agents in the model anymore, but rather by the
modeler herself. While the exposition of the principles according to which
one should want to minimize or maximize the effects of a network cannot
find a place in this chapter, it is clear that a modeler should support its
strategy with sound principles from psychology and decision theory in order
to formulate an appropriate schema for assigning weights similar to those
given above in tables 4.1 and 4.2.
4.6.2 Decriptive justification
Some interpretations take the Lehrer-Wagner model as a descriptive model
of consensus formation11. In the second part of this section I will justify a
network-depended assignment of weights from a descriptive point of view.
A descriptive interpretation of the Lehrer-Wagner model claims that the
model is a representation, however idealized, of how consensus is formed,
rather than a deliberating method that groups should use in order to achieve
agreement.
Agents often seek consensus by deliberating and putting their opinions
together, and trying to come up with a “group opinion”. But the process is
not one of pure amalgamation, as some pooling algorithms may imply, rather
it is, normally, an iterative process, in which agents come closer and closer
to each other’s opinions until a single one emerges as the consensual one.
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that agents will tend to assign (perhaps
11Indeed early versions of consensus models that use the properties of convergent
Markov chains make reference to DeGroot (1974), who takes the model to be descriptive
in character. In fact, if the Lehrer-Wagner model is taken as an “impossibility of
disagreement” result, as Lehrer (1976) does, it is necessary to take the model to be
descriptively accurate, and not only rational from the normative view point. This point
cannot be developed further in the space of this chapter.
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unconsciously) some trust or confidence to other agents. The higher the
degree of trust I assign to agent i, the more i’s opinion will influence my
own opinion while moving towards the sought consensus.
How the mathematics of the Lehrer-Wagner model applies to the sit-
uation just depicted is fairly straightforward. The iterative nature of the
deliberating process is captured by the subsequent rounds of the model
towards convergence, and the measure of trust is represented by the weights
that agents assign to each other. In the chosen model, where the opinions
of some influence my own opinion to an extent greater than the opinion of
others, at each round my opinion will be driven mostly by those agents to
whom I have given higher weights — this is the idea that my opinion at each
round will be affected mostly by those agents that I deem more trustworthy.
An interesting extension of the idea of describing consensus formation
through the Lehrer-Wagner models is to apply the theory of networks to its
system of weight assignment. Some networks will, in concrete cases, affect
the formation of consensus, and it is in principle possible to study the effects
of the network on the consensus that is produced.
A very straightforward example will clarify the latter point. Figure 4.3,
represents a group in which two subgroups are present, groups (B,D,E, F )
and (C,G,H, I), and the two are linked by a “mediator” (A).








In this case it is clear the mediator plays a central role in the formation
of a consensus, as it is the only one that shares a certain measure of trust
or confidence with the two subgroups. Indeed, were A to be deleted from
figure 4.3, together with the two edges that link it with B and C, then the
two subgroups would not converge to a consensus, but to two independent
opinions, one driven by the communication of trust in subgroup (B,D,E, F ),
and the other driven by communication of trust in subgroup (C,G,H, I).
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As French (1956) saw, one can study the way a group converges to one
consensus, or to more and distinct opinions, by looking at the distribution
of weights in the matrix W characteristic of a specific group. That matrix,
in turn, will likely be dependent on the network of the group, thus providing
a descriptive justification for a network-dependent assignment of weights.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter started off by considering a well known model for consensus
formation, the Lehrer-Wagner model. The use of a formal model for the
analysis of consensus formation, as well as the development of a normative
theory of consensus, is a very fruitful approach for the study of consensus in
social epistemology.
The model developed by Lehrer and Wagner, however, besides providing
such a useful tool of investigation, also opens a number of problems, among
which the problem of how a group of agents should assign weights to one
another, or how to represent the distribution of weights (trust, confidence)
that is reasonable to assume takes place in a group that is seeking consensus.
The paper does not claim that there is a one-fits-all solution for deter-
mining weights; for example, the methods suggested in Regan, Colyvan and
Markovchick-Nicholls (2006) and Hegselmann and Krause (2002) seem to
be fit for certain situations but unfit for others.
The proposal of this chapter was to take some ideas from French (1956)
and, more recently, Golub and Jackson (2007), on how to derive weights
from the network structure of a group. Those ideas were extended to a
normative theory of weight assignment, where the analysis of a network is
used in order to minimize or maximize its effects in the group, according to
the modeler’s judgment. The approach is particularly fruitful in those cases
in which we wish to obtain a rational and unbiased consensus in networked
groups. The examples provided in this chapter constitute only a small
fraction of a potentially large number of possible applications and further
lines of investigation.
Chapter 5
Consensus in economics PART 1
5.1 Disagreement and consensus in science
In the previous chapters I analyzed the topics of disagreement and consensus
from the point of view of epistemology. In that context, disagreement and
consensus were treated from a purely abstract point of view. It did not
matter, for example, what the context of disagreement was, whether on
scientific matters, on everyday issues (like in the split-the-bill case — cf.
section 3.2), or other situations. All that was assumed in chapters 2-4, was
that disagreement is on factual matters.
The topics of disagreement and consensus, however, are specific of the
contexts they appear in. For example, disagreement in science is almost
never truly irreducible. Real world epistemic agents are hardly ever epistemic
peers in the sense in which epistemology defines them. Evidence is normally
incomplete, and is not equally available to all agents. For those and probably
several other reasons, the treatment of “real-world” disagreement should be
context-specific. That is the case for disagreement and consensus in science,
the subject of the second part of this thesis in chapters 5, 6, and 7.
The forthcoming sections will introduce the problem of consensus and
disagreement in science, and specifically in the economic sciences. As it was
the case for chapter 4 (cf. section 4.1), the meaning of ‘consensus’ should be
taken more liberally than in the first two chapters. In this context, consensus,
intended as convergence of views, can arise for a variety of reasons, and
it would be too demanding to require a perfect convergence of individual
beliefs in order to be able to speak of “scientific consensus”.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. On one hand I want to motivate the
search for consensus in economics. While concurring with much philosophical
literature on the need for dissenting opinions, theories and methodologies in
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science, I intend to highlight here some reasons as to why a certain degree
of consensus is desirable in economics.
The second goal is to confront the myth of rational consensus in economics.
While admitting that much of the discourse in this chapter could be applied to
other social sciences, the type of examples and the specific matters discussed
mandate caution when applying the same arguments to other sciences. It is
indeed arguable that the extent to which one can expect rational consensus
to arise in a specific science will depend on the advancement of that science,
its methodology, its object of investigation and so on. When that is the case,
then, one cannot hope to provide one-size-fits-all solutions.
5.1.1 Consensus: rational causes and social causes
In this section I will outline some of the factors which may or may not justify
a want for either consensus or disagreement in science. Should consensus be
a goal for science? Or should we prefer to let disagreement thrive among
scientists and theories alike? Much of the answers to those questions will
depend on the stated goals of scientific communities, which in turn will
depend on the preferences and desires of the scientists that are members
of those communities. It seems possible, however, to give at least some
normative indications of why certain goals should be favored over others, as
it has been done repeatedly in the philosophy of science literature.
On the one hand, Objectivism and Progressivism1 are inclined to see
disagreement as a pathological situation in science; that is, as the indication
of an imperfect state of the science itself. Those positions take from Kuhn
the idea that disagreement is symptomatic of a “pre-paradigm” phase (the
stage of immaturity of a science) (Kuhn 1970). In other words, according to
objectivism and progressivism, disagreement is present because the science
has not established a paradigm on which to build cumulative progress.
Some progressivists or objectivists also make the additional assumption that
successive levels of consensus constitute closer and closer approximations to
the best formulation of a science2.
On the other end, philosophers like Mill, Feyerabend, and Solomon
defend the idea that disagreement in science is not only uneliminable, but all
the more desirable. Any specific consensus which forms in science is likely
1By Progressivism it is meant here the attitude, typical of positivism, of seeing the
course of science as a cumulative one, in which better and better theories are produced as
the science evolves. Kuhn uses the more colorful term “Whig historian [of science]” to
refer to a progressivist view of the development of science (see Kuhn 2000, 54 and 282).
2For an essential survey of some of the assumptions of Objectivism and Progressivism
see Solomon (2001, chapter 1 and chapter 6)
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to conceal at least some hidden and perhaps partly arbitrary assumptions
of that science. To the contrary, disagreement will often highlight those
assumptions, and be a motor for the progress and development of science.
A typical claim made by supporters of this stance on the disagreement-
or-consensus debate, is that a consensus is hardly ever based on purely
rational grounds. Agreement, in other words, is not justified solely by the
methodological principles of a science, but is often more likely to be the
product of external factors, and is therefore an undesirable side effect of the
scientific community, rather than the science itself. Agreement can arise due
to social dynamics (e.g. political pressure, psychological conformity, etc.), or
the more or less benevolent rhetorical work of scientists trying to convince
other scientists. Whereas some consider the scientist’s self interest to be a
feature conducive of scientific progress (see Kitcher 1990), social dynamics
and rhetorical arguments can also be detrimental to the goals of science (see
Russell 2009).
It is arguable whether anyone, in the philosophy of science literature,
holds either of the two extreme views presented above, yet it is clear that there
is a stark contrast between advocates of the rational causes for consensus,
and those who see much of scientific consensus as the product of social
and/or political causes (Solomon 2001, 5). A pluralist attitude towards the
problem would most likely admit that both positions are supported by cogent
arguments, none of which, taken in isolation, is sufficient for rejecting the
claims of the opponent. In a pluralist attitude, in the following sections I will
limit the scope of my own arguments to providing some positive claims as to
why consensus is desirable in science, and to show how such arguments are
in principle compatible with the classical arguments provided by supporters
of the “disagreement-first” stance in science.
In section 5.1.2 I outline some of the arguments traditionally presented
in favor of disagreement, while in section 5.1.3 I provide three reasons for
wanting at least a certain degree of consensus in science. Such list should
not be taken as exhaustive of the possible reasons for wanting consensus in
science; the selection is rather on a number of reasons that fit the economic
sciences in particular. Furthermore, I will explain why the reasons I give for
wanting consensus in science are not in conflict with those views, presented
in section 5.1.2, which champion disagreement in its stead.
5.1.2 The value of disagreement
The desirability of disagreement in science is often attributed to the inter-
actional value of dissensus and variety of views and opinions. A “healthy
dose” of disagreement can only be desirable in science, if science is intended
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as an interactional discipline. Even the most cumulative disciplines such as
mathematics undergo, from time to time, major makeovers. Progression is
not always smooth and linear, it can take steps, jumps, and u-turns, and it
is often the case that disagreement within a discipline, or subfield of it, is
the motor allowing and promoting such progression.
“Conceptual heterogeneity is necessary for the continued devel-
opment of a science if science is construed as a selection process.
Some commentators on science praise “pluralism.” Let a thou-
sand theories bloom.” (Hull 1988, 521), see also Solomon (1994,
328)3.
“Let a thousand theories bloom” can be taken as a political, pragmatic,
or epistemic stance. From the political perspective, tolerating dissent can
be seen as a just practice in science. Giving room for debate among people
and programs who deviate from the predominant paradigm is a principle
of democracy, where some degree of ability to make one’s voice heard is
granted to all. A pluralistic stance can be motivated by pragmatic reasons
too: Variety in research topics is likely to please more scientists, or it may
be practically impossible to reach a consensus that eliminates competing
theories, and so on. The limits to the acceptance of dissent in the scientific
field are often procedural ones: The decision on what are “acceptable
scientific statements” is normally based on adherence to the dicta of the
accepted method in that specific science4.
But allowing disagreement in science, according to some, is not only
just, or practically necessary, but also conducive of better science; this is an
epistemic reason for pluralism in science. The epistemic role of disagreement
has been the subject of chapter 2, although one thing is to outline, in
abstract terms, the role that disagreement has in the process of holding
or withdrawing one’s belief; a different task is to explain, at the macro
level, what disagreement has to do with the success and validity of entire
theories and paradigms in science. At the macro level the epistemic value
of disagreement is often attributed to the positive effects of collaboration
and judgment aggregation. More on those two aspects will be said later on
in this and the next chapter, but for now I will focus in the the rest of this
section on some specific defenses of the goal of disagreement.
3The metaphor of the thousand flowers is attributed to Mao Zedong as the motto of
the Hundred Flowers Campaign.
4The statement can be confirmed by a quick look at the stated requirements for
acceptance of most scientific journals. Rejections from publication are often based on
grounds of “form”, rather than ones of “content”.
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According to Solomon, a widespread consensus5 (no pun intended) among
philosophers of science and historians of science is that, in the ongoing
scientific debate “dissent is seen as the stage of competition, consensus the
stage when there is a winner of the competition.” (Solomon 1994, 99). Even
though we might recognize that a plurality of views might benefit some
secondary goals of scientific investigation (such as, for instance, pleasing the
scientists’ personal research interests), in the end it seems that what counts
is that intellectual conflict be resolved, with the formulation of a theory, or
the gain of some “piece of knowledge”, regarding that part of reality that
the science in question investigates.
Even the epistemic virtue of disagreement, in the light of the former
considerations, can thus be seen as a transitory state. Disagreement, plurality
of views, collaboration between scientists with different methodologies and
different opinions, is only conducive of more qualitative science; but the
end point is the final product, a theory or, more generally, a piece of
knowledge, stripped of objections and contradictions. Not all scholars,
including Solomon, agree with the aforementioned consensus. Solomon
attributes to Longino the view that disagreement is not just a “means to
finding “the best theory””, but also the “appropriate result of inquiry” in
science (Solomon 1994).
An eminent proponent of such view is John Stuart Mill. In chapter 2
of On Liberty, Mill presents a number of arguments that are representative
of the views that Longino and Solomon defend: Consensus is not the
only, and perhaps not even the principal, end-point, or ultimate goal, of
scientific investigation. The reasons for wanting disagreement in science are
summarized by Mill as follows.
First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may,
for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to
assume our own infallibility.
Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may,
and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since
the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never
the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions
that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.
Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the
whole truth, unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously
and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it,
be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or
5Solomon calls it the “consensus on consensus” (Solomon 1994, 98)
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feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly,
the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost,
or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character
and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal profession,
inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing
the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or
personal experience.
(Mill 1859, 128)
It is not the goal of this chapter to analyze the reasons Mill adduces for
wanting disagreement and rejecting consensus. Prima facie, they all seem to
be valid reasons for claiming that disagreement is no less an end-point of
science than consensus. The first reason appeals to the fact that even the
strongest consensus might turn out to be false, hence the need for dissenters
of even the strongest opinions. The second reason states that consensuses
do not always contain “all the truth” on a certain subject, hence that
disagreement is needed in oder to reveal those parts of the consensus which
are not true. The third reason is that it is epistemically stronger, according
to Mill, to possess an opinion and at the same time know why the deniers of
that opinion are wrong, rather that to possess an opinion simpliciter. While
in the domain of logic having a proof of a certain statement is enough to
guarantee that its negation is false, scientific, social, political, and in general
most opinions, are not known with the same strength with which logical
statements are. The fourth reason is mostly a variation on the third one,
and for the purposes of this chapter, equivalent.
Leaving Mill aside for the moment, I will go back to his theses on
consensus in section 5.1.4, and show that they are compatible with at least
a number or equally good reasons for wanting consensus. But first, in the
next section, I will present the vindication for consensus.
5.1.3 The value of consensus
Any application of theories and models in science to concrete problems,
at least for those sciences that have such direct application, requires the
formulation of a coherent set of statement on which the practitioners are to
act. In other words, reasoned action requires a coherent principle of action,
a consensus. This is the pragmatic reason for wanting consensus in science.
It should be noted here that the term ‘consensus’ is used liberally in this
context; a consensus can be the product of bargaining, voting, aggregation
and so on, and takes the sense of “converging view”, or “converging numer-
ical value” (for example for probabilistic beliefs). To recall, in chapter 2
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consensus was opposed to compromise, where in the latter the group view
converges, even though the individuals may still retain their personal beliefs
on the subject matter. Nevertheless, in this context it seems unreasonably
demanding to require the consensus needed for action to retain the same
meaning it had in chapter 2. All that is needed for reasoned action is the
elimination of conflicting views, or contradictory statements, and the goal
can be achieved by a diversity of means, such as voting or deliberation.
The second motive for wanting a consensus in science is an epistemic one,
and has to do with some recent trends in social epistemology. Traditional
Cartesian epistemology attributes beliefs, knowledge, rationality and other
epistemic concepts to the individual alone; it is, in that sense, an individualis-
tic epistemology (see Solomon 1994; Goldman 2009a,b). Recent discussions
in social epistemology however — for an example, see List and Pettit (2011)
— suggest at least a partial redefinition of the concept of epistemic agent, such
that it includes certain types of groups and collectivities which function and
should be considered agents to all intents and purposes. If talk about group
agents seems strange in the context of science, consider how often scientific
theories, models, and views are attributed to research centers, universities,
or other institutions. It is not uncommon linguistic usage to claim that ‘such
and such research center has discovered a new protein [. . . ]’, or that ‘such
and such University has cut the budget for basic research by [. . . ] percent’.
The idea of taking groups as epistemic agents, however, is not only meant
to accommodate a linguistic use; some advocate that it is also rationally
motivated, and can be pragmatically advantageous. Pettit and List argue
that institutions trying to perpetuate themselves through time are by all
means better seen as agents, rather than simple aggregates of individuals6.
If such agents are to possess coherent sets of beliefs, aggregation is necessary
in order to form a consensus in the set of (possibly) diverse individual
opinions that make up the group. The need for consensus, therefore, becomes
equivalent to a rational person’s epistemic requirement of having a coherent
set of beliefs.
Finally, a third reason for wanting consensus in science is motivated
by a reflection on Kuhn’s work. Kuhn divides the timeline of a science
and its development into periods of “normality” (Kuhn 1970, Chapter III),
and periods of “crisis” and consequent change in paradigms (Kuhn 1970,
Chapters X-XII). One of the characteristics of the period of normality is
the fact that the majority of the scientific community works under a given
paradigm. What this means is that there is relatively little disagreement
about the validity of the assumptions of that specific paradigm and, as a
6For an introduction to the problem see Pettit (2004); List and Pettit (2005, 2011).
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consequence, there are relatively few resources dedicated to the pursuit of
other paradigms, even if there can still be plenty of disagreement within a
given paradigm. To give an example, the method of mathematical modeling
and econometric testing is, according to many, a paradigm in contemporary
economics, although this does not mean that there is no debate as to which
models are acceptable, which tests are valid, and so on.
In light of Kuhn’s subdivisions of sciences in periods of normality and
periods of crisis, one must notice that the consensus that exists when a
paradigm is left unchallenged allows for a better allocation of resources.
Assuming that a given paradigm is the best advancement of a science, up to
a specific time in history, then selective allocation of resources in periods of
normality prevents energies from going to support less efficient paradigms.
To use the same example as above, the current paradigm in economics
allows fewer resources to go into the development of historical approaches
to economics which, according to the paradigm, would deliver less benefit to
the science itself. This does not mean that the historical paradigm should
be ignored. Historians of economics develop their paradigm in parallel to
the mainstream one, only with fewer resources.
Probably the major objection to this Khunian argument for consensus,
comes from the observation that differential allocation of resources can bring
the science into a lock-in or path-dependence, where deviation from the
paradigm becomes harder and harder, because it implies a vast reallocation
of resources. A lock-in is not a negative phenomenon in itself, but it is when
the path (the paradigm) in question is an inefficient one, albeit it being
still consented upon by the community of researchers. Arguably there was
widespread consensus around the geocentric model of the universe, and one
could argue that resistance to the new evidence brought by the telescope
was at least in part due to such lock-in effect.
On the other hand, equal allocation of resources is not always the best
alternative, and is in fact the least desirable when a clear “by-far best
paradigm” can be identified. For example, it would be wasteful to share a
government’s resources equally among, say, western (or ‘evidence-based’)
medicine, homeopathy and acupuncture, if the latter two could be shown to
contribute to the population’s health to a much lesser extent than western
medicine. It is also for this third reason then, that a certain degree of
conformity (consensus) in science is desirable.
5.1.4 Compatibility of disagreement with consensus
While it is perfectly fine to claim that both the advocates of disagreement
and those of consensus have good reasons for defending their claims, if one
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wants to be liberal on the subject, one should at least show that the claims
on one side are compatible with those made on the other side. In this section
I argue that the two positions outlined in sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 are indeed
compatible. The claim that science should pursue only variety of opinions
would be just as narrow-minded as the claim that science should pursue the
elimination of all disagreement, and strive for consensus alone.
To see how the reasons provided in section 5.1.3 are compatible with
Mill’s theses one should start by noticing that Mill’s theses are concerned
with the epistemology of science in the first place. If by ‘science’ we mean
solely the formulation of theories and models of the world, and of method-
ologies for explaining and possibly predicting the world, then it is clear
that disagreement might have more epistemic benefit than consensus. If
science were taken to be abstract investigation only, the first reason (sec-
tion 5.1.3) would not apply, the second reason would be mostly a perhaps
pedantic subtlety, and only the third reason would have some bearing on
the disagreement-consensus debate. One needs to balance the allocation
of resources to the most promising line of investigation, with the need of
keeping research in an open-minded framework, as Mill suggests. But, as
Mill rightly argues, in an epistemic context consensus is never the end-point
of science.
Nevertheless, economics is not a purely abstract or theoretical science.
The idea of this chapter and the following chapters is to take economics as a
science concerned primarily with economies (that is economic phenomena,
as they appear in different contexts), and economic policies. Clearly the
expectations from economics become stronger, when one views the science
as being concerned with economies and policy making, but it is hard to deny
that economics gains its reputation and value from the very fact that it is,
by many, deemed capable of dealing with concrete economic problems. Not
just a science that only explains economic phenomena, but one that predicts
and manipulates the economic environment as well. This type of science is
concerned with what Reiss (2008) calls ‘social capacities’.7.
In that sense, economics is a “toolbox science”, where investigation and
manipulation go hand in hand. For policy making, however, the epistemolog-
ical problems Mill mentions should be put in the background. Lack of clear
7In Reiss (2008) knowledge about social capacities is “knowledge about causal
relationships that are stable across suitable ranges of circumstances”. Of course, a number
of renowned methodologists think that economics can not achieve knowledge of social
capacities, nor of course the ability to predict and manipulate economic reality (see Reiss
2008, chapter 9 - Social Capacities). In this and the other chapters I side with Reiss’s
optimism about the possibility of achieving social capacities in economics, and chapter 6
will suggest part of a methodology for achieving that goal.
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and explicit guidelines (which have to be agreed on), verifiable predictions
(on which there need to be some consensus), and so on do not serve the
interest of an applied science, even a pluralistic one. Different methodologies
and theories can be admitted at the theoretical level, but contrasts and
disagreements need to be eliminated if the goal is to evaluate a piece of
economic knowledge against the results of policy making.
In conclusion to this section, one can see that the reasons for wanting
consensus, outlined in section 5.1.3, apply mostly to economics as an applied
science, whereas Mill’s theses apply mostly to economics as a theoretical
enterprise, and the fact that the distinction between the two is often blurred
does not help the debate, at least in the field of economic applications. The
reason is that any science which aims at giving policy advice (or technological
advice) needs to evaluate its methodology against the results from policy
making. In order to be open to evaluation, however, a methodology needs to
be at least in principle identifiable, and identifiability quite clearly requires
at least a certain degree of consensus.
The debate whether it is more important to have consensus or disagree-
ment in science, and in particular in economics, is probably not going to be
easily settled. In the preceding sections, however, I hope to have been able
to at least show that, on one hand, consensus is one of the desiderata in
economics, and secondly, that such a desideratum is not in conflict with Mill’s
(and his successors’) thesis on the importance of disagreement in science. In
the foregoing sections I will take up the problem of how consensus is formed
in economic sciences.
5.2 The normative question
5.2.1 Stating the normative question
Accepted that consensus is one of the desiderata in economics, the second
task of this chapter is to see what ought to drive the formation of such
consensus. Here one needs to distinguish between a factual question about
consensus formation in economics, and a normative one. The former asks
how a consensus is, as a matter of fact, driven by this or that factor, political
or methodological, rhetorical or evidential, and so on. The latter question,
on the other hand, has as its ultimate goal a normative theory of consensus
formation in economics. Such theory would try to delineate what criteria
should be used, in order to evaluate the truth or falsity of a certain economic
matter (a single economic statement, a group of statements, or a whole
theory), on which economic consensus has formed or ought to form. The
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normative question that will guide the rest of this and the next chapters can
then be formulated as follows:
What criteria should regulate the acceptability or non acceptability of a
specific economic consensus as a piece of economic knowledge?
Some remarks are in place here. Firstly, a criterion should identify
economic statements that can be turned into policy advice, at least to a
certain extent. Clearly some statements in economics, like in science in
general, can be underdetermined with respect to the world, because they
are too general, or vague. Such statements can still be considered economic
knowledge, and even be economically relevant, but may not be suitable for
any policy recommendation. If that is the case, evaluating the acceptability
of a given consensus may be pointless, since, in the spirit of Mill, we could
argue that any purely theoretical stand benefits more from the presence
of disagreement than the existence of a consensus. An exception may be
made insofar as a specific theoretical consensus might positively influence a
direction of research. Even when that is the case, any consensus criterion
should still keep as its goals the formation of consensus on social capacities.
Secondly, the notion of knowledge used in the formulation above should
be taken as a fallibilist notion. In other words economic statements can
always turn out to be false, but in so far as we can justify them to the best
of our abilities, they can justifiably become part of our stock of “economic
knowledge”, on which we act and promote policies. The epistemological
standards for ‘knowledge’ are often stronger: Knowledge is justified true belief,
where the concept of ‘justification’ varies across different epistemological
stances. However, it does not seem proper of a pragmatic approach, as is
the one undertaken in this chapter, to suggest a methodology that can help
answer economic questions once and for all. All that the normative question
I am considering asks is for a “best answer”. It will become clear in the
following sections what is meant by that; for now, suffice it to say that a
method should be allowed to be fallible, at least when what one has in mind
is “applied theory”, as it is the case here.
Thirdly, it is clear that assuming a realist perspective, as the question
above does, is not an innocent assumption. Consensus in science, according
to a realist, would ideally converge towards the truth (with or without
capital ‘T’ (see Mäki 1995; McCloskey 1995)), or the right theories. An
instrumentalist, on the other hand, may defend the thesis that consensus must
ideally converge towards those theories or models that are most successful,
or which produce the best results. The problem is open: Any philosophical
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account able to uniquely identify a certain goal, will want a consensus that
forms in the direction of that goal. The space of this chapter does not allow
for further investigation into this matter. And, for the moment being, I will
assume a realist stance.
A final issue with this formulation of the normative question is the fact
that, it should be noted, the question of how consensus should form, from a
normative point of view, in economics is parallel in important respects to
the question of how we should gain knowledge in economics. To motivate
this claim, suppose that a consensus forms among economists, around the
problem of the relation between the quantity of money and the price level.
The example is loosely taken from Reiss (2008, 168). Imagine it is possible
to agree on the truth of a specific correlation, complete with conditions under
which the correlation breaks down and so on, between the two variables, such
that, so claims the consensus, by manipulating the former we can control
the latter. In the words of Reiss (2008) we have come to agree on the truth
of a “social capacity”.
The truth of this social capacity is, for now, only agreed on; the question
remains of whether such consensus is correct, whether the correlation is
in fact found to hold in the economy. In fact the problem is equivalent to
establishing whether such newly formed consensus is knowledge or not. In
the first place, is it a true belief, the one shared among the economists in this
imaginary example of consensus? This question pertains to the problem of
verification: whether we can verify, or test, the statement of the correlation.
In the second place, is the statement justified, and how is it justified? The
latter question pertains to the problem of the methodology, which will be
the focus of the following sections.
There are several ways, in the sciences and in economics, to justify a
given consensus as a rational one or not, at least as many ways as there are
methodologies.
[. . . ] there are a plurality of methods for gathering evidence:
indeed observation with the naked senses; instrument enhanced
scientific observation; statistical methods (such as data-reduction
and analysis techniques, index numbers, regression, ANOVA
etc.); mathematical modeling; computer based methods such
as simulations; laboratory experiments, thought experiments
and the analysis of natural experiments; testimony and expert
judgment.
Reiss (2008, 3)
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While Reiss, above, is speaking about methods for gathering evidence,
the discourse is equivalent to the problem of consensus and knowledge. There
are several ways to justify a consensus as rational and several ways to gather
knowledge of economic objects and phenomena.
In the following section, I will focus on that part of this methodology
that is preferred by at least a large part of the contemporary world, the
scientific and empirical method, which comprises a number of subfields and
is primarily focused on modeling and experiment, hypothesizing and testing.
5.3 Rational consensus formation in science
Solomon talks about “rational causes for consensus” when referring to the
position according to which “overwhelming evidence” is the main motor
for consensus in science (Solomon 1994, 5). A certain version of scientism
holds that science, defined in broad strokes as the strict adherence to the
method of hypothesis formulation and testing, gains authority by the rules
of evidence, evidence that is present in the natural and social world. What
exactly counts as evidence cannot find place for discussion here; in general,
evidence is recognized as one of the pillars of the Scientific Method, together
with the use of mathematical (or at any rate formal) tools for the formulation
of hypotheses.
Salmon writes “[. . . ] the use of scientific methods is believed by many
people to be the best way to obtain genuine (though not infallible) knowledge
about the world. Despite this admiration for science and its methods, it is
not easy to say exactly what science or the scientific method is [. . . ] let us
assume that science involves such features as laws, testability, prediction
and explanation [. . . ]” (Salmon 1999, 405). Notwithstanding the difficulties
with the formulation of a standard definition of scientific method — in fact,
there is no such standard definition — I will loosely define here the scientific
method as that method of investigating natural or social phenomena by
formulation of hypotheses, derivation of predictions, and verification of the
occurrence of those predictions. This is known as the hypothetico-deductive
model of science8.
While empirical confirmation of a theoretical hypothesis is not possible,
as it is tantamount to the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent, on the
other hand a negative tests can falsify it (cf. Karl Popper’s falsificationism).
Consequently, hypotheses that have resisted testing over and over again are
8The model was first formulated by William Whewell in the 19th century, although
its core principles were established much earlier in the works of Galileo Galilei and Isaac
Newton.
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preliminarily accepted as good ones, until new evidence comes to reject them.
In the philosophical literature this process is called confirmation of scientific
hypotheses. The theory of scientific confirmation has been widely extended
since its early formulations in the 1950s, in order to accommodate logical
problems with the initial formulations, and also to capture probabilistic
phenomena; a thorough review of the literature is in Earman and Salmon
(1999).
Despite the many yet-to-be-settled philosophical debates, the hypothetico-
deductive model and the theory of scientific confirmation have had a strong
appeal in economics. In fact, their principles are substantially similar to the
ones proposed by Friedman for the methodology of the economic sciences,
in his famous and much-influential article The Methodology of Positive
Economics (Friedman 1953). There, Friedman claims that the core of
economic methodology is the formulation of hypotheses, the derivation of
informative predictions, and the testing of the former by verification of the
occurrence of the latter. “Only factual evidence can show whether [a theory]
is “right” or “wrong” or, better, tentatively “accepted” as valid or “rejected.”
(Friedman 1953, 8)
The hypothetico-deductive model, as well as Friedman’s methodology of
positive economics, have been extensively criticized, especially as descriptive
tools. It must be conceded that the “rational consensus”, or “scientific
consensus”, approach is too simple to account for concrete scientific practice.
It is however more difficult to assess the approach, when taken as a normative
one. To many, scientific criteria are those by which consensus should be
evaluated, and in that sense they apply to the context of justification, not
the context of discovery.
It would be out of place, for the purposes of this thesis, to aim at giving a
definitive answer to the problem of whether the hypothetico-deductive model,
or some variant of it, are adequate for a normative assessment of scientific
theories. For that reason, in the following sections I will only provide some
examples, where it can be argued that the ideal of the scientific method
works at its best (section 5.4), in order to contrast them with others, taken
from the field of economics, where instead the ideal of the scientific method
runs into an impasse (section 5.5).
5.4 An example: celestial navigation
The example I discuss in this section comes from physics. While one may
argue that any example from physics bears little relevance to phenomena
5.4. AN EXAMPLE: CELESTIAL NAVIGATION 79
in the socio-economic world9, the goal here is to present an example that
can clearly and easily fit the view of rational consensus presented in the
previous section. While there are some (relatively extreme) positions, which
would argue that also the example presented below would not fit the rational
consensus view, I will deal with that type of criticism in section 5.4.1.
The example chosen here is the theory of Celestial Navigation. “Celestial
navigation is a technique for determining one’s geographic position by the
observation of identified stars, identified planets, the Sun, and the Moon. Its
basic principles are a combination of rudimentary astronomical knowledge
and spherical trigonometry.” (van Allen 2004, 1418) The technique relies
heavily on the model of celestial mechanics, in particular the calculation of
the position of 57 so called navigational stars.
Figure 5.1: A schematic representation of the theory of celestial navigation.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the main theoretical and practical components
of celestial navigation. At the top level is the physical model of celestial
9That, however, has not been the dominant view in much of 20th century economics
(Lo 2004).
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mechanics, plus the development of software for handling the data. The
physical model is a piece of the underlying science, whereas the software
is in part a product of science and in part of engineering, although the
limits between the two may be blurred. Scientific ephemerides and the
sextant are essentially tools for the application of the underlying science (e.g.
trigonometry). Finally, at the bottom, is the practice of celestial navigation
itself; it requires training in the use of the tools used to apply the underlying
science.
Celestial navigation may not be considered a science in the proper sense;
it is in fact a technique made possible by the application of different sciences.
If one abstracts from the strictly practical issues of the technique, however,
it is possible to isolate the scientific principles and theories that make naviga-
tion possible. On those, a large degree of consensus has formed, allegedly on
mostly scientific and rational grounds. Celestial navigation cannot be consid-
ered explanatory of any specific natural phenomena; nonetheless, it focuses
on prediction, which is often one of the principal focuses of the scientific
method (cf. Friedman’s instrumentalist theses in Friedman (1953)).
The schematic representation in figure 5.1 should be sufficient to give an
idea of how the elements of the model of celestial navigation are combined.
The schema applies to celestial navigation at sea, and, with the proper
adjustments (omitted here), to navigation in outer space.
Celestial navigation allows ship crews to calculate their position on the
surface of the earth. Models of celestial mechanics are used in order to
compute ephemerides, tables with long lists of the positions of the relevant
stars at any given time. Using a sextant and a chronometer navigators can
then determine their latitude and longitude on the earth’s surface. Learning
celestial navigation requires precision and long training, or sophisticated
computer programs in the case of automated vehicles (see Sigel and Wetter-
green 2007); in that sense, it is not a “simple” science, nonetheless, it can
be considered, for the purposes of navigation, an exact science.
Stars can be computed as points moving along invariant trajectories with
known speed; disturbing factors are mostly known, errors can be calculated,
and increases in the sophistication of the tools allow for greater navigational
accuracy. Moreover, the physical system itself, the relative motion of the
starts in the sky, is simple and stable10.
10Stability must be considered a relative term in this context. From a reference frame
of billions of years the universe may not be considered a stable system. It is arguable
that astronomy could not compute the development of the universe in millions or billions
of years, since unresolved issues such as the presence and quantity of dark matter and
dark energy are a major determinant on the possible scenario of evolution of the universe.
Despite all that, the time frames considered in the example provided in this section are of
5.4. AN EXAMPLE: CELESTIAL NAVIGATION 81
Salmon’s characterization of the scientific method (cf. section 5.3) men-
tioned four factors that can all be found in the theory of celestial navigation,
that is, laws, testability, prediction and explanation. Celestial navigation
involves laws, the laws of mechanics, which in the time frame of interest
are exact up to approximation. In other words, small errors in calculation
produce small deviations between the predicted values and the actual values.
The model provides simple predictions (e.g. the position of a vessel on a
map), which can be as accurate as desired, conditional on the available
technology. Those predictions are testable, they concern observable objects
— stars are points, the horizon is an imaginary line — which in turn can be
used to verify the predictions of the theory. Moreover, the theory underlying
celestial navigation is explanatory : With mathematical principles (spherical
trigonometry and elementary arithmetic), and very general and tested as-
sumptions on the relative positions of the objects in question (position of
stars to earth, etc.), we can explain why such and such observations on the
celestial sphere indicate my position on the surface of the earth.
In short, the theory of celestial navigation seems to fit well to the ideal
of the Scientific Method. In other words, if asked about the theoretical
justification of the theory, the rational answer would be to provide the
inquirer with the principles and computations involved with the theory, and
present the evidence available for confirmation of the theory. Possibly, we
would want to compare the theory, or specific bits of it, with alternative
ones, and therewith settle questions such as “what are the advantages of
relying on an atomic clock rather than on a pocket chronometer?”, “how
safely can we navigate a vessel in the dangerous Great Barrier Reef?”, and
so on.
5.4.1 Socio-historical influences on celestial naviga-
tion
The question in this section is whether evidence and computation are the
only principles at work, when we agree on the truth of some statement
concerning the theory of celestial navigation? Even defending the weaker
point that the hypothetico-deductive model is only normatively valid, in the
case of celestial navigation, comes under attack from the ranks of the Social
Studies of Science.
The concept of horizon and the method of computation of one’s distance
from the horizon, had to undergo several mathematical refinements through
such a small magnitude that the system of celestial mechanics can be considered extremely
stable for the purposes of celestial navigation.
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the centuries. Moreover, calculation of the latitude was for a long time a
major unresolved issue.
To determine the longitude Λ of the observer, a knowledge of
the simultaneous longitudes of the respective substellar points
is essential. In other words, it is essential to know the absolute
time (for example, GMT, the mean solar time at Greenwich).
The historical challenge of developing an accurate chronometer
for maritime use rests on this simple fact.
(van Allen 2004, 1421)11
According to the sociologist of science, then, the difficulty is to reconcile
the claim that only the scientific method, in its ideal form, should be at work
in the evaluation of the theory of celestial navigation, with the observations
that the formulation of the concepts involved in the theory have been, and
in all likelihood will be in the future, subject to historical development, not
at all immune from sociological and political factors.
The answer is that there is no need for reconciliation. It is undeniable,
save for denying the existence of historical documents, that the concepts
involved in the theory evolved through time and where subject to political,
social, and contingent events. The same holds for the mathematical theory
involved in the computation (spherical trigonometry) and also, in modern
times, for the development of the technologies involved in the observations
and computations. However, this is not to say that those factors are at work
nowadays, in the precise moment in which a navigator out at sea is trying
to locate her vessel on a map.
To qualify the latter statement, note that such navigator, had the afore-
mentioned historical and social events taken a different course, would possibly
now be in a different position with respect to her capacity of navigating at sea
with a certain degree of precision. For instance, had the British Parliament
never promulgated the Longitude Act in 1707, perhaps the development
of the chronometer (necessary for determining the longitude) would have
been delayed greatly. It is thus possible to envisage a chain of events, for
which we would be now in a very different position with respect to our
capacity of navigating at sea, due to that possible “missed” act in 1707.
Nevertheless, the fact that we can now navigate at sea, or in space missions,
is only “counterfactually dependent”, on those sociological and historical
11For the historical account of the “challenge” that Van Allen refers to, see Sobel
(1995).
5.4. AN EXAMPLE: CELESTIAL NAVIGATION 83
factors, just as much as my last statement was possible because David Lewis
provided an analysis of counterfactual reasoning about 40 years ago.
To make the previous point stronger, I will draw an analogy from the
theory of knowledge regarding the Kantian definition of the a priori. Kant
defines a priori knowledge as that type of “[. . . ] cognition independent
of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses.” (Kant 1787,
136 - B2) If the statement were given too narrow an interpretation, then
Kant would be saying that a priori knowledge relies entirely on innate ideas,
present in the mind even before the person has ever seen the light. With
some intermediate steps, that would lead to the paradox of someone who
has been locked up and fed in a sealed dark chamber since their birth, but
who could still reason of mathematics or logic.
Without pretension of historical accuracy, it must however be reckoned
that clearly the meaning of Kant’s statement should not be taken to imply
that paradox. A possible interpretation of the apparent absurdity is that
a priori knowledge is independent of all experience, in the sense that it
cannot be shown false by appeal to experience. In other words, we need
experience in order to acquire a language, the capacity to reason, etc., but
our presently exercised ability to reason a priori is not dependent, for its
validity, on experience and sensations.
The analogy applies to the case of celestial navigation — sociological,
historical, and political factors have shaped the development and formulation
of the theory through the centuries, but we cannot appeal to any of those
factors today as what justifies the fact that we rationally rely on that theory,
and not on others, for navigation.
The discourse so far may have given the impression that there is a stark
separation between theories (such as celestial navigation) which can be justi-
fied by reason, and other theories whose justification, or better, acceptance
in the relevant community, has to be found in socio-historical factors. It
is certainly imaginable a scenario in which the historical developments of
human society had deviated greatly from the course they in fact took, or in
which the social constructs would be extremely different from the ones in
fact present today. In those scenarios, we could thereby certainly imagine
that the theory of celestial navigation would nowadays not be justified in
the eyes of the scientific community, and, for example, that some other
theory would be; perhaps one which relies on entirely different principles,
and absolutely incompatible with ours.
It does not seem to be the task of philosophy of science to account for
such scenarios. Possible alternative scenarios, where the theory of celestial
mechanics would not have come to be consensually believed, are so distant
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from the actual one that it is reasonable to consider the theory justified by
scientific reasons alone. Therefore, the consensus formed around the theory
derives from what Solomon (1994) refers to as “rational causes for consensus”
(cf. section 5.3, above).
5.4.2 More examples
Is the example of celestial navigation representative of all scientific phe-
nomena and the scientific theories around them? The theory of celestial
navigation relies on one of the oldest mathematical theories (trigonometry),
on a branch of physics that has enjoyed hundreds of years of astronomical
observations, as well as a physical system that can be considered rock-stable
for the time frame of interest. Because of those and possibly other reasons,
the example cannot be considered representative; in fact, it is quite an atypi-
cal situation in science to have such favorable conditions for the investigation
of a phenomenon.
However, the example is not an outlier either. Metrology, the science of
measurement, has undergone important historical challenges and is far from
uncontroversial, but its hypotheses and the physical systems it works with
can be compared to the case of celestial navigation. Similar considerations
can be made for stoichiometry, the science that deals with quantitative
relationships between reactants and products in a chemical reaction, and
even for some branches of medical diagnostics: those that develop software
for aiding physicians diagnose patients on the basis of statistical relations
among symptoms, physical preconditions, past medical history, etc.
In general it must be reckoned that the example of celestial mechanics,
while it is not typical in science, cannot be regarded as an outlier either.
Science is filled with cases of phenomena that can be studied by the methods
of hypothesizing and testing with high levels of precision and little influence
from social, historical and contingent factors. So, what is the case for eco-
nomic theory? Repeatedly throughout the history of economic methodology
economics has been ranked among the so-called “inexact sciences”, even
though it would be more correct to speak of exact and inexact theories, as
inexactness and exactness can, and often do, cohabit the same particular
science (see Helmer and Rescher 1959).
But what the meaning of inexact is, is not at all clear. Hausman (1992),
for example, lists a number of reasons for attributing inexactness to a science,
which do not discriminate between the economic sciences and others, for
example physics, which would instead be considered exact. More on the
latter point will be said at the end of this chapter in section 5.6.1. The point
of the following sections, however, is to try to discriminate between economic
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theories and other theories that belong to that class identified above as the
“exact class”. Is there any difference between a typical economic theory (or
model), and the theory of celestial navigation, or a certain chemical theory
of stoichiometry?
The next section will highlight some of the differences between economic
theories and models, and those scientific theories and models that can
legitimately go under the “exact class”. I will highlight some of the limitations
imposed to the method of evidence and testing in economics. The list of
arguments that follows should not be taken as exhaustive, nor should its
division into three sections be taken as reflecting some objective division of
the problem space, but rather as serving the goal of simplicity in exposition.
5.5 Economic methodology under scrutiny
The problem addressed in this section is how consensus should form, be
evaluated, and eventually accepted in the field of economics. In other
words, should consensus form around the principles of scientific modeling
and evidence, or some other principle or set of principles? It was assumed,
in sections 5.2.1 and 5.3, that the rationalist’s answer to the problem on
consensus is acceptable from a normative viewpoint if also metaphysical
realism and a correspondence theory of truth are assumed.
One should reckon, however, that pragmatic considerations would require
that the methods of modeling and testing also be available and successfully
applicable to the field in question. That, I argued, is the case in at least some
fields of physics, chemistry, medicine and so on. The success of modeling and
testing that natural sciences have seen in the past few centuries has arguably
pushed the so called “social sciences” into acquiring a similar methodology.
To restate the point in Salmon (1999) “Clearly, the label “scientific” carries
a certain cachet in our society. Scientists are respected, and their work is
heavily funded by public and private agencies. More importantly, the use of
scientific methods is believed by many people to be the best way to obtain
genuine (though not infallible) knowledge about the world.” (Salmon 1999,
405).
Despite Salmon’s observation, and what I have assumed about the validity
and opportunity of the scientific method, it is a much debated issue whether
the scientific method (or, as Salmon, uses the term, ‘methods’), is successfully
applicable to all — or, if a part, which part — of economic problems. In
the following four sections I will give some examples of many of the issues
involved in using a methodology typical of the natural sciences, to problems
in the economic world. The analysis will focus on a number of mostly
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pragmatic issues, rather than theoretical problems.
One important theoretical issue, for example, is the nature of human
will in relation to economic forecasting. The problem dates back to John
Stuart Mill; the argument against the possibility of performing mathematical
calculations of human factors is at times used against the possibility of using
identical, or even similar, methodologies in the natural and the social sciences.
This and similar other problems will not be discussed here. Instead, I will
focus on problems related to the practices of economists as they investigate
and try to understand economic phenomena at work in the economic system.
5.5.1 Instability and unaccounted-for factors
The problem of the stability of a system was mentioned in section 5.4;
the model of celestial mechanics, it was said, can be considered stable for
time frames of some few thousands of years or even longer, allowing for
exact calculations up to approximation. As a working definition, a system
is stable within a timeframe T , if the same laws operate at every time t
of T . For instance, imagine a biological system, such as “Rabbit-World”,
and a population model for rabbits. The system the model represents can
be considered stable if the same biological laws (or trends) operate within
the timeframe T considered by the model. If rabbits in Rabbit-World, at
some point within T , undergo a behavioural change that speeds up their
reproductive habits, the system’s stability will have been broken.
Problems for a model can also come from factors occurring outside the
predictive powers of the model. As a working definition, an unaccounted-for
factor is a factor in the system that the model or theory has not included
in its formal structure. It should be noted that a break in the stability
of a system, that is, a change in the underlying forces (laws of nature),
may also be considered an unaccounted-for occurrence, but for pragmatic
reasons it seems legitimate to limit the domain of stability to forces and laws,
and confine the domain of unaccounted-for factors to changes in the initial
conditions, external influences, etc. For example, imagine that in the area
initially postulated by the population model for rabbits, a certain number
of rabbits were introduced from without. The model did not account for
that type of population increase; moreover, it would not be convenient to
add such a variable either, thus complicating the mathematics of the model,
unless the introduction of individuals from without the population were
constant, or could be at least given a certain probability.
A “normal” population model would account for increases in rabbit pop-
ulation that are dependent on reproductive rates, mortality rates, seasonal
changes, etc. But unless there were constant and predictable introductions
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of rabbits from without into the environment, it would not be standard
to introduce such phenomenon as a variable in the population model for
rabbits.
In the example of celestial navigation, the system in question can be
considered stable. The apparent motions of stars in the celestial sphere
are subject to constant laws — similarly for the bodies in the solar system.
Moreover, unaccounted-for factors can often be neglected; even when they
cannot be ignored, their effects are visible in small increments, not as dra-
matic changes in the laws of the system. In a cosmological model, examples
of such factors could be the formation of a black hole in a certain region
of space, or on a smaller scale, a previously unknown asteroid perturbing
a planet’s orbit. But such events often show their effects in much longer
time-frames than the ones of interest for an economic system.
The problem of stability and unaccounted-for factors is a major cause of
imprecision, if not randomness, in several areas of economics. At least two
types of phenomena are identifiable in the economic world. On the one hand,
some events are known to happen but it is extremely hard to predict them
with meaningful accuracy. These types of events are, for instance, runs to
banks. We know that runs to banks occur: they can be triggered by news,
irrational behavior, or other causes. Runs to banks are disruptive events,
they show their effects in short periods, and are highly unpredictable, by
scientific methods at least. The sudden appearance and rapid development
of such factors in the economy afford little or no time for fixtures in the
models, thus leaving inflexible mathematical methods unable to give reliable
predictions.
On the other hand, some of the factors that go unaccounted for by
mathematical or statistical models are simply unknown. Examples of that
latter type are phenomena like the Internet and its effects on communication,
or the effects of containerization (a mode of freight transport standardized
in the 1970s) on global trade. Such selection is merely illustrative, but two
prominent nontechnical works have been written on the subject: Malcom
Gladwell’s Outliers, and Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s The Black Swan (see Taleb
2007; Gladwell 2008). The important aspect of these phenomena, which
occur in the social as well as in the natural world, is that they are very
frequent in economics.
In the economic world, changes in the underlying laws (for example the
speed at which information spreads), and occurrence of an unpredictable
event (a run to a bank) are a constant threat for a forecaster. When that is
the case, the process of modeling, theorizing, and testing can be painfully
slow to account for the developments of the environment. Moreover, a
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model’s exactness and rigidity is more often an impediment rather than a
virtue, when the occurrence of unforeseen events requires a change in the
initial assumptions and conditions. Such changes are often very costly, in
terms of changes in the specific methodology, the reformulation of models,
adjustments in how the data is collected and so on. Consideration on the
costs can cause institutional failures if adjusting the tools in order to have
accurate predictions is taken to be more costly than accepting the price of a
wrong prediction.
5.5.2 Openness
Openness to exploitation is the second phenomenon surveyed in this section.
The fact that economic systems can be exploited is often attributed to
irrationality. For example, people holding probabilistically inconsistent sets
of beliefs, according to Bayesian theory, are subject to so called Dutch-
Bookies, sets of bets that will seem rational to them, but which will make
them lose money consistently. Irrationality, nonetheless, is not the only
source of openness in economics. Openness to exploitation, that is, to profit
making, can come from flaws in the economic system itself, or from the
legislative structure that is superimposed on the economic system.
Charles Ponzi started off the infamous Ponzi scheme by taking advantage
of a flaw in the system regulating international reply coupons for postage
stamps (Dunn 2004). Initially, Ponzi was not acting in breach of the law,
but simply taking advantage of different international rates in order to buy
international reply coupons in a country at a certain price, and exchange
them in another country for stamps of a value higher than the price paid
for the coupons. Similarly, recent reports in the New York Times claim
that U.S. banks are shifting speculative activities from proprietary trading,
limited by the so called Volker Rule currently implemented in the United
States, to client-related business. In other words, banks would be allowed to
engage in risky speculations, intendedly forbidden by the legislation, under
a different name (Schwartz and Dash 2010). In this second case, more than
a flaw in the system itself, the possibility of exploitation seems to derive
from a gap in the legislative system, if banks are indeed allowed to operate
as before by simply changing the name of their activities.
On the one hand, legislation seems to open the system to loopholes and
gaps which will be exploited by those who are smart enough to figure out
a way to do so. If that is the case, it seems that economic liberalism had
an argument against regulatory practices in economics. That is only one
side of the coin though. Indeed, regulatory practices are meant to protect
individuals from the irrationality trap (mentioned at the beginning of this
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chapter), which also opens economic systems to exploitation.
How the exploitation of economic systems affects predictions in eco-
nomics, can be explained with another example. Before the 1990s only big
savers could access interest-bearing financial instruments (treasury bonds or
corporate bonds), but by the late 1990s most small savers could open interest-
bearing checking and savings accounts. Clearly, the precise configuration
of the former financial instruments will have to guarantee an equilibrium
between risk and yield of those financial instruments. But banks can try to
surpass their competitors by exploiting the loopholes of regulations, in order
to offer their financial instruments to a wider range of customers. Once that
happens, the equilibrium that was calculated at the beginning will no longer
be the real equilibrium, because the number and type of customers have
changed.
In general, a fully formalized system would be desirable, as the more
formalized a system is, the less easy it is to exploit its gaps (see Suppes 1968).
Ideally, one would like to have a fully axiomatized system of economic laws,
similar to axiomatizations in mathematical or theoretical physics. According
to Suppes (1968), the advantages of formalization are many, among which
are explicitness, standardization, objectivity, self-contained assumptions. For
instance, explicitness would guarantee that the terms of the theory have
the same meaning for all the users, a fact that is not always the case in
economics, where several of the terms are fuzzy or vague. A self-contained
set of assumptions, on the other hand, “is a way of setting off from the
forest of implicit assumptions and the surrounding thickets of confusion, the
ground that is required for the theory being considered.” Suppes (1968,
655)12
While admitting that Suppes is right in posing formalization as a desider-
atum, in science, it would be a highly ideal normative stance to request
such level of formalization, for economics, as the one Suppes envisages. The
viewpoint taken in this chapter was certainly to analyze a normative theory
of consensus formation in economics, while still maintaining some considera-
tions of minimal feasibility in the normative requirements. Feasibility does
not seem a requirement in Suppes’ assumptions, when he puts formalization
as a desideratum in science, without discriminating among sciences. Perhaps
it is not a case that Suppes considers mostly examples from physics, with
one main exception (an example from linguistics) which is also a highly
12It is tempting to give reason to McCloskey’s consideration on the persuasive power
of rhetoric, when, in order to justify why a self-contained set of assumption is a good
thing, Suppes talks about the “forest of implicit assumptions”, the “surrounding thickets
of confusion”, and the “ground that is required for the theory being considered.” (Suppes
1968, 655 - italics added).
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disputable one in the context of his paper.
5.5.3 Observables and variables
The third and last source of problems for the application of the scientific
method to at least some economic problems is the definition of the variables,
and identification of the observables. Looking back at the example of celestial
navigation, we can try to identify the observables and variables there. The
main observables for celestial navigation are lines (the horizon) and points
(celestial bodies), and perhaps a few others. The variables are angles and
distances.
In the other examples provided in section 5.4.2, the identification of ob-
servables, and the related measurements becomes slightly more complicated.
Medical diagnostics relies on the reading of symptoms (the observables), a
process that can involve quite subjective factors; on the other hand mea-
surements of the variables (e.g. temperature, pressure, electrical activity
of the brain, etc) often rely on tested tools and statistical methods. While
there clearly is ample room for error, the system investigated in medicine
is a natural one, and at least under normal conditions statistical methods
succeed in making errors and biases cancel each other out.
What is the case for economics? In general, measurements in economics
are a particularly complicated matter13. Not mainly because of the difficulty
of calculating what is identified as the quantity to be calculated, but rather
because of the difficulty in agreeing on what such quantities should represent
and what they should leave out. The rate of inflation and GDP are very
important factors in several macroeconomic models, thus their measurement
is a central task in economic theory. In the remainder of this section I will
briefly discuss those two examples. Both examples are mainly illustrative.
I start from the rate of inflation, which measures how prices increase in
time.14 Since a list of the price increases of each and every single commercial
commodity would be both intractable and uninformative, the price increase
is given as an average. Moreover, since averaging among all commodities
would also be intractable and unnecessary (most people probably do not care
much about the price increase in polarizing lenses for SLR cameras), the price
increase is given as an average of the price increases for some commodities.
Commodities that are included in the calculation of the inflation rate make
13For a comprehensive discussion of some issues related to measurement in economics
see Boumans (2007).
14Reiss provides a thorough discussion on the formulation of the Consumer Price Index,
problem that is directly related to the calculation of the rate of inflation (see Reiss 2008,
chapters 2-4).
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up the market basket (or commodity bundle). The problem then is to decide
which commodities should go into the market basket. The simple answer is
“the important ones”, and it is not far from the “true” answer.
The problem is not merely a technical one. The answer to the question
above depends on what one wants the inflation rate to represent. Because the
inflation rate represents the rate at which our money looses value, at the end
of the day inflation rate represents how much poorer we become as possessors
of money. Clearly, however, that depends on what we buy, if the price of
diamond rings goes up tenfold, and about 0.0001 % of the population buys
diamond rings, the population has not really become considerably poorer,
but only that section of the population which buys diamond rings (1 in a
million). On the other hand, if the price of wheat or rice increases, it is a
much larger part of the population that becomes poorer.
What goods should go into the market basket, then, does not seem a
matter of which techniques give the “best answer”, because there is no
unique best answer. Any prescription as to which goods should and should
not be included, which ones should be added and which ones should be
eliminated, will depend on what one wants to represent and what one wants
to leave out. In the early 1990s internet provider fees did not exist; less
than twenty years later they now represent a significant monthly fee for
about 77% of the population of North America, 58% of Europe and 80% of
Australia15. There is no programmatic or principled reason for adding or
eliminating items from the basket, and whereas some cases like bread and
internet fees are clear-cut, most of them are not.
In fact, the problem of calculating the inflation rate is handled mostly
by a complex number of statistical methods that should, in principle, cancel
out biases16. Different price indexes aim at making sure that different sets
of goods are represented, price averages are weighted according to good’s
consumption rates, market baskets are kept up to date with changes in
the marketplace and seasonally adjusted to reflect possible seasonal trends.
The complexity of dealing with inflation measurement is already a proof of
the impossibility to fully “rationalize” the theory of inflation. Necessity of
adjustment in the basket, for example, is by definition a process that needs
to be motivated by considerations that go beyond the domain of economic
analysis into the social, sociological, or even political spheres.
The second example mentioned at the beginning of the section was the
calculation of GDP. Whereas calculation of price indexes and inflation is
15Source: http://www.internetworldstats.com/ Retrieved August 29, 2010.
16For an example of these methods, I refer to the BLS Handbook of Methods (Bureau
of Labor Statistics 2010).
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fairly unproblematic, calculation of GDP has been under the critic’s spotlight
for a long time. Criticisms are cast from all fronts (see Hershey 1995); for
example, a GDP index should be able to record quality increases, it should
avoid double counting; for instance, the cost of destroying a block of flats
and building a hotel instead both go into standard GDP counting. For a
survey of the many biases present in the calculation of most GDP indicators
I refer to Roubini (1998); however, what several critiques fail to point out
is the nature of the problem of calculating GDP.
One of the major controversies about GDP indexes is that they leave
out any non-monetary transactions in the economy. Virtually all household
activities are systematically left out from GDP calculations.
The general definition of the production boundary may then
be restricted by functional considerations. In the SNA (and
in the U.S. accounts), certain household activities — such as
housework, do-it-yourself projects and care of family members—
are excluded, partly because by nature these activities tend to
be self-contained and have limited impact on the rest of the
economy and because their inclusion would affect the usefulness
of the accounts for long-standing analytical purposes, such as
business cycle analysis.
(Bureau of Economic Analysis 2009)
The statement that “these activities tend to [. . . ] have limited impact on
the rest of the economy” is quite clearly misguided. A toy-example should
illustrate why the impact of “private” activities is not negligible.
Two households (A and B) are made up by two individuals each (X and
Y ). In both households, X earns 50 euros. In household A, Y earns no
income, and takes care of raising the children, cooking meals, and cleaning
the house. In household B, Y has a paid job and earns 50 euros; here, Y
does not have time to take care of the children and other household activities,
and therefore pays for children day care, meals catering, and house cleaners.
Households A and B, intuitively, produce about the same amount of total
wealth, even discounting for the extra amount of quality that household B
may gain from outsourcing. For the purposes of GDP calculation, however,
household B produces twice as much as household A, an amount that does
not seem counterbalanced by the (possible) benefits of outsourcing. If the
foregoing example were to be used in the context of two very culturally
different societies, assumption that is realistically plausible, then “traditional”
society would have a very large number of A-type households, whereas the
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Figure 5.2: An elementary example of GDP calculation.
“progressive” society would have predominantly B-type households. The bias
of the calculated GDPs has a large, quite definitely not a “limited”, impact.
The effects of the examples above are accrued by considering other
traditionally “private” activities, such as nail polishing, lawn mowing, house
redecorating, and so on. Those activities also contribute to a country’s GDP
only when they involve a monetary exchange. One does not need to go as
far as comparing third world countries with industrialized nations, in order
to see that the GDP of a country with a fully developed service sector will
be much higher than one with a smaller service sector but equivalent real
provision of services.
It is worthwhile analyzing a little more the point that the impact of such
unaccounted factors is limited in an economy. What that means is that
factors such as the private education a father imparts to his child does not
have a monetary value; in other words, it cannot be substituted for another
good of the same monetary value. On the other hand, a teacher’s salary
does have a value because, at least under ideal conditions, a family can
choose the schools they send their children to, and perhaps even the teachers
who are dedicated to their children. Whereas monetary transactions can
buy education in a market, there is no market of the services offered in the
privacy of a household by its members (see Bureau of Economic Analysis
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(2009, chapter 1) and Australian Bureau of Statistics (2000, chapter 1)).
Monetary value, in this context, is at odds with social value, where in the
previous example the latter is the value that is associated with the father’s
activities within the household. However, some definitions describe an econ-
omy as “the wealth and resources of a country or region, esp. in terms of the
production and consumption of goods and services” (New Oxford American
Dictionary 2005). If one accepts that definition, it is clear that transactions
between husband and wife, parents and children, a neighborhood council
and the elderly of that neighborhood, are all interactions and exchanges
that bring wealth and resources into the economy, even though they are not
exchangeable, nor can they be purchased in a market.
A further problem, is that the definition of an economic measure often
times also defines an economic target. Most countries’ economic agendas,
whether implicitly or explicitly, will contain a GDP-growth target. But any
switch from a private transaction to an equivalent public one will result
in economic growth, as defined in Bureau of Economic Analysis (2009),
without guarantee that there ever was any concrete production of a new
(or a better) service. In this sense, then economic indicators are not just
objective looks into a certain state of the economic world, but can at the
same time define a certain end or goal.
The idea of creating objective and measurable indicators is arguably
an important one, because it allows assessments and ameliorations when
necessary. Nonetheless, the previous discussion should have highlighted the
fact that GDP indicators are not synonymous with “wealth”, not even just
material wealth. Wealth, however, is what we ultimately desire, at least
with respect to our material needs.
In short, it seems that calculation of GDP, as it is done nowadays by most
national economic bureaux, is a source of misrepresentation of the true state
of the economy as well as, potentially, a booster of change, in good or bad,
in the distribution and nature of human economic but also social activities.
Analyses on the issue of GDP calculation have been done repeatedly and
even prominent economists such as Amartya Sen have suggested alternative
indicators. Nonetheless, the task of finding an indicator, or indicators,
alternative to GDP is essentially a human task, thus subject to the evolution
of the human psychology. What an economic measure is not, is something
that can be developed with sole reference to economic theories, and corrected
and refined by testing or experimenting, as instead several of the measures
we use for the natural world can.
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5.6 On the epistemology of the inexact sci-
ences
The issues listed in section 5.5 are certainly known in economics, even though,
for one reason or the other, they are often presented and analyzed in isolation.
For instance, on the issue of the limits of GDP accounting an enormous
amount of literature has been written, which has produced suggestions for
several alternative economic (or welfare) indicators, for example the human
development index, and even the gross national happiness indicator.
Similarly, the problem of formulating meaningful systems for predicting
stock market changes has been treated in several instances. The problem is
analogous to the one described in McCloskey (1992): An economist cannot
be “smart” and informative at the same time; to wit, she cannot make a
forecast which will yield her a net gain, and at the same time make her
forecast public. In the same way, a model that predicts the value of stocks
will have to make some assumptions about the behavior of buyers and sellers.
The behavior, however, is affected by the predictions of the model, rendering
its initial assumptions invalid. The case is often made for arguing against
the possibility of meaningful prediction and/or policy advice in the field of
economics (see Reiss 2008, 166).
The point of the foregoing sections was to gather those and other issues
side by side, in order to show, as a whole, where the ideal of scientific
methodology fails to yield a consensus, when applied to the economic world.
The problem has been put before as a problem of “inexactness” of the social
sciences. Inexactness is the reason why the simple application of modeling
and testing fails to yield a consensus on statements about the world. This
indeed is possibly one of the principal issues with the so-called inexact
sciences, that they fail to draw a consensus on many, if not most, statements
about the portion of the world they attempt to describe and manipulate.
But what exactly is inexactness? The concluding sections of this chapter
will try to cast some light on the issue of inexactness in economics.
The idea of inexactness, in economics dates back to at least John Stuart
Mill, who divided the sciences into those that are capable of accurate
predictions and those that are not 17. Inexactness, at least in the social
sciences, was attributed by Mill to the fact that social sciences have to deal
with the behavior of individuals. Due to the complex psychology of human
behavior, and perhaps also to the contribution of the free will, it is thus
not possible to detect the same exact regularities that we can observe, for
example, in some areas of physics.
17Salmon reports on Mill in Salmon (1999).
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Much later, Helmer and Rescher returned to the idea of inexactness when
describing the problem of predictability in some areas of research. To them
(Helmer and Rescher 1959), the idea of inexactness is not related to the
problem of free will or human behavior, but rather to the complexity of
the environment, and the difficulty of formalization of the problem space
in the social sciences. Because Helmer and Rescher’s idea will be in the
background of much of the following chapter, their theory will be discussed
in more detail later on.
More recently, Hausman applied the concept of inexactness to economics
in describing how economic models make use of ceteris paribus clauses, and
how economic laws are derived from pragmatically selected generalization
in what he calls the inexact deductive method (Hausman 1992). The next
section will analyze Hausman’s conception of inexactness and argue that it
does not capture the whole scope of inexactness in economics.
5.6.1 A comparison with Hausman
Hausman (1992) takes from Mill the observation that economics is an
inexact science, and elaborates on that. Mill’s thesis, according to Hausman,
can be interpreted in four ways:
There are at least four ways in which one might attempt to
analyze inexactness or the notion of a “tendency.” These are
not mutually exclusive, and some may be combined with one
another:
1. Inexact laws are approximate. They are true within some
margin of error.
2. Inexact laws are probabilistic or statistical. Instead of
stating how human beings always behave, economic laws
state how they usually behave.
3. Inexact laws make counterfactual assertions about how
things would be in the absence of interferences.
4. Inexact laws are qualified with vague ceteris paribus clauses.
(Hausman 1992, 128 - italics in the original)
Hausman is fairly liberal about the four possible interpretations, although
he provides some moderate criticism of the first three and defends a version
of (4) (Hausman 1992, 128-151). The problem with the account Hausmann
provides is that all of the conditions (1 to 4) seem to be typical of about
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any of the sciences, even in many of the most exact formulations of specific
theories we can come up with. On the other hand, the “inexactness” pointed
out in sections 5.5.1 to 5.5.3 above, seems to be of a very different nature
from the one Hausman talks about. The following will justify the two points.
Let us go back once again to the example of celestial navigation. In section
5.4, we may ask, are the laws regulating the system exact or inexact18? If by
that we mean the laws in themselves, as inscribed in the “book of nature”,
they must certainly be exact, but if that is the case (excluding arguments
from the nature of free will or similar ones) also the laws that regulate human
behaviour are exact. Therefore, that cannot be what Hausman means.
What he means, instead, is probably the laws as formulated in scientific
practice: “the apparent retrograde motion of celestial bodies on the celestial
sphere follows the trajectory α with velocity β”, or “the moon appears
every Monday July 3rd at 00:00 hours with x degrees, etc.”. These laws
are: 1) approximate, they are true only within a certain margin of error; 2)
statistical, in the sense that the data points on which they are based are
always handled by statistical methods; 3) make counterfactual claims: If
there were no interferences, the calculations would not need to be revised
and adjusted every so often; 4) qualified with (perhaps not vague) ceteris
paribus clauses: If secular motions were not in play, if our instruments were
a great deal more precise, etc.
Hausman’s idea of inexactness seems to be grounded on his description
of inexact laws. It is reasonable indeed to assume that a theory or model
containing inexact laws are also themselves inexact, and that a science
that contains mostly inexact theories or models is an inexact science. If
the characterization of inexactness is the one provided by Hausman then
probably all sciences are inexact, at least all applied sciences. In particular,
also those parts of science described in section 5.4, which seemed to be good
candidates for the application of the rational method of consensus formation,
in virtue of their fairly clear adherence to the method of modeling and
testing, should be tagged as ‘inexact’.
The examples provided in section 5.4 were meant to provide items of
comparison against which to have a look at the economic sciences. Economics,
in virtue of the reasons provided in sections 5.5.1 to 5.5.3 above, is inexact
in a way that is not reducible to any, or any combination of, the four reasons
provided in Hausman (1992). It remains to be argued, in the following
sections, which source of inexactness is the one that characterizes economics
18It is important to notice that the right question of comparison with Hausman is
whether the laws, not the science, are exact or inexact. In the end however, also Hausman
wants to claim that it is economics itself, as a science, that is inexact, not just its laws.
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in specific, and what possible alternatives to the strict adherence to the
scientific method are at hand, if any.
5.6.2 The nature of inexactness in economics
In section 5.6, a difference was mentioned between Mill’s reasons for calling
the social sciences ‘inexact’, and the reasons advanced in Helmer and Rescher
(1959). Helmer and Rescher attribute the property of a science to be exact
or inexact to the availability of a formal characterization of the phenomena
that science investigates. In line with that idea, it is no longer possible to
characterize a science as either exact or inexact, because such attribution is
dependent on the specific matter of investigation, so that the same science
can be either exact or inexact depending on the specific phenomenon it
analyses.
We speak of an ”exact science” if this reasoning process is for-
malized in the sense that the terms used are exactly defined and
reasoning takes place by formal logico- mathematical derivation
of the hypothesis (the statement of the fact to be explained or
predicted) from the evidence (the body of knowledge accepted
by virtue of being highly confirmed by observation).
[. . . ]
In an inexact science, conversely, reasoning is informal; in partic-
ular, some of the terminology may, without actually impeding
communication, exhibit some inherent vagueness, and reasoning
may at least in part rely on reference to intuitively perceived
facts or implications.
(Helmer and Rescher 1959, 25,26)
The difference between Mill’s and Helmer and Rescher’s interpretations
is that in the latter no science is precluded from making exact predictions,
or giving exact explanations, so long as there is a formal (and faithful)
representation of the phenomenon investigated. It is not clear from the text
whether Helmer and Rescher claim that the representation of the phenomenon
must preserve as much richness and complexity of the phenomenon itself
as possible, or whether all that matters is that such representation give the
correct predictions19.
19This is the position defended in Friedman (1953).
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Whether we only need prediction, or also want our formal representations
to be faithful representations of economic complexity, it is clear that the
complexity of the economic world makes both harder to achieve, in compari-
son with other (especially natural) sciences. However there are two types of
critique to economic formalism, which should not be confounded. One could
argue against the possibility to adequately capture economic phenomena,
due to the fact that the phenomena are set in an environment that is too
complex to be captured by formal means.
The criticism, however, is tempered by at least two considerations. On
one hand computer models are now able to handle much more complexity
that it has ever been possible to handle in the history of mathematical
modeling in economics. On the other, the criticism would have no effect
against Friedman’s instrumentalist approach, where all that matters are
predictions, and not how realistic the assumptions are.
It is in the context of prediction and policy making then, that the problem
of complexity bears. How can we form a valuable consensus on the social
capacities of economic sciences, that is, on policy applications, from the
relatively simple representations of a very complex economic reality? The
conclusion from the foregoing analysis was that the system of economics is
too complex for the method of hypothesizing and testing to be sufficient for
producing economic knowledge.
5.7 Conclusion
When applied to the study of scientific phenomena that can be considered
exact for the intended purposes (e.g. explaining the relative positions of
two heavenly bodies at time t, calculating a chemical reaction’s yield, etc.),
the scientific method is the best available reference point for evaluating
the “goodness” of statements about the world. I avoid intentionally here
to talk about the truth of those statements, to avoid metaphysical quarrels.
All that one can infer from the discussion about the celestial navigation
model (section 5.1) and similar models, is that by adopting a minimal realist
perspective, the evidence produced by the method of modeling and testing
ought to drive the formation of consensus, since that evidence seems to be
the best candidate around which agreement can be sought.
When the matter of investigation, however, is not such that it can be
easily formalized, or whose formalizations cannot be easily interpreted, the
distance between the statements produced in the model world and the
statements about the world is such that the scientific method does not seem
to produce a measure of justification for the latter on the basis of the former.
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The question then arises as to what, if anything, should be the criteria of
consensus formation in economics. In order to try answer the question, one
needs to look at alternative sources of knowledge (in the form of statements
about the world) in economics. The next chapter will start off with a look
at possible alternative sources of knowledge in economics.
Chapter 6
Consensus in economics PART 2
6.1 Sources of knowledge in economics
Knowledge comes from a variety of sources, and in epistemology it is common
to divide them between those which provide justified beliefs (knowledge), and
those which only warrant unjustified, or partially justified, beliefs (opinions
or credences). Justification itself does not come from a single source; the
literature broadly identifies direct sources of justification (e.g. sensory
experience, introspection, etc.), and indirect sources of justification (e.g.
testimony).
The scientific method of theorizing, modeling and testing seems to be
the best source of knowledge for several disciplines (cf. section 5.3), at least
from a normative perspective. Nonetheless, it was shown in section 5.5, that
a number of phenomena that seem to rationally pertain to the domain of
economics (e.g. welfare, market equilibrium), cannot be easily (or at all)
handled by the scientific method. The goal of that section was to provide
some examples, in which the application of the scientific method is either
inadequate or logically unsound, for contingent or necessary reasons.
The scientific method is not the only source of knowledge, neither in the
social nor in the natural sciences. Geology applies the scientific method of
theorizing and testing extensively to its objects of investigation, although
most pioneering geological knowledge was acquired by experience, and also
at the present time field methods in geology are still an essential source of
knowledge about geological phenomena. To say that the field geologist does
not possess the Science of geology, but only “practical knowledge” of geology,
is to miss the point that she possesses empirically justified statements about
the objects of geological investigation. Those statements are obtained from
experience (more on experience later), not from theory.
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Other sources of knowledge are historical, for example in political sciences
or international relations. The idea is that, by recognizing patterns in a
succession of events in the pasts, we can reliably infer to the occurrence
of similar events in the future. The notion is not alien from scientific
methodology, being simply an application of the principle of empirical
induction, commonly applied to experimental or statistical sciences. The
major difference between the historical method of induction and the scientific
one is that, in the macro field of historical occurrences, the inductive process
is not as easily formalizable and quantifiable as in scientific experimentation.
That, however, does not seem to imply that we cannot have reliable knowledge
of political, historical, or cultural phenomena.
Like in most other sciences, in economics knowledge comes from sources
alternative to the ones allowed by the scientific method. The major problem
is that there seems to be very little consensus as to the principles that should
guide the production of economic knowledge, in particular, that type of
knowledge that enables policy making. According to McCloskey and others,
the situation is dire (see Reiss 2008, xvii).
Economists don’t believe one another. [. . . ] I think it’s worse in
economics than in what we English speakers call ‘science’. And
I know it’s worse than in historical science. Historians don’t
believe everything they read in the library. But they expect,
rightly, to be able to rely on sheer factual assertions by their
colleagues and to have some confidence in their interpretations, if
signs of haste or of party passion are absent. [. . . ] I could claim
that in economics we have nothing like this degree of scientific
agreement.
(McCloskey 2003, quoted from Reiss (2008))
If McCloskey is right, however, anyone looking at economics as a toolbox
science (cf. section 5.1.4), should be even more worried. After all, policy
makers are definitely more inclined to rely on economists than on historians.
But is it possible for economics to ground their consensus formation on
anything else other than the hypothetico-deductive model and Friedman’s
methodological approach? (cf. section 5.3).
The next two sections will discuss that point. The next section will
discuss experimental methods, while section 6.1.2 will discuss the historical
method in economics. It must be noted that, while experiments are by all
means considered an essential part of the scientific method, in this case they
are discussed independently because that is not the case in the economic
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sciences1. When speaking about the economic scientific method, then, it
would be more correct to speak about mathematical/computer modeling and
econometric testing. The latter, at least, is the predominant interpretation
given to Friedman’s idea of positive economics.
6.1.1 Experiments in economics
According to some scholars, in recent decades experimental economics has
gained a new and independent epistemological status, by supporting eco-
nomic claims independently of the presence of a preexisting mathematical
or statistical model for those claims2. Sugden (2005, 2008) defends the
idea that experimental economics is nowadays evolving into “systematic
inductive enquiry” (Sugden 2008, 623), from the initial stages in which it
was instead only meant to test the assumptions of existing theories.
“The first sustained programs of experimental economics — those
in which Kahneman and Smith worked — were presented as tests
of core components of existing theories.
(Sugden 2008, 623)
Kahneman and Tversky’s early experiments were meant to test the
hypothesis of rational choice, widely assumed in economic models and
theories of the time, and, to a certain extent, of the present too. In general,
the goal of early experiments was to test the validity of assumptions in order
to go back to the theory and, if necessary, modify it. According to Sugden,
later experiments were taken to be independent confirmation of “economic
laws” or “trends” (similar to some experimental laws of chemistry — e.g.
Fick’s laws of diffusion, or Gay-Lussac’s law for gases), that were induced
from those experiments even before specific theoretical hypotheses had been
formulated.
Sugden reports that “for most of the twentieth century [. . . ] economics
was generally understood, by both practitioners and methodologists, to be a
nonexperimental science.” (Sugden 2008, 621) From the point of view of the
scientific method, as applied in many areas of the natural sciences, economic
methodology was perhaps a “crippled” science, lacking an experimental
method. Assuming the truth of Sugden’s stance, the question then arises
1For a perspective on how the experimental method relates mainstream economics
see Sugden (2005, 2008).
2For a general introduction to experimental economics, in relation to epistemology
and philosophy of science, see Guala (2005).
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whether economics, with the addition of an experimental face, can provide
more reliable knowledge of economic phenomena.
There are at least two reasons why, despite the improvements that
experiments can carry to economic methodology, the Scientific Method still
remains of limited applicability to economic phenomena.
The first reason is the following. Clearly experiments can aid economic
methodology in finding regularities and, possibly, “economic laws”. From
those, we can hope to build models and theories whose assumptions will likely
be more realistic, and less dependent on ceteris paribus clauses. Nonetheless,
that might not be enough to resolve some of the problems mentioned in
sections 5.5.1, 5.5.2 and 5.5.3. For example, where knowledge of the model,
if made available in the system, is going to affect the predictions of the
model itself, or where the conditions of an economic system change very
rapidly, more realistic assumptions will not help. Moreover, the problem of
measurement could possibly even be amplified by experimental economics,
highlighting questions like what exactly is being measured in experiments
(see Ross 2007).
The second reason has to do with the problem of devising and performing
experiments in the macro scale. The scale of these hypothetical macro-
experiments is such that “experimental macro-economics” might never be
feasible under the current state of technology. However, two remarks are
in place here: On the one hand, improvements in microeconomics might
bring about unexpected development in macroeconomics. In fact, if one sees
microeconomics as the foundations and starting point of macro, clearly it
should be the case that improvements in micro carry over to macro.
On the other hand, there already is a way of running “experiments” in
macro scenarios, and that is by means of computer simulations. Although
at the moment our machines’ computing power to run macro-scale realistic
economic experiments is nowhere close the levels that would be necessary, it
is possible to envisage futuristic scenarios in which such computing power is
achieved. Because of that, the argument that economic macro experiments
cannot be performed by means of computers seems to be based on contingent
factors.
6.1.2 Historical investigation in economics
An old Latin adage, attributed to Cicero, claims that historia magistra vitae
est (history is life’s teacher). According to some scholars, indeed, history
is not only recollection of the past, but also a guide to future actions. As
said before, epistemologically the idea is a simple application of induction:
By looking at the past and finding patterns of recurrence, I can hope that
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the system in which I should take a decision now has not changed, in the
relevant aspects, from the past, and that the same causes in the past will
yield same effects in the future.
In practice, the concrete everyday investigations of historians into the past
and the logical application of the principle of induction are far apart, making
the direct application of history to “future economics” highly dependent on
interpretation. A well-known, though perhaps overworn example is at hand:
the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States of America. The
economic events of the period that goes under the name Great Depression
have been, and still are, a heated topic of discussion. Scholars, both historians
and theoreticians, still debate over the causes of the economic events of the
late 1920s and 1930s.
The major debates were not exactly over what caused the initial Wall
Street Crash of 1929 — dramatic market fluctuations are known to happen
and are often attributed to random processes — but rather as to what made
the initial situation persist for over a decade. It would be beyond the point
of this section to recall the threads of the various debates among the schools
of thought relating respectively to Friedrich Hayek, John Maynard Keynes
(and neo-Keynsians), and Milton Friedman, but what is certain is that the
debate about the Great Depression is far from settled3.
What one can conclude from a glance at the course of economic history,
and the literature written on it, is that history is quite definitely not the place
where to look for economic consensus. That however, is a descriptive point;
the question remains as to whether it is the place where one should look. The
foregoing comments should not be taken as a particularly developed theory
of the relation between economic history and knowledge of the economic
world as it functions and develops. However, it is arguable that economic
history is in no place to be a normative basis for consensus anymore that
economic theorizing is.
The reason for that is that “historical induction” is at least as contro-
versial as other forms of economic analysis. On the one hand, as it is the
case in the historical reconstruction of the Great Depression, it is possible to
reconstruct the historical events in a way that will support one or another
of a range of policy applications. On the other hand, it is always possible to
argue that a certain historical period differs in significant aspects from the
present one, thus possibly invalidating any inference from the former to the
latter. While neither of these are conclusive arguments against the possibility
3To give the idea of the extent of the debate nowadays, it should be enough to highlight
the fact that on the causes and possible lessons of the Great Depression there have been
written a dedicated Wikipedia article and a volume of the popular for Dummies® series
(Wikipedia 2010; Wiegand 2009).
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of correct historical inferences from the past to the present, the arguments
do show that any such inference is likely to raise reasonable disagreement
from other historians.
The conclusion from section 5.5 and the subsequent sections, was that
statements about the economy and economic systems are underdetermined,
in the sense that often models and theories fail to provide adequate support
and justification for specific economic predictions or explanations. Similarly,
one can easily argue that historical investigations also tend to only vaguely
justify economic predictions or explanations. Whereas the complete denial of
any value to the study of history, for the purposes of economic applications,
is probably both theoretically unjustified and of little practical use, one
must reckon that there is no easy way to go from historical observations to
predictive statements and policy prescriptions.
6.1.3 Methodological liberalism
It is time to draw some preliminary conclusions about sources of knowledge
in economics, and the problem of consensus seeking on those theoretical
issues that have a direct application in the economic world (e.g. forecasting).
Ariel Rubinstein, discussing the practical role of economic modeling, resorts
to poetry:
As in the case of a good fable, a good model can have an enor-
mous influence on the real world, not by providing advice or
by predicting the future, but rather by influencing culture. Yes,
I do think we are simply the tellers of fables, but is that not
wonderful?
(Rubinstein 2006, 882)
Rubinstein defends the idea that models are not that much different from
fables, both in their characteristic structure (idealized worlds, unrealistic
claims, etc.), and in the function they perform: they influence the culture,
and, arguably, the minds of policy makers, managers, CEOs, bankers, etc.
It is far from clear that most economists would agree with Rubinstein, and
that their (at least intended) goal, when building models or constructing
experiments, is to tell fables, or less literarily, influence culture. It is
undeniable that science influences culture (see Russell 2009, Part V), but
that is often taken to be a secondary effect of science, not its primary
purpose.
If economic theorizing were simply story-telling, there would be little
debate as to why econometrics is superior to economic history, or why
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experiments are more accurate than careful conceptual investigation; in fact
there would be no debate because books of history tell wonderful stories just
as much as models, and reports of experiments influence culture just as much
as mathematical models. If the situation were really as Rubinstein portrays it,
then all methods would be on a par with all others, at least from a normative
point of view. Such a situation would give little room for distinguishing, a
priori, good economics from bad economics. The resulting situation would
be one of methodological equality: no method can, a priori, be claimed
superior to another. This is the sort of situation that McCloskey seems to
advocate, or perhaps the methodological anarchism Paul Feyerabend defends
(Feyerabend 1988, 1999).
Clearly there may be other methods for discriminating between good
economics and bad economics. It is assumed here that one should be able to
at least say something a priori on the quality of a method from an epistemic
point of view, without resorting to considerations of style, utility, ethics and
so on.
Without rejecting, in principle, the idea of methodological liberalism (Mc-
Closkey), or the stronger claims of methodological anarchism (Feyreabend),
the next sections will try to provide an alternative analysis to the problem
of how knowledge should be tackled in economics and what principles would
ideally guide the formation of economic consensus.
What is left for the space of this section is to highlight the fact that in a
situation in which the principal sources of economic knowledge underdeter-
mine claims about economic phenomena, one can still ask the question of
what type of justification such claims may have by looking at other, perhaps
less obvious, sources. Accepting the fact that in economics there does not
seem to be a way to univocally justify an official method over another, in the
following sections I will investigate those sources of economic knowledge that
are most proximate to the recipient of economic consensus, be these public
or private institutions. Such sources are institutionally called “economic
experts”, and are those who, with any previous background information
(historical, theoretical, practical, etc.), have a say in the public or private
arena on the theoretical matters underlying economic decision-making.
6.2 Experts in economics
It was argued, so far, that no one of the methods mentioned (modeling and
econometric testing, modeling and experiments, historical investigations,
etc.) is individually sufficient for the economic toolbox that a science wishing
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to apply its results needs4. At the same time it is hard to deny that there is
such a toolbox in any political administration, government agency, banking
institution, or company. Even more, one can argue that there are several
toolboxes, all partly different from one another, and perhaps also partly or
wholly incompatible with one another. The latter are descriptive statements,
but the fact that a consensus needs to form, for a policy-making action to
be taken, should be granted. The question then remains as to how such
consensus forms, and how it should form.
The claim defended in this section is that there is a source of knowledge
that is often overlooked, and that is expertise. Experts, I will argue, are
themselves sources of economic knowledge, and irreducible to any of the
previously mentioned sources or combinations of those. But before delving
into the subject of experts and expertise, there is a common misunderstanding
about expertise which must be dealt with.
That experts are a source of knowledge is a trivial thesis, at least in
the following sense: Experts constitute a large part of the communicative
channels through which whatever type of knowledge is gained, by scientific or
other methods, is passed on to the decision-makers. This function of experts
should not be minimized5, but the role of an expert as a communicator is
essentially different from her role as an irreducible source of knowledge in a
specific discipline. We can exemplify the role of an expert as a communicator
by sticking to the example of celestial navigation (cf. section 5.4).
In the example of celestial navigation, it is likely that the practitioner
(the sailor, pilot, etc.) will not know the details of the science behind celestial
navigation. Practical knowledge about navigating by use of celestial bodies,
indeed, comes from training or navigation manuals. It is probably then up
to the scientific expert to communicate the science, that is, to reduce it to
practical operational principles. Despite the possible dangers involved in
such operation, this does not impinge on the science of celestial navigation
itself, as it was described in section 5.4.
Moreover, it is arguable that in those fields where it was said that “exact
science” is possible, it is relatively easy to double check the information
conveyed by the expert to the layman, with other experts or on textbooks.
This is not true of the situation in which experts are direct (and not only
indirect, as in the case of the communicator’s role) sources of knowledge.
The meaning of the expression ‘direct sources of knowledge’ as referred to
experts, will be explained in the remainder of this section.
4It was assumed in the introductory sections of chapter 5 that economics does have
aspirations to be (also) a toolbox science.
5For an introduction and a brief survey of the topic see Russell (2009).
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6.2.1 Experts and tacit knowledge
The goal of this section is to make explicit the sense in which experts can be
thought of as sources of knowledge beyond their role as communicators. In
that light, experts are the depository of a form of knowledge that has been
called with various names in the literature: ‘personal knowledge’ (Polanyi
1958), ‘background knowledge’ (or ‘implicit knowledge’, as opposed to explicit
knowledge) (Helmer and Rescher 1959), but mostly, and currently, ‘tacit
knowledge’ (Collins 2010).
The definition of tacit knowledge is problematic because different authors
elucidate the concept in different ways; some define it as an actual state of
knowledge (knowledge that is tacit), some as a modal concept (knowledge
that can only be tacit). For working purposes, I will give Collins’s char-
acterization, without attributing it a definitional value: “Tacit knowledge
is knowledge that is not explicated.” (Collins 2010, 1). Also Helmer and
Rescher (1959) write on the relation between tacit knowledge and experts.
“The expert has at his ready disposal a large store of (mostly
inarticulated) background [read ‘tacit’] knowledge and a refined
sensitivity to its relevance, through the intuitive application of
which he is often able to produce trustworthy personal probabili-
ties regarding hypotheses in his area of expertness.”
(Helmer and Rescher 1959, 38)
Experts make use of tacit knowledge in most natural and social sciences.
A doctor diagnosing a patient might rely on decision aid software (see section
5.4.2), although almost invariably there will be a great deal of personal
judgment involved in the diagnosis. Similarly, conservation biologists make
large use of their knowledge of the field, besides their theoretical science,
when giving advice like forecasting the expected success of a particular
conservation program.
That there is tacit knowledge, and that it constitutes a large part of
one’s “professional” knowledge (viz. knowledge of the investigated environ-
ment), is a well-known fact in the field of business planning and forecasting.
Explicitation and transmission of tacit knowledge is the leading concept of
Ikujiro Nonaka’s business theory (Nonaka 1991; Stillwell 2003). Nonaka
claims that most of the potential in a business enterprise is the ability to
render the large batch of knowledge present in a company’s human capital
explicit and usable for the company’s development.
The discussion of knowledge in the business literature tends to blur
important distinctions that a science-based approach would like to draw
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between how-to knowledge (or skills), factual knowledge (information), or
theoretical (predictive or explanatory) knowledge. For example, Gourlay’s
definition of tacit knowledge includes values and emotions: “Tacit knowledge
is a non-linguistic, non-numerical form of knowledge that is highly personal
and context specific and deeply rooted in individual experiences, ideas,
values and emotions.” (Gourlay 2002, 2). Whereas one must recognize
the importance of values and emotions in a decision making context, it is
debatable whether they play a decisive epistemic role in the creation of
scientific knowledge in the form of explanation and prediction.
Here, the focus is on the epistemic value of tacit knowledge, that is, on
its role in forecasting and explaining scientific (and in particular economic)
phenomena.
“A source of characteristic examples of the predictive use of
expert judgment is provided by the field of diagnostics, especially
medical diagnostics. [. . . ] the use of background information,
in a way that is not systematized but depends entirely on the
exercise of informal expert judgment, may appropriately lead to
predictive conclusions in the face of prima facie evidence which
points in the opposite direction.”
(Helmer and Rescher 1959, 40)
In the above quotation, the “prima facie evidence” is evidence that can
be managed by a medical decision aid system, a software with a number of
inbuilt functions and a database, which mechanically formulates a diagnosis
on the basis of the inputs (symptoms, etc.) given by the doctor or nurse in
the standard pre-clinical visit procedure.
Cooke reports on the use of experts for assessing risk in the engineering
sector.
“As in the nuclear sector, expert opinion entered the aerospace
sector because of the desire to assess safety. In particular, man-
agers and politicians needed to assess the risks associated with
rare or unobserved catastrophic events. The likelihood of such
events could obviously not be assessed via the traditional scien-
tific method of repeated independent experiments.”
(Cooke 1991, 19)
I will come back to the problem of using expert opinion in the best
possible way later. For now, the question I want to address is what makes
expert opinion valuable and not reducible to a simple combination of textbook
data.
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6.2.2 What is experience?
Expertise, and its characteristic tacit knowledge, can be a product of histor-
ical, scientific, mathematical, or conceptual investigation, but what seems
peculiar to it is that it is almost invariably highly dependent on experience.
Knowledge deriving from experience, like tacit knowledge in general,
is most of the times imperfect, vague, and hard-to-describe. Moreover,
assessments based on experience are also hard to replicate in a controlled
scenario (Cooke 1991, 18), a factor that makes the scientific mind suspicious
of any claim based on experience.
If I were asked the time by a passerby, looked at my wristwatch, and
uttered “it’s 3 o’clock in the afternoon”, the passerby would likely walk away
confident, to a certain extent, that it is in fact 3 o’clock in the afternoon.
If, in the same situation, I were to raise my head to the sun, check the
surroundings, and utter “it’s 3 o’clock”, the passerby would likely walk away
just as uncertain of the time as she was before our encounter. Nonetheless,
some people can quite reliably know the time if, for example, they have
acquired a sensitivity towards the relation between the time of the day and
the conditions of their surrounding environment.
If I step outside of my house, which stands opposite to a school, and
see a line of cars parked all along the curbside, but not much movement of
students in the street, I can very reliably assert that it is five to ten minutes
to one o’clock, when the students are about to come out of school, and their
parents are waiting for them outside. If, instead, I see no cars lined up, but
only a small number of students standing in front of the school and chatting,
I can reliably infer that it must be five to fifteen minutes past the hour,
when most of the students that came by car left, and those few who remain
are waiting for the school bus.
With more and more experience, more and more exposure to the same
scenarios from day to day, and perhaps a richer number of cues that can aid
my estimations, I can probably become fairly accurate and determining the
hour even when conditions are slightly changed from the standard picture
described above.
With rich enough scenarios and refined sensitivity, experience can be
a very reliable source of knowledge. Besides, such type of knowledge is
flexible, contrary to mechanical or “automated” knowledge. Regardless,
experiential knowledge cannot be verified, other than by “proxy” indicators,
past performance, trust, etc., and can easily be faked, so that the passer-by
will likely prefer to put her trust on a watch than on my refined sensitivity
for telling the time.
A person’s reliability in telling the time does not come from computing,
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for the above example, the number of cars, parents, students, and their
relative positions in the street. More commonly, such knowledge is arrived
at unconsciously by the background work of the brain when we interact
(through the senses) with the environment around us.
The example of time telling, as are most illustrative examples, is sim-
plistic. Psychologists, however, have dedicated plenty of work to the role
of experience in problem solving tasks (see Ericsson 2001; Simon 2001;
Fischhoff 2001). Experience seems to be one of the factors that affect
expertise, intended as performance at problem solving abilities. Experience
determines skills (e.g. playing musical instruments), as well as analytical
abilities (e.g. chess playing, forecasting), although the correlation between
experience and expertise is very domain-specific and assumes both positive
and negative values6.
Expertise and experience certainly have a role in the economic sciences
too. One of the standard roles attributed to economics is explanation. What
is irreducible of the expert is the fact that she has experience and thus
tacit knowledge of economic matters. Whereas knowledge derived from the
application of the scientific or the historical methods can at least partially
be communicated and made explicit in textbook style writings, knowledge
gained from experience is harder to be put to use.
6.3 Tacit knowledge in groups
So far the concept of tacit knowledge has been outlined mainly as a personal
one. Tacit knowledge resides in experts in the form of experience, implicit
information, or other forms. However, there is also a sense of tacit knowledge
that applies to groups of epistemic agents.
The basic idea is simple. Imagine a group of two agents a and b, each of
which is in possession of a certain item of knowledge, respectively Ia and Ib.
Since there is not any standard partition of knowledge in its fundamental
elements, it is possible that item IG, also an item of knowledge, be a set
G of the items a and b. Trivially, then, the group of two agents will not
know IG as long as a and b do not communicate their individual items of
knowledge to each other and, by that means, the group.
As an example, imagine the following scenario: Jack and Sally are heading
6Two important experiments testing the calibration scores of business students
forecasting stock prices and earnings showed an “inverted” expertise effect, where more
experienced subjects (graduate business students) did worse at forecasting than the less
experienced ones (undergraduate students) (see Yates and McDaniel 1991; Staël von
Holstein 1972).
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to the river bank for a picnic. While, Sally is unaware of where Jack, who is
driving, is going, Jack knows the exact location. Sally has heard the news
in the morning and knows that the river has overflown during the night, so
that any vehicle directed towards the flooded area is bound to be caught
in the muddy terrain. Together, Sally and Jack know that they are going
to get stuck in the flooded area, but as long as they do not communicate
their individual information to each other, that item of knowledge — and
arguably a valuable one — only remains in the group as tacit knowledge.
A 2004 article in the New York Times reports the words of Samuel R.
Berger, national security adviser to President Clinton: “We’ve learned since
9/11 that not only did we not know what we didn’t know, but the F.B.I.
didn’t know what it did know.” (Shenon 2004) The reference is to the fact
that, due to the inefficient communicative structure of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, while the community, as a whole, had knowledge about
the risk of terrorists attack, on the other hand such knowledge was not
explicit, and thus unknown to the group intended as an operational entity.
Knowledge that remains implicit, even though it is present, makes the group
unable to operate in the light of that knowledge.
It is evident then that tacit knowledge exists both at the individual and at
the group level, albeit with different characteristics and for different reasons.
Consensus, it should be noted, is a composite of the individual convergent
(or identical) opinions of a group, but it can also be the information, as a
primitive composite, that is present at the group level, and which is then
transmitted down to the members of the group. It should be clear then
that tacit knowledge is important for the formation of consensus both in its
individual and group forms.
One final remark should be made about the nature of expert knowledge,
both at the individual and at the group level. In the examples above, experts
and the group possessed “factual knowledge”; in philosophical terms, they
possessed some evidence of facts. But this is not the only type of knowledge
that experts possess. In the context of economics, there are at least two
other types, which are of primary importance for policy making.
The first one is knowledge of the future, to wit, forecasts. Experts can
predict the future of events related to their field of expertise. Formal methods
(statistical models, computer-based methods, etc.), which are normally used
for forecasting, can and should be substituted by “human predictors” when
the conditions require it. In that way, experts become forecasting devices,
when formal tools are not available or not suitable for a specific problem. A
full analysis of experts as forecasting devices is found in Helmer and Rescher
(1959) and Cooke (1991). More on that will be discussed later on this
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chapter, in the discussion of the Delphi method (cf. section 6.6.1).
The second type of knowledge related to expertise is how-to knowledge.
How-to knowledge is not necessarily related to manual or physical ability,
but it refers to the complex set of skills that are required in problem solving
situations. Indeed, part of the task that economic sciences are faced with,
when their primary concern is with policy making, is that of problem solving.
Problem solving is in some respects more complex than scientific under-
standing and forecasting, insofar as it involves the ability to identify the
problem, identify the tools that can resolve it, and use the tools available
to resolve it. How-to knowledge is here the ability to think creatively, to
identify solutions for relatively new and non-standard scenarios, and so on.
In this sense, economics turns into economic engineering, a process where
explanation and prediction are only of secondary importance, while the
primary aim is the achievement of specific goals with given means.
An example of the way economic engineering is achieved is given in Guala
(2001). In general, auction theory and the licensing of broadcasting licenses
by several governments, is often taken to be an example of the successful
use of economic knowledge for policy making (see also Reiss 2008, chapter
5). The policies that were implemented in actioning broadcasting-spectrum
licenses involve a very complex number of skills, and a sensitivity to the
specificity of the problem, for which experts are said to have a special type
of “practical” knowledge. A large part of tacit knowledge (see section 6.2.1),
is ‘how-to’ knowledge, and plays an important role in economic applications.
6.4 Some preliminary conclusions
Given the status of theoretical knowledge in economics, most of the situations
of consensus in the sciences must be a direct product of economic experts.
These will be people formed in the scientific, historical, and business studies
but probably also trained in the economic field, and experienced in economic
decision making for businesses, governments, economic organizations and
other institutions. Descriptively, this seems to be the best depiction of the
situation in the economic sciences.
However, since the emphasis of this thesis is on the normative question
(cf. section 5.2), the foregoing considerations will focus on assessing whether
such situation is optimal, that is, whether reliance on expertise is desirable
in economics. Economic experts clearly have advantages over textbook
economics, if textbook economics is transmitted uninterpreted to the policy
makers or to whomever it is to be transmitted to. It seems that in economics
the situation should resemble more the case of, say, a geopolitical advisor
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— who communicates to the policy-maker by interpreting her theory and
making extensive use of her tacit knowledge — than to the case of the
hypothetical instructor of celestial navigation mentioned in section 6.2.
The interpretative layer, however, and the use of personal non-explicated
knowledge, makes the judgment of the expert subject to important biases
and flaws. Such biases are important insofar as they both undermine
the justificatory status of expert knowledge (hence the skepticism towards
experts expressed in the literature), and they produce knowledge that is
either, incorrect, unjustified, or in general, “bad” knowledge.
The following section will present the main problems associated with
expert knowledge, both from an individual and a collective viewpoint.
6.5 The drawbacks of expert elicitation
It should be noted that the great majority of the literature on the methods
for using expert judgment tends to argue, by empirical testing, that such
methods are superior to informal deliberation and elicitation. However, little
is said as to the various problems that make the use of expert judgment
and elicitation problematic. An exception is in Cooke (1991), who provides
a survey of the major biases and some mathematical problems in expert
elicitation.
This section is an attempt to categorize and put in a schematic form the
various issues that affect the use of expert elicitation. Even a brief survey of
the many biases and other problems that affect experts and their judgment,
as individuals and in groups, would require covering two very large literatures:
on the topic of individual biases, the psychological literature on cognitive
biases, and the one on logical and probabilistic fallacies of reasoning. On the
topic of group biases, the literature on judgment aggregation, with related
impossibility theorems, and the psychological literature on biases that arise
specifically at the group level.
Realistically it would be close to impossible to handle even a small section
of such literature. For that reason, this section will cover the problem of the
disadvantages of expert elicitation from a very schematic point of view. A
table will give an essential representation of the various problems associated
with eliciting expert’s opinion, and some essential references. Each of the
four points in the table with be briefly explained individually and some
preliminary conclusions will be drawn.
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Table 6.1: Taxonomy of the drawbacks related to “expert judgment”
Logics & Mathematics Psychology
Individual Level ELICITATION INDIVIDUAL BIASES
Group Level AGGREGATION SOCIAL BIASES
6.5.1 Elicitation
Elicitation is the process of asking an expert her opinion on a certain subject
matter. The problem seems trivial. If I want to know whether a certain
statement is true or false, I can just ask the expert for a yes/no assessment.
Oftentimes, however, the information obtained from a yes/no statement is
not very valuable.
In the engineering sector, for instance, expert elicitation is often used for
risk assessment (Cooke 1991, 19, quoted in section 6.2.1). Risk is assessed
as a probabilistic value; therefore the expert, asked to assess the risk that
associates a certain scenario with a certain danger, should provide a value
between 0 and 1. This form of elicitation is called ‘point estimation’.
Point estimation, however, does not provide information on the uncer-
tainty associated with a certain assessment; that is, it provides only one
degree of information (Cooke 1991, 46). If a mechanical engineer is asked
about the risk of a particular machine component to break beyond the point
of functionality, she might give an informed estimate. Were I to be asked
the same, I would probably give a very uninformative estimate. Informative-
ness and non-informativeness is second level information on my assessment,
that is, a measure of how confident I am that my assessment be correct.
Clearly, knowing how confident an expert is about her assessment is relevant
information for the decision maker.
Elicitation is a formal problem because the formal treatment of yes/no
answers, point estimates, or interval estimates is different and different
measures do not have a clear psychological interpretation. A simple example
is the problem of comparing different individual scales. We can assume that
it is clear to most assessors what the meaning of ‘risk 0’ and ‘risk 1’ are.
What lays in the middle is not as straightforward. Expert A’s scale for
risk might be linear, while Expert B’s could be logarithmic; if that is the
case, then different estimates will correspond to the same piece of subjective
information. It is difficult to know a-priori what piece of information they
correspond to, although psychological scaling seems to be the most reliable
method (Cooke 1991, chapter 14).
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6.5.2 Individual biases
Even assuming that individual elicitation, as a mathematical task, is somehow
a solvable problem, the issue would still remain of individual psychological
biases which affect human judgment. The landmark reference for this subject
is in the works of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman; notorious biases are
‘framing’, ‘hindsight’, ‘confirmation’, and several other ways in which human
judgment consistently deviates from the principles of logic or probability
theory. Classified cognitive biases are known because they have been tested
in controlled settings and are normally replicable.
More in general, individual biases are psychological predispositions that
influence one’s judgment when certain cues are given. Biases need not
be normatively undesirable. A bias to truth, were such a bias to exist,
would certainly be epistemically desirable. Expert A’s bias towards expert
B, that is, A’s tendency to follow B’s opinion, is normatively desirable if
B’s opinion tends to be consistently better (e.g. closer to the truth) than
A’s. Unfortunately, in most contexts in which expert judgment and tacit
knowledge are involved it is impossible to tell a-priori whose opinion is likely
to be the best one (Armstrong 2001, 421-422).
To conclude this brief section on individual biases, it should be noted
that cognitive biases and biases affecting behavior7 are, in principle, a red
flag on the good epistemic status of the judgment that is elicited.
6.5.3 Aggregation
Section 6.3 motivated the study of expert elicitation from the viewpoint of
groups rather than single individuals. Cooke writes “Most decision-making
bodies are not individuals but groups.” (Cooke 1991, 171). The statement
is true not only for decision making bodies, but also for advising committees,
expert panels, etc. Moreover, whereas Cooke only makes a factual statement,
the claim that most decision bodies should be groups rather than individuals
is also true, in a great many contexts8.
7These are political, emotional, or other types of biases, which have not been mentioned
here because their study is not as developed (and replicable) as the research on cognitive
biases. Nonetheless, in principle they are equally affecting the epistemic value of one’s
judgments, and a proper handbook of expert elicitation should at least give mention of
them and possibly give guidelines on how to avoide such biases.
8There is no space here to provide a thorough defense of this statement. Group
judgment and the aggregation of judgments, in many scientific and social contexts, is
considered to be epistemically superior to individual judgment. The branch of philosophy
that goes under the name of ‘social epistemology’ provides a number of justifications for
that thesis. For a philosophical analysis see Goldman (1999).
118 CHAPTER 6. CONSENSUS IN ECONOMICS PART 2
Group judgment, however, almost invariably requires some artificial
method of consensus formation. The meaning of consensus here needs not
be as narrow as it was taken to be in the initial chapters of this work (2,
3, 4), where consensus was analyzed from a purely epistemological point of
view. There, consensus meant convergence of individual beliefs to a common
view, and the prospects of having a formal model capable of producing
mathematical consensus seemed destined to fail. In the context of policy
advising, decision making and, in general, from the viewpoint of philosophy
of science, consensus has normally a broader meaning. Consensus can be,
and normally is, reached as a compromise, or an aggregation, of reported
beliefs. Because the problems related to reaching a compromise belong to
the next section, I will start from aggregation below.
Aggregation is the mathematical or logical merging of initially different
mathematical or logical values. Values can be numerical estimates (e.g. life
expectancy, in number of years), probabilities (e.g. risk), binary values (e.g.
yes/no for qualitative assessment), and possibly other values. Judgment
aggregation gives rise to a number of problems that stem from various impos-
sibility theorems. The pioneering work on the literature has been Arrow’s
work in social choice theory. His famous theorem is on the impossibility of
formulating a social preference ordering that satisfies a number of seemingly
innocuous principles.
Arrow’s work gave life to a whole literature of impossibility results.
Saari (2008) gives a compendium and a general mathematical theory of the
major impossibility results. List, in a number of papers, has extended the
results of Arrow’s and proven new ones; List and Pettit (2011) provides
a good compendium of the major results in collaboration with different
authors. Finally Xu and Da (2003) gives a broad comprehensive overview of
aggregating operators, without impossibility results.
The conclusions that can be drawn from the literature on aggregating
judgment is that there are almost always trade-offs to make between condi-
tions when aggregating expert judgment. In relation to their impossibility
result for the aggregation of propositional attitudes, List and Pettit (2011)
take a constructive attitude.
How should we interpret this impossibility theorem? [. . . ] our
result can be taken to show that, if a group seeks to form inten-
tional attitudes, it must relax at least one of the four conditions
[the passage refers to the four conditions, analogous to Arrow’s
conditions, from which the impossibility is derived].
(List and Pettit 2011, 45)
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Which trade-offs to make, however, is hardly ever a purely technical
choice, other than for convenience. Whether to sacrifice, for example,
collective rationality or universal domain (see List and Pettit 2011, 49),
may depend on the composition of the group that is required to aggregate.
A particularly cohesive group, one where major differences in individual
opinions are not expected, may accept the drawback of having incomplete
group attitudes by taking a supermajority rule of two-thirds or above (see
List and Pettit 2011, 53). Whether such group is functional, and avoids the
impasse of not achieving a majority, is an evaluation that can only be made
a posteriori in the operational context.
6.5.4 Group biases
Often times deliberating groups do not apply an aggregating procedure
directly. Deliberative methods can themselves bring the opinions of the group
closer to one another through simple discussion, feedback, and evaluation.
In fact, a convergence effect is observed in the Delphi deliberative procedure
(more on this in section 6.6.1), where iterations of problem assessment and
provision of feedback to the members leads, in some cases, to a certain
degree of convergence.
In general, a deliberative group, in light of the necessity of forming a
group opinion, might often simply settle on a compromise solution without
necessarily requiring aggregation9. A compromise is normally the result of
psychological processes10, obtained as exchange of opinions and more or less
slow settlement and elimination of the individual differences.
Suppose one (e.g. a prime minister) is to assess a number of factors that
will affect the inflation rate in order to stabilize the rate within a specific
interval. The prime minister will gather a committee around a table, ask
them to exchange opinions, and come to a feasible number of policy advices.
Despite that seeming the most intuitive procedure, hardly ever is the strategy
successful in order to obtain valuable expert opinion.
9It should be noted that aggregation is not always the best solution and in some cases
it leads to absurdities. Imagine a group that is trying to decide whether to cut public
sector wages, thus losing the public sector section of the electorate, or increase corporate
taxes, loosing the support of some corporations instead. A compromise, half wage-cut and
half-tax increase, might loose both electorate and corporate support. Even though in this
case one can blame the problem on the fact that one should not “aggregate apples and
oranges”, it is possible to formulate a similar argument with one type of entity alone. A
similar example was given in the introduction of this thesis, the example of King Solomon
and the two women.
10Negotiation can also be seen as a psychological process.
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In the first place, a committee of such sort is very unlikely to even be able
to get to an orderly and fair discussion without a moderator. The moderator
(or chair) is the first form of superimposition of an “elicitation mechanism”
over the committee. As trivial as its role may seem, the moderator should
prevent the group from running into social dynamics that will likely lead it
to low performance. For instance, the most aggressive individual will likely
take over the discussion floor imposing her views on the rest of the group.
The often-cited adage “repeat a lie a thousand times and it will become
a truth”, at times attributed to renowned Nazi or Communist dictators,
stands as a voucher for the idea, taken from the psychological literature,
that it is not the right opinion that tends to be believed by the masses, but
the one that is repeated most times and most fervently.
Biases that arise at the group level are at times called social dynamics,
that is, forces which are a product of the group as a whole, and affect the
individuals composing it. Social dynamics are tendencies of individuals to
act in ways that are conditioned by the forces of the group.
6.5.5 Relying on experts
As the previous section should have indicated, reliance on expert judgment
is problematic, especially when the distance between the theory and the
practice is large. The more precise and operational the science is, the less
the room for personal judgment will be, when moving from the abstract
domain of the theory to its concrete application. But whenever room for
personal judgment is large, biases of different types and judgment errors will
likely be numerous.
Trout (2009) warns against the use of so-called “experts” in a number
of situations where simple statistical methods are shown by psychological
research to perform better. The decisions of probation officers evaluating
parole candidates would better be substituted by evaluations based on the
felons’ past record (Trout 2009, 163-168). Similarly, argues Trout, student
interviews are worse at selecting students for admission than other methods
that consider only past academic record (Trout 2009, 163-168).
McCloskey (1992) asks the question why professed economic experts are
not themselves the richest men, all other things being equal. The question
is rhetorical, and the paper is meant to show the absurdity of the concept of
a forecast that is both profitably informative and public11. Yet, the effect is
to cast doubt on the professed “expertise” of economists as predictors.
11If a forecast is public, the public has already exploited its information for their profit,
thus making it unprofitable.
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To throw even more doubt on the efficacy of economists as predictors
are two papers (Staël von Holstein 1972; Yates and McDaniel 1991),
showing that expertise seems to be negatively correlated with stock market
predictions. Yates and McDaniel (1991) confirms and extends the results
in Staël von Holstein (1972): “[. . . ] subject’s probability forecasts of stock
prices where shown to be surprisingly inaccurate” and “[. . . ] although we
might expect that greater experience will lead to demonstrably greater
accuracy, it instead simply resulted in more useless variation in judgments”
(Yates and McDaniel 1991, 75). Although, as the authors admit, the results
are far from being generalizable, the aforementioned papers cast doubt about
whether the expertise of stock prices forecasters is real or only professed.
Angner applies the studies on the effect of overconfidence to a historical
case, showing how professed individual experts in government advising
positions “are likely to fall prey of significant overconfidence” (Angner 2006,
19). By means of conclusion, the author states “I have assumed throughout
that we are on the whole better off relying on serious economic analysis in
public decision making. My point is that to make the best of the situation,
we need to be aware of the limitations of expert advice and try to anticipate
diverse negative consequences.” (Angner 2006, 20)
The model of expertise that Angner presents is a simple one: There is
one individual, trained as an economist, who advises directly the Russian
government on which economic policies it should adopt. Even though it
is impossible to know exactly how the chain of power was working, it is
arguable that the advisor to a government was consulted in briefings and
perhaps written memoranda. The scenario seems open to the influence of all
the problems described in section 6.5, with the only exception of aggregation
problems12.
In the next section two models for expert advising will be presented.
The major difference between these models and the folk models of expert
advising is that the latter lack almost any formal structure and take the
number of individuals in the advising structure to be only a contingent issue.
The next section will present a number of methods for deliberation and
expert elicitation where the attempt is to control the type and quality of
interaction between experts, in order to avoid at least some of the issues
involved with expert judgment.
12Note that group biases can arise not only in advising committees, which would not
be the case for the example that Angner (2006) gives, but also from the interaction
between advisors and policy makers.
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6.6 The advantages of expert elicitation
Before presenting the methods, it should be said that there are at least
some facts about expertise and expert judgment that have been quite
extensively investigated: a) group judgment is epistemically superior to
individual judgment, and b) structured judgment is epistemically superior
to unstructured judgment.
a) Groups outperform individuals. The first fact has been investigated in
several respects. The first pronouncement came in the form of a mathematical
theorem, the Condorcet Jury Theorem, showing that if some initial conditions
are met, a group as a whole is better at tracking the truth than its individuals
in isolation. The theorem has successively been extended and its assumptions
relaxed. Empirical literature has also shown that experts tend to perform
better than individuals at problem solving and forecasting tasks (Rowe and
Wright 2001; Armstrong 2001b; Aspinall 2010; Stewart 2001).
The literature on the Nominal Group Technique (more on this later)
has shown that groups provide a better exploration of the problem space,
enhancing creativity (Delbecq and Van de Ven 1971), and producing more
input in the form of available information (Nonaka 1991). What should
not be assumed, when developing a formal tool with the idea of capturing
a natural (or social, in the case of economics) phenomenon, is that the
formulation of the problem is both easy and innocent with respect to the
conclusions that can be derived from that tool. Groups have a better chance
at formulating the problems more accurately because they will likely possess
more information than the single individual on the issue in question.
b) Structured judgment outperforms unstructured judgment. The principle
that one ought to structure the judgment process of a group seems to go
against what was stated before about the superiority of tacit knowledge over
mechanical methods in fields where formalization of the problem is hard to
achieve. The confusion, however, arises from a misinterpretation of what it
means to structure a judgment process.
The existence of a chairman in a discussion session clearly limits the
freedom of expression of the participants, but, ideally, only insofar as such
freedom goes against the principle that all information should be made
available. Similarly, the requirement of anonymity in the Delphi Procedure,
limits the interaction of experts by not allowing them to recognize each
other other than by means of the expressed judgment. In other words,
in Delphi, an expert is identified with its judgment, not with its physical,
behavioral, interactional features. While one could object to such limitations
by arguing that such aspects are an essential part of the human dimension
of interactions, it turns out, from the research briefly reviewed in section
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6.5, that such interaction is in many cases conducive of “bad judgment”,
for example, if the social attitudes of the expert made her otherwise sound
judgment look unworthy.
Structuring judgment then means, on one hand, limiting the effect
of those factors that are irrelevant to the judgment itself and potentially
conducive of negative social dynamics, such as weighting someone’s judgment
by factors (e.g. personality) that have nothing to do with the judgment
itself. On the other hand, it means to facilitate the creation of those
social dynamics that are instead conducive of better judgment. For example,
constraining judgment into being a product of groups rather than individuals,
or facilitating the provision of feedback from the group level back to the
individuals.
It is clear that the procedure of directing expertise in the formation of
judgment can only partly be decided on a-priori grounds. Some procedures
will fit different purposes better than others, but such assessment is often
made a-posteriori.
The foregoing sections will review two of the methods for constraining
expert judgment, the Delphi Method and the Nominal Group Technique.
Each review is divided in three parts: 1) I describe the procedure in its
essential features; 2) I give a brief history of its formulation, uses and goals;
3) I list the positive contribution of the procedure to the formulation of
group judgment.
6.6.1 The Delphi project
In the Delphi Method the administrator of the procedure formulates a
problem for which she wishes to obtain forecasts or subjective judgment.
The formulation should allow for either yes/no answers or a probability
value in the form of point estimates or interval estimates. The problem is
administered to a number of selected experts13, with the request to provide
their judgment.
Experts submit their reports (and in some cases the reasons for their
personal judgments) to the administrator, who can choose, depending on the
situation, to formulate a summary of the first round of reports. Either the
summary, or the individual reports, are fed back to each of the experts with
the request to consider their judgment again and resubmit their (possibly
revised) judgment. The process is iterated as many times as it is feasible
(iteration is time consuming and costly), or until the process stabilizes (more
13Selection of experts can present problems and biases too, for a treatment of the issue
see Collins (2004).
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iterations do not produce significant change in the judgment).
The Delphi Method was developed in the 1950s14 and 1960s at the RAND
corporation, mostly by the work of Dalkey and Helmer (Dalkey and Helmer
1963; Dalkey 1969). Extensive reviews of the method were published in
Dalkey et al. (1972) and Linstone and Turoff (1975). Recent evaluations
and commentaries are in Rowe and Wright (1999), Rowe and Wright (2001)
and Rowe, Wright and McColl (2004).
The rationale and philosophical foundation for the use of Delphi was
outlined in Helmer and Rescher (1959). There, the authors motivate the use
of experts in situations in which a formal analysis is not yet possible. The
sciences for which formalization of problems is particularly hard are classified
as “inexact sciences” (see section 5.6 and 5.6.2), even though Helmer and
Rescher deny that there is a qualitative distinction between exact and inexact
sciences. Instead, their claim is that in all sciences there some are degrees of
inexactness as well as domains that resist formalization more than others15.
In an inexact science [. . . ] reasoning is informal; in particular,
some of the terminology may, without actually impeding com-
munication, exhibit some inherent vagueness, and reasoning may
at least in part rely on reference to intuitively perceived facts or
implications. Again, an inexact science rarely uses mathematical
notation or employs attributes capable of exact measurement,
and as a rule does not make its predictions with great precision
and exactitude.
(Helmer and Rescher 1959, 25-26)
The Delphi method makes use of expert opinion in those domains in
which the formalization of the problem would be either impossible or mis-
representative of the problem (e.g. too simple to lead to robust conclusions
about the object of investigation). The major advantages of Delphi are listed
below.
• Aggregation. Delphi performs better than single individuals by
simple aggregation of the individual judgments. “Delphi effectiveness
over comparative procedures, at least in terms of judgmental accuracy,
has generally been demonstrated [. . . ]. Rowe and Wright [. . . ] found
14Because the original work was done in the context of military decision making and
evaluation — the project was originally developed for the US Air Force — very early
presentations of the Delphi Method were protected by secrecy.
15A similar picture is justified by the observations made in sections 5.3 and 5.5 of this
work.
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that Delphi groups outperformed ‘statistical’ groups (which involve
the aggregation of the judgments of noninteracting individuals) in
12 studies, underperformed these in two, and ‘tied’ in two others,
while Delphi outperformed standard interacting groups in five studies,
underperformed in one, and ‘tied’ in two.” (Rowe, Wright and McColl
2004, 378) The application of Delphi, as well as that of several other
methods, seems to validate the first fact that was mentioned in section
6.6, that is, the first step towards better judgment is the passage from
individuals to groups.
• Anonymity. In the Delphi method there is no personal interaction
among experts, or more precisely, no direct physical interaction. Sur-
veys and elicitation are done via mail (in the original implementations
of the method) or computer interaction (now becoming the standard
method for Delphi interaction (see Garćıa-Magariño et al. 2008,
2010)). Anonymity and lack of personal interaction eliminates the
several psychological biases that can arise from direct group interaction.
Some bias can still occur with the provision of feedback, especially
when feedback is provided on the reasons that have been given to
support an expert’s opinion in previous rounds.
• Feedback. Feedback is meant to provide experts with more informa-
tion from round to round, in the hope of improving their accuracy.
Experimental studies show that, in weather forecasting and engineer-
ing applications, feedback can improve an expert’s calibration (Cooke
1991, 26,27, 72-76). Unfortunately, in the context of stock market
prediction, calibration seems to produce no improvements and experts
perform worse than non-experts. An analysis of the role of feedback
in Delphi is in Rowe, Wright and McColl (2004).
• Convergence. Iterations of the rounds of elicitation in Delphi produce
partial convergence of the views of the experts involved. This is often
attributed to the effects of feedback. Convergence, together with the
evidence that Delphi outperforms ‘statistical groups’ (see first point),
points towards the conclusion that the convergence is towards the
truth. In directly interacting groups, on the other hand, convergence
is normally unrelated to the truth of the matter (herd behavior).
.
This list concludes the brief survey on the Delphi method. The moti-
vations for the use of Delphi as part of the methodological apparatus of
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economics will be motivated in section 6.7, after a review of the Nominal
Group Technique in the coming section.
6.6.2 Nominal Group technique
The main goal of the Nominal Group technique is not forecasting, but rather
problem exploration and program management. It was argued in the sections
of chapter 5.5, that one of the issues in economics is the formulation of the
problem itself. Correct formulation of problems is, in science, as important as
their solution, inasmuch as the conclusions derived from an overly simplified
problem will likely bear little resemblance with the real problem.
A Nominal Group is put together, as in Delphi, by an administrator in
order to explore a certain problem or to manage a certain project (the two
are not exclusive). The technique divides the process of expert elicitation
into phases, in which the experts are called to give their contribution, and
in minutely specified steps for each round. The complexity of the process,
and the detailed description of each step, would make their exposition here
pedantic, and the interested reader can refer to Delbecq and Van de Ven
(1971) for a detailed description.
In its original formulation the Nominal Group technique has five phases:
Problem Exploration, Knowledge Exploration, Priority Development, Program
Development, and Program Evaluation. The last three steps can be considered
of primary interest for the business sector, whereas the first two phases are of
important theoretical interests and will therefore be the focus in this section.
Problem Exploration involves a number of steps in which the experts
are asked to provide feedback on the understanding of the problem itself,
rather than provide solutions to previously formulated problems: “The
organizational representative [. . . ] then indicates that the purpose of the
meeting is to understand the problems, not to explore solutions.” (Delbecq
and Van de Ven 1971, 470) The process involves both personal assessment
(individuals write down their judgments on 3” x 5” cards) and interaction
(individuals read aloud what they have written), but the interaction is strictly
mediated by the administrator.
Once the problem has been explored and the goals have been established,
the phase is over; the administrator, taking from the pool of Problem
Explorers and from other pools of experts, then forms a second group,
smaller than the first, in order to elicit knowledge about possible solutions
of the problems selected in the first phase. Knowledge Exploration takes
the same modalities of the previous phase, but is aimed at making the tacit
knowledge present in the second group explicit.
It was said in section 6.2, that a large, yet mostly unexploited in the
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economic context, source of knowledge of economic phenomena, correlations
and solution possibly resides in the form of tacit knowledge, gained from
the diverse practices of economists as historians, mathematicians, modelers,
experimenters and so on. That section, however, posed the problem of
how to make such knowledge “working knowledge”, that is, how to make it
explicit. Nonaka (1991) poses the same problem, but seems to focus on the
problem of eliciting how-to knowledge in large companies and organizations.
Moreover, Nonaka only gives general indications for that task, without giving
any particular procedural guideline.
Contrary to that, Delbecq and Van de Ven (1971) provide a precise
methodology for letting experts express their subjective judgment on the
problem under discussion. As said before, the Nominal Group technique is
not meant for forecasting; the although limited interaction of experts in a
small group would in all likelihood trigger those biases that were thought to
bring the group to underperformance in the Delphi studies (e.g. dependence
of the judgments, tendency to follow the strongest opinion, etc.). The
main use of the technique is in “(a) identifying strategic problems and (b)
developing appropriate and innovative programs to solve them” (Delbecq
and Van de Ven 1971, 467).
This research indicates that [freely] interacting groups produce
a smaller number of problem dimensions, fewer high quality
suggestions, and a smaller number of different kinds of solutions
than groups in which members were constrained from interaction
during the generation of critical problem variables.
(Delbecq and Van de Ven 1971, 772)
The Nominal Group technique was initially developed by Delbecq and
Van de Ven (Delbecq and Van de Ven 1971). Subsequent papers developed
the technique and compared it to similar methods, including Delphi (Van De
Ven and Delbecq 1974). Since then, the technique has had little theoretical
development but has been, and still is, widely applied in many practical
contexts whenever the assessment of the problem and the identification of
solutions is a particularly complex task.
The advantages of the technique are listed below (the list is not exhaus-
tive).
• Group process structure. The full justification of the superiority of
a structured group over brainstorming or free interaction is given in Van
De Ven and Delbecq (1971). Among the several advantages reported,
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are the following facts: A nominal group “avoids the dominance of
group output by strong personality types” (one of the biases mentioned
in section 6.5), “avoids evaluation of elaborating comments while
problem dimensions are being generated”, and several others (Van De
Ven and Delbecq 1971, 206,207). One can notice that the advantages
that Delbecq and Van de Ven report are mostly in the psychological
dimension. Nonetheless, such advantages would reflect on the epistemic
dimension too, if the psychological biases are conducive of partial or
incomplete judgment.
• Alternation. The Nominal Group Technique separates the periods of
personal problem and solution exploration from the periods of sharing.
According to the authors, this gives the opportunity to all the members
to reflect privately without disturbance such as immediate objections
and comments (see previous point). The alternation of the two steps,
in both the first and the second phase, can be seen as a direct feedback
process similar to the Delphi one, with the only difference being that
in this case the process is not anonymous.
• Social Interaction. A number of positive reasons for using Nominal
Groups is given that makes reference to the positive social advantages
of the technique. For example, it allows exchange between different
types of expertise and even between the experts and the “clients”,
viz. those who are the receivers of benefits from the project under
analysis. Or, also, it gives the administrators the opportunity to select
the appropriate expertise at different stages of the process. Because
these advantages belong to a dimension that is not discussed in this
work, to wit, the proper decision-making aspect of economic sciences,
where the interactions are not among economists alone but between
economic sciences and the political or social sphere, these advantages
should not be considered as epistemic advantages per se. These aspects
of the technique, on the other hand, are important if the goal is to
address the decision-making process in relation to the use of expertise,
as for instance in (Collins 2004).
6.7 Conclusion
It was argued, in this and the previous chapter, that the rational model of
consensus formation in economics suffers from a number of drawbacks due
to the fact that the system investigated by economic sciences is a rapidly
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adapting system, and one where the object of analysis can respond to infor-
mation coming from the analysis itself and thereby defy its predictions. The
debate on whether even adaptive systems are to a certain extent predictable
by the means of the scientific method, modeling and testing, is far from
settled. More than trying to provide a definite answer to that point, these
two chapters were meant to suggest that the sources of economic knowledge
are larger than the scientific method implies.
While those conclusions are not new in the literature on economic method-
ology, the problem remains to provide a valid alternative method that is
able to take into account all the different sources that are available to eco-
nomics for understanding and manipulating the economic environment. In
this chapter, it was suggested that besides modeling economic phenomena
themselves, the goal of economic methodology should be to model those who
were identified as the primary sources of applicable economic knowledge and
around which economic consensus forms. Those are the economic experts.
On the one hand, reliance on the scientific method has the advantage of
precision, replicability, communicability and perhaps other advantages as
well, but that comes at the cost of flexibility, as a model is a mathematical
construct that does not respond to information that was not included in the
model at the time of its formulation. As it happens, however, that infor-
mation is essential for understanding the volatile nature of many economic
phenomena.
On the other hand, relying on expertise has the advantage of flexibility,
often however at the expense of those advantages that modeling and testing
offered. The first idea of section 6.6.1 was to provide an initial framework
for modeling expertise. The reason for modeling expertise is to avoid the
shortcomings of expert judgment, especially in the context of committees
of experts. The second idea of this chapter was to suggest a shift from the
concept of individual expertise to that of collective expertise. While the
justification of the power of groups over individuals was mostly assumed
throughout the chapters, the idea that a single economic expert can manage
the variety of tasks that require him or her in the real world is at best
illusory.
The picture given in the introduction to this thesis, the one of the
economist as the apothecary drawing from his stock of medical substances,
each apt for a specific illness, should be replaced by a normatively more ade-
quate representation. Economists are mostly trained in a specific subfield of
their science, almost always a highly specialized area and with a very specific
methodology; that is true for all areas of economics, from econometrics to
history of economics.
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What the policy maker requires from economists, however, is to treat
and solve problems that go well beyond the limits of an expert’s area of
competence. Clearly an economist is likely to have been able, by her own
intelligence, to gain knowledge of the mechanism of the economic world
beyond the specificity of her own domain of specialization, but it is unrealistic
to think that she has been able to gain all the understanding and competence
that is necessary for the task she is assigned by the policy-maker.
Figure 6.1: Pictorial representation of an expert’s domains of competence.
Figure 6.1 represents the idea just expressed. The training of an economist
grants her some competence (dotted line in the figure) which runs across
different social organizations (e.g. a corporation or a government), but which
will probably not cover the full extent of that organization’s need. It is likely
that an expert will have been able, through her own cognitive resources, to
gain a decent understanding of phenomena outside her own direct field of
competence (dashed line in the figure). It is however virtually impossible
that an expert’s competence can reach the whole domain required at higher
and higher levels of social organization (continuous line in the figure).
That latter domain, on the other hand, can easily be covered by the
combination of the competence of more than one expert, even though at
a price. The price is that of coordination, group biases, and the other
shortcoming of collective expertise. The idea in this chapter was to suggest
some strategies of expert elicitation for groups of economic experts. While
some of these strategies have been extensively applied to other domains, like
engineering and policy-making, the contribution of chapter 6 was to justify
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the adoption of such strategies for the field of positive economics, that is,
for the development of that economic toolbox that policy makers, managers





The previous two chapters of this thesis concluded by supporting the idea
that economic methodology should be guided by the concept of modeling
expertise, in addition to the traditional scientific idea of modeling phenomena.
The second idea in section 6.7 was that expertise is better exploited when it
comes as collective expertise than when it comes as individual expertise. It
must be reckoned, however, that especially in the field of applied economics,
where the science has direct consequences for the policy-making and, in turn,
for the wellness of those affected by the adopted policies, modeling experts
goes hand in hand with the ethical principles that the science, or better, the
scientist, is expected to follow.
It is a fairly accepted standard to regulate the behavior of scientists,
or at least those scientists who work in particularly sensitive domains,
by adopting moral standards in the form of ethical codes or even special
legislative provisions that the community enforces on its members. The
classical example of such code is the Hippocratic oath for physicians, but the
use of ethical codes has spread to other areas of science as well, for example
in genetics. While in the field of business ethical codes have been studied
and experimented for some decades now, in economics the idea is relatively
new and in part inspired by the recent financial crisis of 2007-2010 (Epstein
and Carrick-Hagenbarth 2010).
When groups are involved, however, the problem of responsibility can
become complicated because the concept of group responsibility or collective
responsibility is still a controversial one. Nonetheless, according to some
scholars, any discussion about groups, group deliberation, and group action
leads to the question of responsibility or culpability from the collective
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viewpoint. The idea that groups can act in concert to provide analysis and
evaluation of economic matters, as individuals do, makes them resemble
individual agents so closely that the problem of responsibility for these
“unusual agents” needs to be addressed.
The traditional idea of an agent is of something which is able to deliberate,
make a decision, and act accordingly; in virtue of that, an agent is also
open to blame for the actions taken or the consequences of such actions.
The question that arises when talking about group agents is then whether
groups are also subject to blame, when the consequences of their actions
are blameworthy, or deserving of praise otherwise. The need to settle this
question, according to Pettit (2007), derives from the fact that group agency
entails group responsibility.
The conditional ‘group agency ⊃ group responsibility’ implies that if a
group can deliberate, make a decision, and act accordingly — that is, to
most accounts, be considered akin to an agent — then it must be the case
that that group is also liable or praiseworthy for the consequences of its
actions. In this final chapter I will analyze Pettit and List’s account of group
agency, group responsibility, and the conditions for both. I will argue that
their account falls short of providing sufficient conditions for responsibility,
given the recognition of a group as an agent. In addition, I will suggest
an extension of their account, which makes use of the same tools for group
deliberation that were presented at the end of chapter 6.
7.2 Committees and moral responsibility
The concept of responsibility and accountability has become almost a tech-
nical term as applied more and more frequently to corporate bodies. Some
argue that corporate bodies such as governments, corporations, decision-
making and even advising committees should be held responsible for their
faults, and, correspondingly, deemed praiseworthy for their merits. Among
the several accounts that have been given on the topic, some argue that
corporate responsibility is a practical necessity (Coleman 1990), in order to
prevent corporate powers from doing harm in pursuit of their interest and
pressure them into producing welfare.
Others instead, argue that the idea of corporate responsibility is not
justified on pragmatic reasons, but rather that it comes from the analysis of
the design of the group agents themselves, which shows them to be akin to
individual agents, and thus open to the same (or similar) moral standards.
No incorporated agency, without incorporated responsibility.
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[. . . ] This, in a slogan, is the line I defend in this article.1
(Pettit 2007, 172)
According to this stance, individual agents are analogous to collective
ones, such that the same criteria for holding the former responsible apply
to the latter as well. Pettit (2004) and Pettit (2007) defend the argument
that corporate agents should be considered autonomous agents in their own
right, not reducible to the individuals composing them. Pettit (2007) and
List and Pettit (2011) develop on the same idea, identifying a set of three
features, found both in individual and in corporate agents, which justify an
attribution of moral responsibility. The aforementioned texts will be the
main references throughout this chapter. I will assume Pettit and List’s
stance on corporate agency and corporate responsibility, and develop on
their premises. Henceforth, I will refer to their account as the entailment
account, since, according to it, it is true that ‘agency ⊃ responsibility ’2.
In the following sections I will argue that Pettit and List’s account
on corporate responsibility does not fully capture the extent of conditions
that seem necessary to attribute moral responsibility to a group agent. In
other words, the slogan reported above does not hold in general: There
can be incorporated agency without incorporated responsibility, when the
incorporated agents are “ill-designed”; more on the meaning of that will
be said in the next sections. In addition to the three conditions that the
entailment account requires, I make the additional point that one needs
to say more about the design of corporate agents, and in particular about
their deliberative structure, in order to attribute them responsibility. I will
draw from the technical literature on expert deliberation in order to defend
the thesis that some deliberative procedures are more apt than others for
satisfying the conditions for moral responsibility given in Pettit (2007) and
List and Pettit (2011).
7.3 Philip Pettit: Group agency and group
responsibility
The term ‘collective responsibility’, or the equivalent ‘corporate responsi-
bility’, refers to the attribution of moral blame and moral responsibility
1For more references where a similar position is defended, see Pettit (2007, 172),
footnote 3.
2Pettit’s “slogan” (above) gives the contrapositive of my statement, that is
‘∼responsibility ⊃ ∼agency ’, the latter implies my ‘agency ⊃ responsibility ’; the proof is
trivial.
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to so-called group agents or corporate agents. Corporate agents are col-
lectivities of individuals that are so formed and designed as to possess the
characteristics that are normally attributed to “personal agents” (e.g. human
beings).
List and Pettit (2011) list a number of salient features which belong
to agents. An agent i) “has representational states that depict how things
are in the environment”, ii) “has motivational states that specify how it
requires things to be in the environment”, and iii) “has the capacity to
process its representational and motivational states, leading it to intervene
in the environment whenever that environment fails to match a motivating
specification.” (List and Pettit 2011, 8)
In other words, an agent can form internal states of how the world is
configured, has a certain “plan” for how the world should be, and, when the
plan and the state of the world do not match, is able to conjure strategies
for manipulating the world so to make it match with the plan. According to
Pettit and List, those are minimal conditions for agency. In the same work,
as well as in Pettit (2007), the authors give three conditions under which an
agent can be considered morally responsible for an action.
Pettit writes that an account of moral responsibility reflects the doctrine
of the Christian catechisms, whereby a deed constitutes serious sin if and
only if there has been “grave matter [. . . ], full knowledge of the guilt, and
full consent of the will.” (Pettit 2007, 174) The full explication of the three
conditions is given in the following3:
1. Value relevance. The group is an autonomous agent that
faces a significant choice between doing something good or
bad or right or wrong.
2. Value judgment. The group has the understanding and
the access to evidence required for making judgments about
the relative value of such options.
3. Value sensitivity. The group has the control required for
being able to choose between the options on the basis of its
judgments about their respective value.
(Pettit 2007, 175)
3It must be noted that the concept of responsibility comes as responsibility for and
responsibility to. We are responsible for something, but responsibility is also always
directed to something or most often someone, which can be a person, a group of people,
an institution and so on. In this chapter, as well as in Pettit and List’s work, the concept
of responsibility is only analyzed in terms of responsibility for.
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7.4 A caveat on Pettit’s account
Among the conditions that Pettit (2007) and List and Pettit (2011) list, in
order for a corporate agent to be held responsible, condition (2) is particularly
important, since it has to do not only with the group’s possession of a specific
characteristic, namely whether this “constitutes an autonomous agent” (first
condition), but rather with the precise way in which that characteristic is
implemented in the structure of the group. The following considerations will
clarify this point.
To iterate, condition (2) claims that a group is fit to be held responsible
if it “has the understanding and the access to evidence required for making
judgments about the relative value of [the moral option it faces]” (Pettit
2007, 177). A little further in the text, Pettit expands on that condition,
explaining how the group might gain understanding of the situation it faces
and access the evidence that will guide its moral decision. Understanding
and gathering of evidence, according to Pettit, might be done for example
by means of “a vote in the committee of the whole, a vote in an authorized
subgroup, or the determination of an appointed official”, in general by means
of some voting mechanism: “by means of a vote or something of the kind.”
(Pettit 2007, 187)
Because the mental states attributed to the group agents are dependent
on those of the individual agents composing it, the faculty of understanding
and access to evidence must be attributed in the first place to individuals. In
most groups individuals will most likely have access to different collections
of evidence and almost certainly the understanding of that evidence, be it
completely or just partially shared, will differ among them. This situation is a
typical one and, with a jargon that has become technical in the philosophical
literature, the group is said to be starting deliberation from a situation of
disagreement.
Solving disagreement therefore becomes the task the group is faced with,
when it is to assess a certain issue and to form the beliefs of the group as a
whole. If a group’s beliefs were simply the summation of individual beliefs,
then, under the initial conditions, viz. condition of disagreement, the group
would hold inconsistent sets of beliefs. Persistence of disagreement would
halt most functions of the group as an agent; for example, the capacity
to act according to a rational and coherent strategy. Pettit suggests that
deliberation and voting, or some similar aggregation procedure, can resolve
initial disagreement and thereby provide the initial requirements for the
fulfillment of condition (2).
While disagreement can in principle be resolved by deliberation and
voting, it is not clear that this alone can satisfy the requirements of condition
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(2). In the following sections I will provide some examples where deliberation
and voting are not enough to make the epistemic group agent in question
also a morally responsible agent. In particular, some ill-designed group
structures, even though they may fulfill the conditions for being a group
agent, may well fail to satisfy the responsibility condition as given by Pettit
and List.
7.5 An ideal example
Consider the following situation: A decision maker seeks recourse to an
especially appointed committee to provide evaluation and analysis of the
facts and problems concerning the subject matter that is object of delibera-
tion. Such committee is diversely composed, with experts from the various
disciplines involved. The committee produces research, discusses, and is
aware of the fact that a final and coherent message must in the end be
delivered to the policy maker.
It is expectable that, at the beginning of its works, the committee will
be divided on several sub-issues pertaining to the matter that is under delib-
eration; at least some of those issues will likely be logically interconnected
so that the conclusion (or conclusions) will depend on the premises or some
subsets of them4. However, in this example, the group does not use a decision
structure on “one level” only, as it is the case in most of Pettit’s deliberative
examples where the members deliberate and vote communally, and the
conclusion is reported directly as the outcome of the group deliberation.
Instead, in the imaginary committee considered here, the structure of
the group is multilayered, the bottom levels reporting to the ones further up
in the pyramid of power, and the top reporting to the policy maker. The
group can be thus said to be a “hierarchical” one, or “multilayered” (the
terms will be used interchangeably here). Such composition of the group is
intuitively a realistic one (more on this in section 7.7), and the first question
to answer is whether a so formed committee could fulfill the conditions for
agency. It will be useful here to recall the conditions for agency given in
List and Pettit (2011), whereby an agent should posses all of the following
three features.
• First feature. [An agent] has representational states that
depict how things are in the environment.
4As in Pettit’s Deliberative Dilemma cases, the opinion of the group can thus end up
being significantly independent from the opinion of its members (see Pettit 2004); in the
same text, see also the justification for the thesis that the attitudes (beliefs, preferences,
etc.) of groups supervene on the mere aggregate of the attitudes of their members.
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• Second feature. [An agent] has motivational states that
specify how it requires things to be in the environment.
• Third feature. [An agent] has the capacity to process
its representational and motivational states, leading it to
intervene in the environment whenever that environment
fails to match a motivating specification.
(List and Pettit 2011, 8)
In order to see whether a group with a hierarchical structure, as the
one introduced in this section, can be an epistemic agent of the type Pettit
and List have in mind, it will be useful to think of what difference such
structure could possibly make, for the fulfillment of the three features, from
a non-hierarchical one.
In the first place, a hierarchical group should be able to have represen-
tational states and motivational states just as a the deliberative groups
depicted in List and Pettit (2011). For that, it should be noted that the
representations of a layered group are just the same as those of Pettit and
List’s groups: they are grounded on the individual psychological representa-
tions, and possibly transmitted from agent to agent across the group. As in
Pettit and List, there is no ontological claim here as to what exactly such
representations may be (see List and Pettit 2011, 10); all definitions are
functional ones, that is, any object that can serve as a representation is
considered as one.
Similar remarks can be made for the presence of motivational states,
although a caveat is due here. It may be argued that, in a hierarchical
structure, the bottom layers of a group have different motivational states
from those of the top layers because at different levels of a hierarchy the
motivations guiding action might change.
To respond to that, it should be noted that the problem does not concern
multilayered structures alone: A certain subset of individuals, in one of
the groups that are exemplary in Pettit and List, could have motivations
which differ from the ones of another subset of that same group. If that
were the case, one could argue whether the agent has coherent motivational
states at all, and therefore whether it can be taken as an agent in the first
place. But the problem is not specific of the type of hierarchical groups
I introduced above. Therefore, provided that one can identify a group’s
motivational states, the particular structure (hierarchical or not) should not
make a difference.
The third feature of group agents (see above), ought to guarantee that
groups can act in the environment surrounding them in order to match their
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representations with their goals (motivational states). A hierarchical group
might function differently from other types of groups, as the “executive
power” is not shared homogeneously. As in the comments to the second
feature, however, the same is true for groups where the composition is not
multilayered, and this particular feature should not be problematic for the
fulfillment of the agency conditions.
The foregoing comments were not meant to provide a definite statement
on the possibility for hierarchical groups to perform as agents. The claim
that no hierarchical structures can be agents would have to find an essential
feature of such structures that is incompatible with agents in the sense
of Pettit (2004), Pettit (2007), and List and Pettit (2011). The burden
of proof in that case is on the opposer of the view defended here. The
comments above were instead meant to show that there are no obvious
features that make a hierarchical structure incompatible with group agency.
That should have served the purpose. In the next sections I will proceed with
the argument stated at the beginning of this section, that some hierarchical
structures, though meeting the demands for agency, might fail to meet the
demands for moral responsibility.
7.6 The responsibility requirement
The pyramidal structure of the group described in section 7.5 implies that
the message informing the policy maker (the transmission of which can be
considered the action that the group, as an agent, performs) is delivered to
the policy makers by the top layer alone. While it is not possible to claim
that the message formed at the top is independent of the rest of the group,
because it is the product of the group agent as a whole, I will argue that a
multilayered group does not meet condition (2) for moral responsibility.
The hierarchical structure described above is ill-designated because the
group does not have “understanding and access to the evidence required
for making judgments”5 (Pettit 2007, 175). To be more precise, access to
evidence is different at each layer, unless there is a mechanism of transmis-
sion for evidence across the layers. This latter condition, however, is not
guaranteed by either a voting or a deliberation procedure, as I will argue in
the rest of this section and in the following ones.
In general, while the hierarchical group described above satisfies the
conditions for agency, its composition and chain-of-command do not make it
5It can be argued that the group does not have “the control required for being able
to choose between the options” (Pettit 2007, 175) either, but this problem will not be
addressed here.
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able to function as a responsible agent, that is, one which evaluates evidence,
forms judgments, and chooses among a number of options. Whereas in groups
with one layer it is easier to argue that the evidence has been transmitted
in the deliberative phase, the options have been laid out in front of the
members, and the group has thus acted in communion of its members, that
is not the case for the type of groups discussed in this and the previous
sections.
To stress the previous point, it seems possible to imagine cases in which
a certain judgment or action is formed as the product of the group (and
specifically what we would consider a group agent), and yet the structure of
that group is such that the ultimate responsibility for its judgment or action
cannot be ascribed to the group as a whole. Suppose, for instance, that the
group is compartmentalized (as many real world groups and institutions
are), and that different layers of the group have different agendas. If so, the
group would still fulfill the conditions for agency without fulfilling those for
responsibility.
The reason for that is that in a compartmentalized group, only the
agendas of the top layers are the basis on which decisions are taken (or
policy suggested); and that is because the understanding of the goals of the
group, the ability to access all evidence, and the control on the information
transmitted, all belong only to the top layer (or layers). Nonetheless, the
group can still be called a group agent because it fulfills the conditions for
group agency outlined in section 7.3 (conditions i, ii, iii).
The consideration from the fictional scenario described in this section
suggest that not all decision making configurations make a group fit to be
held responsible, even when intuitively we would claim that the group is
an autonomous agent. Those considerations, however, are at this stage still
hypothetical. Evaluation of whether a group satisfies any of the conditions
above cannot be abstracted from the empirical analysis of the specific group
in question. One can advocate the possible existence of a group which
satisfies conditions for agency and fails to meet conditions for responsibility,
but while this might be a logical problem for Pettit and List’s account, it is
not at the logical level that such argument is an interesting one. For those
reasons, the next section will give some concrete historical examples where
it is possible to see the difference between group agents that can and cannot
be also held morally responsible for their actions.
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7.7 Historical examples
In this section, without pretense of historical accuracy, I will give two concrete
scenarios where the considerations of the foregoing sections find application.
The first example is one of an ill-designed group structure, where, despite
the group being an agent according to Pettit and List’s conditions for group
agency, it cannot be claimed that the group was responsible for the decision
taken as a consequence of its deliberation. The second example will serve
as a contrast to the first one, and will present a case in which the group
agent in question fulfills both the conditions for agency and those for moral
responsibility.
7.7.1 The decision to use the atomic bomb
The decision to use atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
as the very final act of WW2, was preceded by a long and intricate evaluation
& decision process by the so called Interim Committee. The committee was
especially set up to analyze the costs and opportunities of using nuclear
weapons against Japan, and to formulate advice on the issue directly to
president Truman. A look at one of the major historical sources on that
decision process (see Alperovitz 1996) shows that the decision group was
not homogenous. In particular, there were at least three layers that clearly
influenced Truman’s final decision: a group of four scientists from the
Manhattan Project (not officially members of the Interim Committee but
providers of advice to it), the Interim Committee itself, and a member of
the committee, James F. Byrnes, who had direct influence and access to
Truman’s inner circle of advisors.
The structure of the interim committee was a hierarchical one. The
reasons why Byrnes was not at the same level of the other members of
the committee are thoroughly explored in Alperovitz (1996), where it is
argued that any piece of advice coming from the committee was in large
part influenced by its most influential member, who had direct access to
the president. The analysis of the decision making process that led to the
use of the atomic bomb, points to the conclusion that such decision was not
the product of one man (which in that case would have likely been Byrnes
himself), because no such decision could have been taken without the intense
discussion and reporting from the scientific advisors and the other members
of the committee. The group, in this sense, can be considered an agent
because it was operating as one, fulfilling conditions (1) to (3) in section 7.2.
Nonetheless, it seems clear that the final opinion had been largely influ-
enced by Byrnes’ agenda, and the agenda of the political group it represented
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(distinct from the Interim Committee), which had independent reasons, other
than the termination of the conflict with Japan, for using atomic bombs
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Alperovitz (1996) attributes the ‘historical
responsibility’ to Byrnes and the political agenda he represented for the
information provided to Truman, which led to the final decision on the use
of the bomb, even though the support of information and analysis that led
to the decision was the product of the Interim Committee as a group agent,
in Pettit and List’s sense.
Alperovitz’s analysis, like any historical analysis, is in principle open to
objections and criticisms, but that does not undermine the claims made
in this section. If the analysis in Alperovitz (1996) is correct, then the
case is one in which a group (the Interim Committee) is an agent, yet
the responsibility of the actions it produced (namely, the formulation and
transmission of information to the president) cannot truly be attributed to
the group as a whole.
The Interim Committee, while fulfilling the conditions for agency, was
not able, as a group, to access all evidence. In particular, it could not
evaluate the evidence on the basis of the agenda that only Byrnes (among
the components of the group) had in mind6. This is because there was no
sharing of information from the top layers down, whereas there clearly was
a lot of communication from the bottom layers up.
Most members of the Interim Committee, then, even though they were
in fact acting as a group together with Byrnes, the “prominent” member,
could not be deemed responsible for selecting and filtering the information
that was passed on to the decision makers, and ultimately the president. It
is in that sense that the Interim Committee, while on one hand acting as
a group agent, is not responsible for the decision taken in the case of the
atomic bomb.
The next example will serve as a contrast to the example of the Interim
Committee. The claim I will defend is that in the next example the decision
process was structurally different from the case analyzed above, and was
such that the moral responsibility of the action taken should be rightfully
placed on the group as a whole.
7.7.2 The UN Security Council and Resolution 1441
In 2001 intense pressure from United States and the George W. Bush
administration opened the case for a possible military intervention in Iraq,
6Byrnes’s agenda, according to Alperovitz (1996), included the display of extraordi-
nary force to the world and especially the Russians, as the signs of a possible incumbent
East-West conflict were already in sight before the end of the war.
144 CHAPTER 7. RESPONSIBILITY INCORPORATED
in order to eliminate Saddam Hussein’s regime. The case was brought to
the UN Security Council, backed by the Bush administration which built
a case against the regime, claiming it was developing WMDs (weapons of
mass destruction).
Regardless of the truthfulness of those allegations, it is important to
understand how the case was built, and what the decision making process
involved. The case against Iraq culminated with the unanimous support of
the UN Security Council to Resolution 1441, which gave the Iraqi regime an
ultimatum for compliance with previous resolutions mandating inspections
of Iraqi military sites and disposal of all WMDs. The aftermath of Reso-
lution 1441 is known, as well as the allegations that the USA and the UK
overrode the terms of the resolution, waging war on Iraq upon its alleged
non-compliance with the terms of the ultimatum.
In this case, the question I want to highlight is not about the responsibility
for the conflict itself, but rather whether the Council was responsible for
passing the resolution, which gave the US and the UK an opportunity for
waging war under the UN umbrella. Like in the case of the decision to use
the atomic bomb, the group that was delegated to discuss and vote on the
resolution seems to fulfill the conditions for qualifying as an autonomous
agent. The UN Security Council is a highly structured group with precise
decision making procedures, it deliberates and votes on issues whose logical
structure may well open the group to deliberative dilemmas of the type that
Pettit uses to make his case for the autonomy of certain group agents.
Unlike the Interim Committee, however, the Council is not organized
in a multi-layered structure. Concerning Resolution 1441, all the Council’s
members had access to the evidence, and the deliberation process and final
resolution were conducted “communally”, that is, with all the members
accessing the same evidence, and deliberating over the same official agendas.
To be sure, this is not to say that the evidence presented by the US was
“good evidence”. This is also not to say that there were not hidden agendas
guiding the individual votes by each member of the council. But clearly the
deliberation, voting and decision making processes for passing Resolution
1441 was transversal and transparent. If the works of the Council were made
in light of wrong or constructed evidence, or guided by hidden agendas, that
would not be a problem for the claim that the responsibility of Resolution
1441 falls, historically, on the council itself and not on some or only one of
its members.
To be even more precise, the case may be compared to a jury deliberating
and voting over a legal case. The evidence may be tainted and the accusations
may be ill-motivated, but the jury is responsible for the verdict itself, at least
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according to the conditions for responsibility formulated by Pettit and List.
The responsibility for tainting evidence, withholding it, or similar morally
condemnable actions, should be independent from the responsibility for the
decision itself. In the UN Resolution 1441 case, given the evidence and the
deliberation that occurred, it was the Security Council that took the decision
and that should be responsible for it. On the other hand, for the Interim
Committee case, had the committee had a homogeneous and transparent
structure, one can easily argue from the analysis in Alperovitz (1996) that
the conclusions it would have arrived at, and which were transmitted to
Truman, would have been different.
7.7.3 Preliminary conclusions
To conclude section 7.7, it is evident that the claim according to which
there can be no incorporated agency without incorporated responsibility
(see Pettit 2007, 172) is in need of specification. The claim has a rationale,
but perhaps only in those cases in which the group agent gains autonomy
in virtue of specific features that make it fulfill conditions (2) in “a proper
way”, in addition to the fulfillment of condition (1) and (3). In particular,
transmission of information and transversal access to evidence across the
group are required.
In List and Pettit (2011), the authors envisage the possibility of group
agents formation “without joint intention”: “Individuals may combine into
group agents in two very different ways, depending on whether or not joint
intention is involved.” (see List and Pettit 2011, 24). The claim, motivated
with examples in this section, is that whenever a group forms without joint
intention, and this may be due, like in the case of the Interim Committee,
to the lack of a transparent decision procedure, then the group may fulfill
condition (1) on group agency yet fail to fulfill condition (2).
Despite the above criticisms, I think that the conditions for moral re-
sponsibility in Pettit (2007) and List and Pettit (2011) should not be
rejected altogether, nor should it be rejected the claim that incorporated
agency implies incorporated responsibility. The conditions seem justified by
strong independent reasons which make it hard to reject them as a whole7,
and the latter claim seems to capture a notion that is both intuitive and
pragmatically useful. It is intuitive because it seems natural to link agency
with responsibility, and it is pragmatically useful in virtue of the consider-
ations the two authors make, about the opportunity of considering agents
7The details are given in full in the two texts referred to throughout this work (Pettit
2007; List and Pettit 2011).
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responsible for their actions8.
For the reasons just stated, the entailment account (see section 7.2)
should not to be scrapped. In the following sections, I will illustrate how the
problem of the composition of the group, and the possibility that such group
may not fulfill all conditions for moral responsibility, can be resolved leaving
substantially intact all of Pettit’s conditions, but adding some important
appendices to condition (2).
7.8 Decision making in group agents
The question to be answered in this and the foregoing sections is which
deliberation procedures are more apt to meet the demands that condition
(2) imposes on groups, in order for them to be open to moral blame or praise.
To recall, the main desiderata arising from that condition are the following:
a) A group agent should be able to understand value judgments about
options (Pettit 2007, 185).
b) A group agent should be able to access evidence on the relative value of
the options it faces in a certain choice (Pettit 2007, 185).
7.8.1 Deliberation, voting and condition (2)
It should be clear from the examples given in the previous sections that
some group structures are not fit to meet the demands of condition (2).
The problem, however, runs deeper than those two examples. We can ask
whether an institution that uses, for example, majority voting is able to
fulfill those demands. Or else, we can ask whether a group that deliberates
with an open discussion on the issues it faces, before voting, is so able.
Both voting and deliberation are open to failure, with respect to the
fulfillment of condition (2). In voting, evidence is analyzed privately and
only the conclusions drawn from a private assessment of the problem are
expressed in the vote. That, however, seems to contrast with the natural
interpretation of point (b) at the beginning of this section; if evidence is a
purely private matter, it is not the group that is “able to assess evidence
on the relative . . . ”, as point (b) requires. The natural interpretation of
8Such reasons are explained as reasons of deterrence and reasons of development (see
Pettit 2007, 175-176). More precisely, agents (group agents included) are and ought to be
held responsible both in order to prevent them from acting regardless of the consequences
of their actions, and in order to educate them to the principles of “self-awareness” and
“self-regulation”.
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condition (b) seems to be that the group be able to assess evidence as a
group, albeit perhaps only imperfectly.
Moreover, it does not seem that with voting alone the group as such
is able to understand the value judgments about the options it faces. As
before, if such understanding is a purely private matter, it is not the group
itself that is in possession of such understanding. Some individuals of the
group may have in mind a number of moral options and understand them
in a certain (private) way. Others might have access to other options, or the
same options but with a different understanding of them. The preparation
of the agenda itself, on which the members of the group are called to vote,
seems to be an essential part of the fulfillment of desiderata (a) and (b)
above.
Similar considerations can be made for open discussion and deliberation.
Part of the problems with deliberation were already presented in the dis-
cussion of the Interim Committee example above. In this context, I should
add that, in general, the model of unstructured deliberation is open to a
large number of biases and group dynamics which can in principle, and in
practice, make the group unable to satisfy conditions (a) and (b) above.
Free deliberation does not guarantee that the evidence is shared equally
by the members of the group, nor that an effort is made to make sure
that the members are aligned on the understanding of such options. While
complete sharing and alignment might seem a very ideal situation, more
can be done in structured deliberation towards the fulfillment of those goals.
The contrast here is between free and unstructured deliberation and voting,
and a number of mechanisms that committees can put in place to structure
the deliberation and voting process. The next section will be devoted to
explaining the idea of structured deliberation.
7.8.2 Structured deliberation and condition (2)
In this section I will present a framework for deliberation and voting which,
although perhaps still imperfectly, goes towards the direction of fulfilling
condition (2) and its sub-conditions (a) and (b). The underlying idea is to
regulate the processes of deliberation and subsequent voting in such a way
that, in the first place the members of the group are given the opportunity
to align themselves on a common understanding of the values at stake, and
secondly, that the initial information is shared among the members.
The following considerations are taken from a vast literature on expert
deliberation and group management. In the 1960s and 70s two prominent
methods were developed in order to resolve some of the issues that committees
and expert groups ran into, when open and free discussion and subsequent
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voting was adopted. Those methods are the Delphi and the Nominal Group
Technique (NGT, henceforth). The problems they tried to tackle were mostly
group biases9 arising from the dynamics that free and unstructured group
discussion generated.
The goal of structured deliberation is to organize the process with which
members of a group discuss the items in their agenda, and come to a
consensual stance that will be the group’s stance.
• Feature 1. Structured deliberative methods allow the members an
independent assessment of the evidence, free (at least ideally) from
biases and group dynamics.
Structured methods ought to maximize the contribution of individuals to
the group analysis and evaluation of the items in the agenda. For example,
giving members time to analyze the issues in private should avoid that the
influence of group pressure take over the individuals psychologies. The
risk of that happening is recognized in Pettit (2004), where the author
wants to exclude the possibility that the group take over the individual
agents in the context of “how natural and institutional persons relate to
one another within the psychology of a given member.”(Pettit 2004, 189)
According to Pettit, a model by which the institution takes over the natural
person (the individual agents) “is clearly crazy, suggesting that persons
take over psychologies in the way demons are said to assume possession of
souls.”(Pettit 2004, 189).
Nonetheless, the possibility is not excluded from being realized, if unstruc-
tured discussion is allowed in the group, with no constraints, for example, on
how much influence a specific member is allowed to exert on the group, or
how personal evaluation and public disclosure should be separated in time,
and so on. Conversely, structured discussion makes sure that the contribu-
tion of the individual is not overshadowed by the influence of the group or
its most fervent members. Epistemically, the combination of independent
assessments in a committee is normally valued more highly than when the
judgments are dependent on one another, or conditioned by peer pressure.
Similarly, a biased deliberation structure will put the weight of responsibility
more on one individual (or a number of them) rather than the group as a
whole.
9Here ‘biases’ should not be understood in the narrow sense in which the literature
on decision making understands it; according to that literature, biases are mostly failures
in judgment (see Kahneman 1982; Cooke 1991). The term ‘bias’ is used here in a less
technical sense, for example, if a certain piece of evidence is available to only a member of
the group, the group is biased because its judgment is based on incomplete information,
and thus epistemically weaker than if the group had access to more information.
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• Feature 2. Structured deliberative methods allow the evidence pro-
duced at the individual level to be transmitted across all the members
of the group.
In unstructured deliberation, and when the group is not homogeneous (as
in the Interim Committee case), information is not guaranteed to pass from
member to member, and across different layers of the group. As discussed in
section 7.8.1, voting is a clear example of that phenomenon, where all that
is passed to the group are the result of the vote, not the reasons, which are
intuitively the main carrier of evidential force for the group. Similarly, in
hierarchical groups, deliberation can be filtered in such a way that it only
selectively passes up to the top or to whichever subsection of the group is
designated to take action.
While the requirement to “filter” information is a necessary one when the
total amount of information is too large, and cannot possibly pass through
every individual member of the group, the mode in which such filtering is
done bears on the consequent evaluation of the moral responsibilities that
should be attached to the group. If the information is filtered on the basis
of reasons and agendas external to the those of the group (as it was the case
of James F. Byrnes and the Interim Committee), the group, according to
what was said in section 7.6, cannot be held responsible for the use that
is made of that information. To recall, this is because the group has not
fulfilled condition (b).
In order to avoid the aforementioned problems, structured deliberation as
in Delphi and NGT promotes the exchange and transmission of information.
In addition, independent institutions (e.g. moderators) are put in place
when filtering is necessary. For example, in Delphi the moderator can, if she
sees fit, decide not to transmit in full the reasons provided by individual
members in support of their assessment, and provide a summary instead.
In NGT, where the group can be split into layers to form a hierarchy, it
is nonetheless made sure by the structure of the deliberative process that
information is transmitted across the layers (in the technical terminology of
NGT called “phases” (Delbecq and Van de Ven 1971, 46910)).
7.9 Conclusion
It is clear that the conditions provided in the previous section still run
the risk of producing ill-designed deliberative groups, for which, while the
deliberation can be said to be a product of the group, the responsibility for
10The passages from phase to phase are explained throughout the paper.
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the actions taken cannot be attributed to the group as a whole. In other
words, it would be too bold to claim that the issues related to the attribution
of corporate responsibility are resolved entirely by structured deliberation,
in addition to Pettit and List’s conditions for moral responsibility. Like
condition (2), structured deliberation can also fall short of providing sufficient
requirements to avoid the type of situations exemplified by the Interim
Committee example. The attempt in this chapter, however, was not to
provide sufficient conditions, but rather a number of conditions that are
necessary in order to hold a group agent accountable for its actions.
Extensions of the methods presented in this chapter are highly desirable.
In the first place, better specifications of how structured deliberation is
to be carried out are partly available in the literature, and partly in need
of extension. Due to the largely empirical nature of such deliberative
prescriptions, different specifications will serve different purposes and fit
a particular situation better than others. This work is mostly concerned
with the technical development of deliberative methods, based on principles
and observations from the psychological, philosophical and decision making
literature.
Secondly, it is clear that a full specification of how a group should
deliberate will also be dependent on political and social factors. This
however, seems to be a task for a different approach to the problem, which
is not the one that was taken in this chapter. The Delphi method and
the Nominal Group Technique were originally developed for technology
forecasting and policy or industrial planning, but their potential goes beyond
the original intentions. Such potential has in great part yet to be explored.
Of Delphi, Eto (2003) writes that “it is also suitable if there is the (political)
attempt to involve many persons in [decision making] processes” (Cuhls
2003, 97, quoted from Eto (2003)) and it is clear that similar potentials
exist for NGT as well. It is the task of further exploratory work to develop
those and other techniques in order to make them suitable for the different
contexts in which group deliberation is needed.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This thesis started off by posing three queries about disagreement in small
committees, about the process of resolving such disagreement and reaching
a consensus, and about the assessment of responsibility for the work of such
committees.
Query 1 dealt with the problem of whether we can reach a consensus,
or at least rationally change our beliefs and move closer to the disagreeing
parties’ opinions, by recognizing a situation of disagreement and its rational
implications. The conclusion to that question was negative. Both Bayesian
and linear methods are not rational methods for updating on disagreement
because they do not provide an acceptable procedure for updating in the
light of disagreement.
A more tentative conclusion is that disagreement does not constitute
evidence in itself, as instead part of the literature seems to claim. As stated
in chapter 3, the fact that neither linear nor Bayesian methods provide a
rational procedure for changing one’s beliefs in a situation of disagreement
gives quite some ground for the claim that disagreement is not evidence, even
though other methods for updating on disagreement could be, in principle,
available.
The arguments given in the first half of the thesis bear on much of the
literature on disagreement and consensus. In particular, if the arguments
are correct, they show that disagreement is not resolved into a consensus by
the formal methods presented in the first part of the thesis. More often, one
must consider such formal solutions as compromises, that is as bargaining
solutions, where we agree to do something (taking a statement for true),
without agreeing on what the content of the compromise is. While reaching
a consensus would constitute a net improvement of the group over the initial
situation of disagreement, I argued here that such improvements do not
occur as frequently as several consensus models advocate.
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To conclude about chapters 2 and 3, I argued that resolving resilient
disagreement cannot result in a consensus, at least not in the internalist
sense of ‘consensus’ used in those chapters. An independent reason for
such claim is the intuition that all I come to know when I discover I am
disagreeing with someone on a factual matter is that either I or the other
person must be wrong. That alone, however, does not tell me anything
about the possible reasons as to why I may be wrong. If the disagreement is
irreducible, that is, it cannot be resolved by further analysis of the problem
in question, then rationality requires one to hold on to her own beliefs.
The idea of consensus in science does not imply the fact that all the
scientists have internalized and agreed upon the truth of the statements
that make up a certain consensus. In this sense, what is called a “scientific
consensus” in the literature can be the product of compromise, negotiation,
and only under special circumstances a truly consensual resolution.
Addressing query 2, I investigated the issue of how consensus, now in
the more liberal sense of “convergence” postulated in chapter 4, arises in a
specific context; for example the context of science, or a specific science. As
claimed in the introduction, here the choice had to fall, in part arbitrarily,
on some subject, and in chapters 5 and 6 the choice was to zoom in on the
field of economics. Specifically, query 2 was a normative question, and the
second part of the thesis investigates the problem of how we should evaluate
the acceptability of a certain consensus in economics.
Chapters 5 and 6 served the purpose of justifying reliance on economic
experts over reliance on the scientific ideal of a “science of economics” as
expressed in Friedman’s concept of “positive economics”. While I did not
challenge the point that there should, and can, be a science of economics, in
Friedman’s sense, I also argued that positive economics, as modeling and
testing of hypotheses, does not exhaust the domain of theoretical contribution
to understanding economic problems and manipulating the economic world.
On the one hand, there are cases in which positive economics simply
fails to give the right answer to an economic problem, for example because
the formulation of a certain model influences the environment itself that
the model purports to study. On the other hand, there are situations in
which it is in principle possible to build models of a certain phenomenon, but
the speed at which the system changes is so fast that resorting to expertise
can be practically more convenient, as experts and tacit knowledge tend to
respond more quickly to changes in the environment.
Chapters 5 and 6 defended the idea that expertise is still superior to the
utilization of mechanical methods, such as statistical analysis and modeling,
at least for those problems illustrated in sections 5.5.1, 5.5.2, and 5.5.3 of
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chapter 5. That conclusion, however, raised a number of issues related to
the shortcomings (biases) of expert judgment. Presence of biases and, in the
case of groups of experts, problems of aggregation, are the major critiques
normally brought against advocates of expertise over mechanical methods.
For that reason, it was argued that, when defending the use of expertise, one
needs to say something about the possible resolution of biases and mistakes
of judgment.
Indeed, in chapter 6 I put forth the idea of “modeling expertise”, by
means of the Delphi Method and the Nominal Group Technique. While
those two methods are only a partial solution to the problems affecting
expertise (in particular small committees of experts), they are a step forward
into thinking about the various issues that affect expert judgment, on which
economic consensus is (and should) be based. The natural extension of those
two proposals is a normative theory of consensus formation in economics, one
that takes into account a possibly broader range of problems, and provides a
number of rational decision-making procedures with which economic experts
can collectively develop the “economic toolbox” that economics should
furnish policy makers with.
Pretending to provide a short answer to query 2 is unrealistic, due to
the complexity of the problems that the query raises. Nonetheless, the goal
of chapters 5 and 6 was to indicate that any answer to that query will have
to look not only into the scientific method narrowly intended — application
of theory and verification, or modeling and testing — but more broadly into
other possible sources of evidence, such as expert judgment, and how to
bring those sources into a methodology of economics. A possible direction
as to how to bring expert judgment into such a methodology was sketched,
albeit certainly only imperfectly, at the end of chapter 6.
It was observed, at the very beginning of the final chapter, that the idea
of taking expertise and expert judgment into a methodology of economics
brings up the problem of responsibility of the experts themselves. While the
issue of individual expert responsibility is well covered in the literature, the
same cannot be said for the concept of collective expert responsibility. But
if one is to defend the use of expert committees in economics, one should
also say something about the responsibility that is attached to the actions
of such committees.
The latter, at least, is the position taken in List and Pettit (2011),
who argue that any group possessing the features of a group agent should
also be held accountable for the actions it takes as an agent. In the final
part of the thesis, I accepted List and Pettit’s account of group agency, but
argued that their account falls short of providing sufficient reasons for group
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responsibility. Furthermore, I extended their account by means of those
same methods (Delphi and Nominal Groups) suggested in the preceding




In this appendix I present an extension of the Lehrer-Wagner model presented
in chapter 2; the extended version is in Lehrer and Wagner (1981, chapter 4).
The difference between the version of the model given in chapter 2 and the
extended version is that in the latter the matrix of weights is not identical
for all iterations of W k. Instead, the extended model is allowed to contain
different matrices at each step of the iteration process. Consensus, in this
model, obtains when function A.1 converges.
PC = W1 ·W2 · · · · ·Wn · P (A.1)
In A.1, the number n is the number of the nth matrix that is needed for
convergence, and at each step Wα, new weights wij are gathered among the
agents of the model. Clearly, the conditions for convergence of the extended
model are much stronger than for the original version; details are omitted
here and the interested reader can find them in Lehrer and Wagner (1981,
chapter 8: Convergence to Consensus: the Extended Model).
The underlying motivation for using different matrices at each step of
the iteration process is that the original model with a constant matrix W ,
runs the risk of appearing redundant because it uses the same information
(the measure of respect, or accuracy) contained in the weights wijs, over and
over again. Under most conditions, the Lehrer-Wagner model takes more
than one step to reach convergence, and at all steps the same matrix of
weights is used in the basic version of the model.
The extended version of the model, on the other hand, allows agents to
update the weights they assign to the other agents in the deliberating group.
The modification is meant to account for the idea that in the course of a
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deliberation process, while agents update their opinion at different stages of
such process, group members may change their opinion on their fellows and
wish to change the weights they assigned them.
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Delbecq, André and Andrew Van de Ven. 1971. ‘A Group Process Model
For Problem Identification and Program Planning.’ Journal of Applied
Behavioral Science 7(4):466-492.
DeMarzo, Peter M., Dimistri Vayanos and Jeffrey Zwiebel. 2003. ‘Persua-
sion Bias, Social Influence and Unidimensional Opinions.’ The Quarterly
Journal of Economics August: 909-968.
160 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dietrich, Franz and Christian List. 2010. ‘The Aggregation of Propositional
Attitudes: Towards a General Theory.’ In Oxford Studies in Epistemology
- Vol. 3 . Ed. Tamar Szabo Gendler. Oxford: Oxford University Press
(2010).
Dunn, Donald. 2004. Ponzi: The Incredible True Story of the King of
Financial Cons. New York: Broadway.
Earman, John and Wesley C. Salmon. 1999. ‘The Confirmation of Scientific
Hypotheses.’ In Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Ed. M. H.
Salmon et al. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company (1999).
Elga, Adam. 2007. ‘Reflection and Disagreement.’ Noûs 41(3):478-502.
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‘A Rational Consensus Model in Group Decision Making Using Linguistic
Assessments.’ Fuzzy Sets and System 88:31-49.
Hershey, Robert D. 1995. ‘Counting the Wealth of Nations; G.D.P.’s Accuracy
Is Under Attack From All Sides.’ The New York Times, December 19,
1995.
Hsu, Chia-Chien and Brian A. Sandford. 2007. ‘The Delphi Technique:
Making Sense of Consensus.’ Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation
12(10):1-8.
Hull, David. 1988. Science As a Process. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
164 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jackson, Matthew O. 2008. Social and Economic Networks. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Matthew O. Jackson and Benjamin Golub. 2007. ‘Näıve Learning in So-
cial Networks: Convergence, Influence and Wisdom of Crowds.’ Work-
ing Papers 64, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. Accessed July 21, 2011
http://www.bepress.com/feem/paper124.
Jehle, David and Branden Fitelson. 2010. ‘What is the “Equal Weight
View”?’ Episteme 6: 280-293. doi: 10.3366/E1742360009000719, ISSN
1742-3600.
Kahneman, Daniel. 1982. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 1998 [1787] Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Kelly, Thomas. 2005. ‘The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.’ In
Oxford Studies in Epistemology — Vol 1. Eds. John Hawthorne and Tamar
Gendler Szabo. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2010).
Kelly, Thomas. 2010. ‘Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.’ In
Disagreement . Eds. Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield. Oxford: Oxford
University Press (2010).
King, Nathan L. 2011. ‘Disagreement: What’s the Problem? or A Good
Peer is Hard to Find.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Early
View. Accessed July 13, 2011. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00441.x.
Kitcher, Philip. 1990. ‘The Division of Cognitive Labor.’ The Journal of
Philosophy 87(1):5-22.
Kuhn, Thomas. 1970 [1962] The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (Second
edition.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, Thomas. 2000. The Road Since Structure. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Lagueux, Maurice. 2008. ‘Are We Witnessing a Revolution in Methodology
of Economics? About Don Ross’s Recent Book on Microexplanation.’ The
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 1(1):24-55.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 165
Lam, Barry. 2007. ‘On the Rationality of Belief-Invariance in Light
of Peer Disagreement.’ (Unpublished manuscript.) Accessed July 22,
2011http://faculty.vassar.edu/balam/RationalityofBeliefInvariance.pdf.
Lehrer, Keith. 1976. ‘When Rational Disagreement is Impossible.’ Noûs
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Situations of disagreement are a very common occurrence, possibly even
the norm, in most types of human interaction. At the same time humans
spend a great deal of energy seeking to eliminate disagreement and reach
a consensus. From the most private kinds of interactions, e.g. a group of
friends planning to go to the movies, to the most difficult scenarios, like
global diplomacy, consensus is looked for among all classes and occupations:
politicians, physicians, businessmen, and also scientists.
This Ph.D. thesis deals with the problem of disagreement and consensus
from three different perspectives. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 analyze consensus and
disagreement from a formal perspective. Starting from one of the best-known
models for rational consensus, the Lehrer-Wagner model, I provide some
extensions and specifications of the model, arguing, however, that the model
provides only a general framework for aggregation, rather than the normative
notion of rational consensus originally sought by its proposers. Furthermore,
I argue that the formal methods for resolving epistemic disagreement, thus
including the Lehrer-Wagner model, are inadequate for answering the stan-
dard question of how it is that two (or more) epistemic peers can resolve
their disagreement on a specific (and quantifiable) subject matter.
In chapters 5 and 6 I look at the phenomena of disagreement and
consensus as occurring in the field of scientific investigation, in particular in
economics. In that context, I argue that consensus and disagreement have a
lot to do with the dynamics of expert judgment and deliberation occurring in
a specific scientific field. I further argue that the subject matter of economics
does not guaranteed the type of objectivity that is often attributed to its
method and that is often assumed to be present in other sciences, particularly
in the natural sciences. For that reason, the dynamics of expert judgement
and deliberation are all the more important for the quality of the output of
economics sciences, which for the purposes of this thesis is assumed to consist,
mostly, of policy-applicable knowledge. I investigate the literature on expert
judgment and deliberation and suggest a number of possible directions for
future research into how a thorough discussions of the problems related to
expertise can and should enter the field of economic methodology.
In the last section of the thesis, it is assumed that the formation of a
specific scientific consensus bears its fruits to society, whether in a positive
or negative way. When that happens, however, the promotors of consensus
become what in ethics are called “moral agents”, that is subjects open to
praise or blame and, in general, responsibility. In chapter 7 I discuss the
problem of responsibility in small committees, for example the committees
of experts referred to in the previous two chapters. While the topic is
not new, and a number of theories of corporate responsibility exist, the
chapter begins with a discussion of Pettit and List’s theory of group agency
and responsibility. Pettit (2007) argues that group agency implies group
responsibility. I discuss the three conditions the authors give for group
responsibility and argue that there are counterexamples to Pettit’s thesis.
Finally, I add two additional desiderata to Pettit and List’s conditions, and
argue why the addition is important for avoiding the type of counterexamples
I previously illustrated.
